Pissing off the company, whose systems you accessed without authorization, is one way of getting to experience the full force of the justice system.
How is this, specifically, fraud?
However, although you are free to walk around in search of the front door, you can't start eating the fruit off the trees. Perhaps that's the better analogy: the trees are happy to serve up a delicious treat for anyone requesting something of it, but that doesn't mean the tree sets the rules. Just because fences preventing this are popular doesn't make them compulsory.
But how does it become fraud?
Like, if you found a company badge laying around, go to that office and flash the badge to the security guard and go in. You've committed fraud by tricking the guard into thinking you're authorized to enter when you weren't.
No credentials involved here, though.
The same could be said about typing any URL that wasn't knowingly supplied to you by the owner, but a "reasonableness test" in court would sort those out from nefarious activity.
API documented on the website under a section called “For Developers”? Probably, yes. API reverse engineered by intercepting requests? Probably not.
Note that the blog was taken down before I could read it myself.
Though note that this would not help one if one started to use or abuse the API to get free food or cause financial damage to a restaurant through fake orders. For example, ordering the corn soup through the API could really backfire if someone wants to present it as good old fraud or theft, or if the recipient of the unexpected soup got into trouble and started to look for someone to hand the damages to.
By the definition that killed Aaron Swartz, it probably is.
> On July 11, 2011, he was indicted by a federal grand jury on charges of wire fraud, computer fraud, unlawfully obtaining information from a protected computer, and recklessly damaging a protected computer.
> On November 17, 2011, Swartz was indicted by a Middlesex County Superior Court grand jury on state charges of breaking and entering with intent, grand larceny, and unauthorized access to a computer network.
> On September 12, 2012, federal prosecutors filed a superseding indictment adding nine more felony counts, increasing Swartz's maximum criminal exposure to 50 years of imprisonment and $1 million in fines.
The only civil copyright proceedings were JSTOR settling with him out of court.
If any person without permission of the owner or any other person who is incharge of a computer, computer system or computer network
- (a) accesses or secures access to such computer, computer system or computer network or computer resource;
- (b) downloads, copies or extracts any data, computer data base or information from such computer, computer system or computer network including information or data held or stored in any removable storage medium;
[...]
- (e) disrupts or causes disruption of any computer, computer system or computer network;
[...]
- (g) provides any assistance to any person to facilitate access to a computer, computer system or computer network in contravention of the provisions of this Act, rules or regulations made thereunder;
If any person, dishonestly or fraudulently, does any act referred, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine which may extend to five lakh rupees or with both.
====
Though, I prefer a lot the poster of the blog post than the company...
Types of computer fraud include: * [...] * Accessing unauthorized computers * [...]
He accessed their computers to access purchase information of other people (e.g. his friend) and business data. I guess making it public, thereby damaging the companies reputation and potentially getting sued by their lawyers is one way to find out, whether he was "unauthorized" to do so.
Whether or not that seems reasonable to us is a different matter, but basically it boils down to the fact that "they left the door unlocked" doesn't make it legal to walk in.
I mean, come on! To treat this as a proper security vulnerability just gives too much leeway for these fast-and-loose businesses/systems. It will just encourage more such crap to proliferate.
I am with the author on this one, I am fairly certain the issue of this was raised internally already, probably multiple times. Fortunately for the business, their management did the right decision - focus on quick and easy features, security is a non-issue, we will just blame the hackers and have legal channels deal with them. I mean, you even have people here berating someone uncovering gross negligence for Google-backed company. Why would businesses bother with basic security when they can play the victim so damn easy?
Truth is even in the west this kind of irresponsible disclosure could land you in jail, much more so in a developing country where these laws are all relatively new.
The API being unauthd is clearly a core design choice, and finding out any customer or service data is openly accessible with consecutive numbers through that API is not a zero day or something.
There is no "responsible disclosure" to be made here, going to the company and explaining what's the issue with all of this amounts to "handing out free consulting" if anything
Secondly: can consumers be blamed for gross negligence? It's not reasonable for a bank to post account balances in public billboard and ask people not to look at others. We should contest when private data is available publically, hidden only by small obfuscations, not professional security practices.
Your example is flawed because in this case the private data was not made available publicly at all – you need to intentionally exploit a software flaw to access it.
Of course, it also matters how you handle it. If you do enough to just discover the flaw, try to adhere to the bug bounty program scope (if any), use your own accounts in testing and responsibly disclose any findings as soon as you have a poc then you'll probably be ok.
In this case the author went way beyond just finding the flaws, and then disclosed it publicly in a completely irresponsible way without even trying to contact the company or any of the clients affected by it (some of which will certainly have a security contact that can liaise with the vendor)
Maybe a better analogy is a bank with open lockers and no vigilance: if someone enters and steals money, the police will look for them, because "the coffers were open" is not a valid defense. But customers will also demand answers from the bank - why were they so negligent and incompetent that someone can just enter and get their money?
We should hold similar values for digital systems.
Was the author's intent on stealing private data and causing harm? Did he gain from this abuse? Did the company take enough measures to safeguard their data?
Companies have been mostly not held responsible for their fuck ups, and no matter the law, that's wrong to me.
The poster here has no proof that the vulnerability was already being exploited. For all we know, as obvious as this was, no one else had yet thought to look.
This is like going around people's house doors, testing to see if they are unlocked, and if they are, posting a big sign saying "unlocked door" on each one. It's obviously an anti-social act masquerading as benevolent, and it should be punished. Of course, the company running such highly vulnerable code should also be punished, but that doesn't absolve anyone.
Noticing an overhead pipe at McDonald's is dripping onto the griddle and pointing it out to people isn't harming the business, it's pointing out the business' gross negligence.
If you want, a more apt comparison might be going around a business park and sticking big signs on every unlocked archive door you find. The companies not properly locking the doors are at fault, and customer data may already have leaked; but, you are virtually guaranteeing that even more customer data will leak by doing this. It should absolutely be illegal.
We shouldn't limit ourselves to only be responsible and disclose properly when the vulnerability suits us.
That is both unfair and irrational.
At that scale, it would take years to get fixed without forcing it like this.
It's too small for them to care about the liability of security and too large to move quickly
But it also might not take years. The point of responsible disclosure is to give them the opportunity. If they don't take it, fine - that's now on them.
Instead this guy is committing fraud with actual financial damages (wasted food) and then sharing how others can commit the same fraud on a massive scale, potentially causing more damage. This is now on him and Dotpe, not Dotpe alone.
Is that legally true? The legal risk of having published this without responsible disclosure vanishes if the conventional period of opportunity is ignored? That smells fishy.
If you publish an exploit without at least making an attempt to fix it, and someone follows you and exploits it, then there's a direct moral line between you and that exploitation. They more likely than not wouldn't have exploited it without you putting that published info in their path. It's now on you, them and the company, morally. Any damages that result from this interaction are because you and the company enabled them to happen.
That's different to someone else stumbling on it and exploiting it. That's purely on the company and the exploiter.
But in responsible disclosure you usually give a 90 day notice period before publicly disclosing and "forcing" them.
There are pretty common ethical standards about disclosing vulnerabilities privately before disclosing them publicly. I don't see how the obviousness of the vulnerability changes the situation. By warning the company, you give them the opportunity to remedy the problem before announcing to the world that anyone with a laptop can exploit it. Probably they were just hoping that nobody would notice, which is stupid of course, but now they don't have the chance to build up a better wall before the flood of fake orders that could cause real harm to the small businesses whose financial information you disclosed online.
Perhaps I'm being too optimistic about how the company would respond, but I still think it's hard to justify not doing a private disclosure.