Re:CrowdStrike ex-employees: 'Quality control was not part o...
by tsimionescu on Saturday September 14, 2024 @02:21AM
(#41537866)
Not sure, but definitely more enterprisey than "release a patch to the entire world at once before running it on a single machine in-house".
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Re:CrowdStrike ex-employees: 'Quality control was not part o...
by mewpmewp2 on Saturday September 14, 2024 @06:39AM
(#41538870)
So it would be preferable to have your data encrypted, taken hostage unless you pay, and be down for days, instead of 6 hours of just down?
Re:CrowdStrike ex-employees: 'Quality control was not part o...
by xeromal on Saturday September 14, 2024 @11:37AM
(#41540496)
That's a false dichotomy
Re:CrowdStrike ex-employees: 'Quality control was not part o...
by tsimionescu on Saturday September 14, 2024 @01:12PM
(#41541135)
Do you seriously believe that all CrowdStrike on Windows customers were at such imminent risk of ransomware that one-two hours to run this on one internal setup and catch the critical error they released would have been dangerous?
This is a ludicrous position, and has been proven obviously false by the proceedings: all systems that were crashed by this critical failure were not, in fact, attacked with ransomware once the CS agent was un-installed (at great pain).
Re:CrowdStrike ex-employees: 'Quality control was not part o...
by hello_moto on Monday September 16, 2024 @01:34PM
(#41558440)
I'd challenge you to be a CISO :)
You don't want to be in a situation where you're taken hostage and asked hundred mills ransomeware just because you're too slow to mitigate the situation.