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Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Manuel_D on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @04:48PM (#41505349)
I'm not sure how a Tor exit node could operate legally. Tor is widely used for illegal activities. Like drug sales and CSE media. If a government goes on Tor, downloads such material they'll easily see the exit node as the last hop in the chain. It's a clear-cut case that the exit node operator facilitated illegal activity.

My assumption is that Germany has some sort of common-carrier privileges for Tor node operators. In America, telecoms can't be sued for facilitating illegal activity. But they do have to assist law enforcement with finding criminals when requested.

Would be happy to hear from someone who is more knowledgeable in this area.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Hizonner on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @04:49PM (#41505371)
> I'm not sure how a Tor exit node could operate legally. Tor is widely used for illegal activities.

How do ISPs operate legally? Every single thing that's ever been done over a Tor relay has crossed multiple ISPs.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by tensor on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @04:52PM (#41505396)
ISPs cooperate with law enforcement and often happily give out the information for people doing illegal things on their networks. I realize that operators of Tor exit nodes likely can't help track people on the Tor exit nodes, but I doubt law enforcement cares, they just see it as "not helping" while they see ISPs as "helping."
Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by varenc on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @05:00PM (#41505499)
The core question here is w whether law enforcement actually believes, incorrectly, that the exit node operators are being intentionally unhelpful, or if they understand that due to Tor’s design the exit node operators have no valuable information but the police continue to raid them anyway as a scare tactic.
Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by aniviacat on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @05:37PM (#41505868)
> The core question here is w whether law enforcement actually believes, incorrectly, that the exit node operators are being intentionally unhelpful

They could keep logs, but they choose not to. They are intentionally unhelpful.

The reason they aren't keeping logs is not for the privacy of others.

If I run an exit node, I know I am not reading the logs to garner personal information of others. And unless someone hacks my server and goes through the logs, which is extremely unlikely, noone else will read the logs either.

The only one reading the logs would be law enforcement.

By not keeping logs, you are intentionally hindering law enforcement.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by alasdair_ on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @06:35PM (#41506304)
>By not keeping logs, you are intentionally hindering law enforcement.

This is why I keep a diary indicating every single person I've ever interacted with, along with the date, time and place. It's a pain to do so and it takes up a lot of storage space and it makes people wary about interacting with me but I'd certainly never want to hinder law enforcement.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by aniviacat on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @07:19PM (#41506641)
Unless I'm misunderstanding your comment, you are arguing in bad faith.

It is not a "pain" to set up logging. Most non-tor proxies implement logging. It would be a completely reasonable task for the tor project to implement logging by default.

No one would be any more "wary" to interact with your tor node. Trusting your node not to log would be foolish anyway. So whether you make known that you are logging, or whether you claim not to log (but might secretly do anyway) doesn't make much of a difference.

The storage space a log takes up is negligible (unless you keep logs for unreasonably long times) on anything but the smallest systems. And since running a tor node takes quite a bit of processing power, you won't be running your node on a system that can't handle a few megabytes of logs.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by gretch on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @07:36PM (#41506740)
>It's a pain to do so and it takes up a lot of storage space

The perspective is that in order for these actions to be ethical, you must log the traffic, or you should not bother setting up the node. It's irresponsible to setup the node (which takes some amount of effort) but not do the precautionary part which makes it ethical.

You can believe otherwise if you'd like, but this is an ethical framework applied to many other parts of our society and it's the thing that sets you apart from the ISPs, and generally it's the thing accepted by the public at large.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by throwai on Wednesday September 11, 2024 @02:59AM (#41508743)
I'd like to make the argument that "we" believe otherwise.

It is legal to keep some logs for a limited amount of time if you run an IT service in Germany, mostly for the purpose of keeping the service running properly. If you have that data, you can give it to LE when they request it.

The thing accepted by the public at large is often codified within a country's laws. German laws generally do not require you to store logs if you are an ISP. Storing them for too long can even be unlawful. There is no so called Vorratsdatenspeicherung anymore, and it is a recurring topic of political debate. So at least in Germany, the public view on storing data is more complex, and people don't believe not storing data or reducing the amount of data stored is clearly immoral when running IT services. https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Datenvermeidung_und_Datenspars...

On another note, if LE requests you to log specific access patterns in advance, you might have to do it. If your ISP services are really big (lots of users), you might even have to provide some sort of interface for LE. IMO and under certain interpretations of the involved laws, the German state could ask every single node operator in Germany to log everything, but the political backlash would be quite high.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by numpad0 on Wednesday September 11, 2024 @03:07AM (#41508795)
This is why you enable location history for Google Maps. It had genuinely saved few honest people from false accusations.
Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by dmichulke on Wednesday September 11, 2024 @06:19AM (#41509913)
I'm stuck.

Please add /s or the links or both.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by numpad0 on Wednesday September 11, 2024 @10:02AM (#41511492)
Telescreen works both ways. That could come in handy if you truly have nothing to hide, or I suppose if what you are hiding must be within His tolerances.

  Chalmers sent a copy of his timeline to Premier Park Ltd, the company that charged him with  the crimes, and the defendant was able to prove his innocence. The charges against him were dropped.[1] 

  the lawyer met with the detective in order to show him screenshots of McCoy’s Google location history, including data recorded by RunKeeper. The maps showed months of bike rides past the burglarized home, NBC News reports.[2]
1: https://www.phonearena.com/news/google-maps-keeps-user-from-...

2: https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/03/10/google-data-puts-in...

3: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d-7o9xYp7eE

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by afh1 on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @06:48PM (#41506397)
Law enforcement is also about going after whistleblowers, journalists, or, in most countries, just ordinary citizens the current people in power don't like, even if no crime was committed.
Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by aniviacat on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @07:13PM (#41506588)
You seem to have misinterpreted my comment.

I was not making any moral judgement on people operating tor nodes.

I was simply stating that you are, in fact, hindering law enforcement if you set up a non-logging proxy for the purposes of hindering law enforcement.

Whether that's a good or a bad thing is up to you to decide. Clearly many people think it's a good thing; good enough to go through the efforts of setting up a proxy.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by MerManMaid on Thursday September 12, 2024 @07:12PM (#41526627)
Germany does not mandate that TOR end-node providers are expected to log their users. Saying that not logging someone who went through your end-node is intentionally hindering the police would be like accusing a shopkeeper of intentionally hindering the police because they didn't make of record of every person who entered their storefront.
Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by aniviacat on Saturday September 14, 2024 @06:41PM (#41543634)
Maybe.

I think it differs because tor is specifically created to protect against surveillance; both private surveillance and state surveillance (a.k.a. law enforcement).

If a shop was actively helping people avoid surveillance, I would expect them to actively assist law enforcement, too.

I find it perfectly reasonable to consider people who actively help a project which advertises on its website that it is being used to protect against state surveillance / law enforcement to be hindering law enforcement.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by sealeck on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @08:45PM (#41507125)
> They could keep logs, but they choose not to. They are intentionally unhelpful.

Some tech companies have extremely sophisticated observability which dumps huge volumes data about the internal state of a program. Some companies have very limited observability beyond maybe logging "we just served a request". Your argument suggests that companies who don't have the extensive logs of the former are being intentionally unhelpful?

There are lots of reasons to not keep logs – lack of storage space, additional economic cost of doing so, slower response times due to overhead of observability, etc.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by vfclists on Thursday September 12, 2024 @04:56PM (#41525477)
Are shopkeepers required to take down the name and keep a mugshot of everyone who visits their shop in order to help law enforcement? Are the proprietors of any building one might visit required to do so, including those with home security cameras?

You are implying that by not keeping records of all events you are involved with you are intentionally hindering law enforcement, implying that we are morally and legally bound to gather and retain information which helps law enforcement.

Does that make clearing browser history a deliberate attempt to hinder law enforcement?

Internet cafe's wipe the computers after every session. Is that intentionally hindering law enforcement?

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by aniviacat on Saturday September 14, 2024 @06:28PM (#41543555)
I think it's about whether the expectation to log is within reason. Though that is of course subjective.

The difference between your examples and logging proxy access is that logging proxy access is the standard behavior (for proxies which aren't tor).

Tor proxies deliberately decide to behave in a non-standard manner. And with what tor is about, it is clear that this is not for technical reasons but for hindering law enforcement.

I will claim that if the tor project did not openly intend to make government surveillance more difficult, it would have implemented logging long ago.

But that's just a claim, not a fact. Maybe I'm wrong.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by vfclists on Wednesday September 18, 2024 @10:02AM (#41579862)
>it is clear that this is not for technical reasons but for hindering law enforcement.

Aren't there valid reasons for people not to conceal or anonymize their communications, such as whistleblowers, journalists, or people needing to hide their communications from oppressive governments?

On the issue of clearing browser history are you aware that the FBI threatened a boy for clearing his browser history under laws intended for destruction of corporate documents and communications?

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by aniviacat on Wednesday September 18, 2024 @01:55PM (#41583251)
> Aren't there valid reasons for people not to conceal or anonymize their communications, such as whistleblowers, journalists, or people needing to hide their communications from oppressive governments?

Keeping logs doesn't help other goverments. Other governments cannot access your logs. Your government can access your logs. You are protecting them from your government. You may claim that your government is oppressive. But that doesn't change that you are hindering the enforcement of their (oppressive) laws.

Regarding the moral question: I agree that there are cases where hindering your own government's law enforcement may make sense.

Regarding tor, I mostly take issue with the concept of onion services. If you want to publish USA government secrets, you can publish them on Russian servers. If you want to publish Russian government secrets, you can publish them on American servers, etc. The sole purpose of onion services is to publish content which is illegal in every country on earth. I can't think of many good things that are ollegal in every country on earth.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by gwd on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @05:49PM (#41505964)
> incorrectly, that the exit node operators are being intentionally unhelpful

I mean, exit node operators are being intentionally unhelpful? They're intentionally helping people who don't want to be tracked. "I don't want to give you the papers" and "I can't give you the papers because I burned them so that I couldn't give them to anybody" are equivalent morally; the only difference is that the latter is irreversible.

There are good reasons to not want to be tracked, but there are also bad reasons to not want to be tracked. Exit node operators have chosen to help both. Police on the whole tend not to be the kinds of people who understand the "good reasons not to want to be tracked" thing.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by cesarb on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @06:26PM (#41506235)
> "I don't want to give you the papers" and "I can't give you the papers because I burned them so that I couldn't give them to anybody" are equivalent morally; the only difference is that the latter is irreversible.

There are other differences. One is after the fact, the other is a decision made before the fact; one is specific (rejecting that request in particular), the other is general (all requests of that type are guaranteed to be affected equally).

It's the same with, for instance, email retention policies. We accept that old messages are irrevocably deleted after X days, even when we require them to be produced once requested if they still exist.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by gwd on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @06:44PM (#41506368)
> It's the same with, for instance, email retention policies.

Indeed it is. The intention and moral purpose of email deletion policies is to reduce the risk of embarrassing or incriminating emails being turned up as part of a lawsuit or investigation -- in other words, to be unhelpful.

The legal justification for being unhelpful in both cases is that "this is just policy, we're treating everyone the same". That doesn't change the fact that in both cases the intent was to be unhelpful to investigators.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by gavindean90 on Wednesday September 11, 2024 @01:23AM (#41508242)
What if I just want to delete old information because it’s just noise now. My intent is to reduce my operational burden.

I have long retention policies for things and life cycles for others. Information shouldn’t be permanently available to me if it’s not relevant or it’s a waste of resources.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Hizonner on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @04:55PM (#41505436)
Courts, and even law enforcement, are actually smart enough to know that they have to enforce the laws as written and that they can't just act on their feels. At least most of the time. In many places.
Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by beaglesss on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @05:04PM (#41505550)
They can't say they're breaking the law but as long as they don't admit to wrongdoing they can accomplish the goal of picking up pretty much anyone for something..

It's best to assume the government is a hostile, rabid actor who will seize any reachable assets and your freedom at any point they wish and proceed accordingly.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by hnbad on Wednesday September 11, 2024 @04:02AM (#41509133)
FWIW this is more of a concern if you expect the case to go to court. In the US most "criminals" accept plea bargains without a court ever seeing the case. So statistically you can likely "act on your feels" as long as the suspect does not think they can prove you wrong in a court of law (whether it's because they're guilty, because they don't fully understand the law or because they can't afford the time and money involved in a court process).
Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Manuel_D on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @04:51PM (#41505381)
> How do ISPs operate legally?

I described exactly that in my second paragraph.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by RobRivera on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @04:59PM (#41505493)
What law mandates forced compliance outside subpoenas?
Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Manuel_D on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @05:05PM (#41505553)
Communications act of 1934, among others: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communications_Act_of_1934#Wir...
Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by RobRivera on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @05:53PM (#41505996)
Both the communication acts of 34 and 96(?) Do not require software operators to legally do what LEO tells them to do without subpoena.
Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Manuel_D on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @06:00PM (#41506060)
The question was about ISPs.
Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by RobRivera on Wednesday September 11, 2024 @02:18PM (#41513920)
You are quite literally telling me what question I asked.

How do you expect further fruitful dialogue?

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Hizonner on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @04:54PM (#41505419)
Tor relay operators are, as a rule, entirely willing to give law enforcement all the information they have about connections that have gone through their relays. They simply don't have any. And there's no legal requirement for them to have any.

... or at least there never was in the past. The new wave of stupid and extremely broad "duty of care" laws that try to apply to the design of any and every communication service may change that. But it hasn't been litigated anywhere.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Manuel_D on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @05:08PM (#41505585)
Whether or not the exit node operators retained logs is besides the point. These exit nodes are facilitating illegal activities, and it's trivial to prove. How do they not get arrested?

It sounds like Germany extends some sort of carrier protection to Tor exit node operators. E.g. if someone organizes a drug deal over the phone, Verizon is not liable. But Verizon does have to meet some minimum standards of records keeping and law enforcement assistance (wire tapping).

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by lokar on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @05:37PM (#41505867)
Lots of people and organizations facilitate crime. That’s not generally the legal standard. They typically must be proved to done so intentionally (or with reckless disregard)
Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by numpad0 on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @05:54PM (#41506006)
No, it is. There are more often specific laws that exempt platformers of liabilities on condition that they keep logs and cooperate with LE.

Perhaps the most famous example is DMCA: [Google] is exempt from liabilities for hosting pirated movies on [YouTube] by US laws, on condition that it's not actively involved with it and fully robotic with takedowns.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by golergka on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @06:41PM (#41506349)
If a criminal rode on a bus to place of the crime, is the bus driver automatically liable? Bus company? Is his phone company liable because he talked about his crimes on the phone?
Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by betaby on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @09:36PM (#41507355)
No. But legal system treats 'on the Internet' in a more harshly way.
Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by numpad0 on Wednesday September 11, 2024 @02:15AM (#41508509)
IANAL, but "legally"? Bus companies has code of conduct posted on the wall at their depot for its users to read and agree, or state law regulating public transportation, and it always says using it for crimes is against the law. Those clauses let drivers and companies frame themselves as victims to escape prosecutions, unless there's going to be gross negligence or sorts that override them.

It's not like courts treat popular businesses like buses and ISPs as sceneries just by gut feeling. There are always laws.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by codedokode on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @05:38PM (#41505878)
Does iMessage or WhatsApp has wire tapping feature? Are they "facilitating illegal activities"?
Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Manuel_D on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @05:50PM (#41505974)
If a government investigator joins a WhatsApp channel where loads of people are sharing CSE, WhatsApp will help the government find the people responsible. WhatsApp encrypts the content of the data, but they retain message logs and do cooperate with law enforcement. Presumably the same for iMessage.

This largely conforms with how the first telecoms received immunity for abuse of their services. They retain logs and assist the government with investigations, and in exchange they are shielded from liability. WhatsApp and iMessage would probably cooperate to the same extent, minus wire-tapping messages in transit (because they can't). That's vastly greater cooperation than a tor exit node operator that retains no logs.s

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by bawolff on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @05:02PM (#41505529)
The original post mentioned facilitation, which from what i understand is when you assist comitting a crime but have no secific knowledge of the crime.

I imagine for tor, the reason is that there are also good uses for tor. However i dont think "i intentionally know nothing" works as a defence in general.

Ianal

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Hizonner on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @05:15PM (#41505671)
I was answering something about assistance to law enforcement, which isn't the same issue as facilitation of crime.

"Facilitation" as an offense in itself is one of those things that tends to be a real thing, but varies a lot depending on the jurisdiction. In most places, most of the time, you're only going to get in trouble for facilitating crime if your service is especially set up to be unusually useful for crime. You're especially vulnerable if you specifically designed it for crime. If those things apply, then knowing it's being used for crime (but not necessarily on which specific occasions) can make it worse for you. Give or take, depending on where you live.

In the past, Tor nodes, even exit nodes, have mostly gotten a pass, at least in countries where most of them are located. They get raided all the time, but largely as cases of mistaken identity. That's probably because most Tor traffic has historically probably been people trying to hide from ad tracking or people worried about their perfectly legal activities being spied on. So it's hard to say the service is really aimed at illegal activity.

Things are tightening up worldwide, in statute and probably in case law, mostly because of Tor and other services possibly being swept in by standards primarily aimed at social media. We may start seeing Tor nodes targeted because Tor is now considered "too adapted to legal activity", or even because node operators are "not doing enough to prevent" illegal activity (including redesigning the system if necessary).

But until fairly recently that's been more what you'd expect to see in North Korea than what you'd expect to see in Germany (or the US).

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by codexb on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @06:25PM (#41506226)
You can make the same argument for developers of encryption. There are legitimate reasons for privacy. The fact that criminals want privacy, too, doesn't mean privacy should be illegal.
Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by mminer237 on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @08:09PM (#41506944)
The difference is that with Tor you are physically downloading CSAM and forwarding it on to the offender. With encryption you're just providing tools for them to hide material.
Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by ponorin on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @04:54PM (#41505417)
Exit node applies only to traffic that goes into a clearnet. You could to illegal stuff, but only tor users have protection and website owners are liable to raids should they allow illegal stuff to happen on their platforms.

With Tor Hidden Service there's no exit node as such since traffic terminates inside the Tor network. The networking route is doubly anonymized so both the server and the client can't track each other down.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Manuel_D on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @04:58PM (#41505477)
Perhaps I'm not understanding something. I'm imagining this scenario:

1. Bob is running a Tor exit node.

2. Charlie is a government official investigating illegal content (use your imagination)

3. Charlie downloads illegal content via Tor

4. This content is sent to Charlie from Bob's exit node.

5. Charlie observes that Bob's exit node sent him illegal content.

I understand that even if Bob is raided and his computer searched, they cannot find the website hosting the illegal content. But Charlie would know that Bob helped deliver the illegal content. Tor Hidden Service does not anonymize the exit node from the client.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by varenc on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @05:03PM (#41505536)
Your mixing up general Tor use vs Tor hidden services. With hidden services there’s not really an exit node because the traffic never exits the Tor network.

Charlie could only see the machine in the final step of requesting the illegal content it Charlie was hosting the hidden service themselves. These requests can come from many different Tor operators not just exit nodes.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Manuel_D on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @05:29PM (#41505789)
To be clear, Bob is not the host of the illegal content. Bob is just the second-to-last hop before the content reaches the end destination (Charlie). My understanding of the tor network is that it obfuscates traffic across many hops. The path content takes from the host to Charlie:

Host -> Node 1 -> Node 2 -> ... Bob -> Charlie

this obfuscates the Host from Charlie. But Charlie knows that Bob sent him illegal content. Yes, Bob didn't host the content. The host is obfuscated. But Bob is still delivering illegal content and Charlie knows it.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by aniviacat on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @05:48PM (#41505960)
Exit nodes are not the nodes that are directly facing tor users. Those nodes are called "Guard Relays".

Guard Relays usually don't have these issues, since you have to be somewhat technical to actively probe relays by requesting content through tor. And technical people know there isn't any point to rading an operator's home.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by fn-mote on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @08:50PM (#41507153)
> Bob is still delivering illegal content and Charlie knows it

Does BOB know they are delivering illegal content?

No... is it even possible to send unencrypted traffic by Tor? If it's even possible, Charlie must be the only person in the world doing it.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Manuel_D on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @10:12PM (#41507478)
> Does BOB know they are delivering illegal content?

He does when Charlie knocks on his door and informs him that he delivered CSE to him. Ignorance of the fact that one is breaking the law is rarely accepted as a defense. Carriers usually get this protection when when meet some standards of safeguards and cooperation with law enforcement.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Zak on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @11:12PM (#41507712)
Ignorance of the law is not generally accepted as a legal defense, but ignorance of facts is. Most crimes involve a mental state of knowledge or intent with respect to the wrongdoing, and an exit node operator does not know what users are accessing.

Taking the wrong jacket by mistake is not theft, and operating the exit node through which someone downloads CSAM is not criminal possession of CSAM or knowing facilitation thereof.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Manuel_D on Wednesday September 11, 2024 @01:37AM (#41508311)
Do you think drug mules get off scot-free when they say "I didn't know what was in that package"?
Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Zak on Wednesday September 11, 2024 @01:47AM (#41508357)
If the prosecutor can't convince the jury that they did know, yes.

That rarely happens in practice because prosecutors are usually pretty good at their jobs, and tend not to bring cases they can't prove.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Manuel_D on Wednesday September 11, 2024 @12:09PM (#41512714)
The prosecutor doesn't need to definitively prove that the mule knew he was transporting drugs. Only that a reasonable person should have known.

Back to our Tor example: if you've been repeatedly told by the government that your node is being used for illegal activity, it's hard to plead ignorance.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Zak on Wednesday September 11, 2024 @04:26PM (#41515067)
You've described the legal mental state of negligence, and it's true that some crimes use it. Some jurisdictions have "criminally negligent homicide" as a crime with a lower penalty than manslaughter (reckless homicide) for example.

A look at federal drug distribution statutes in the USA[0] shows the mental state used for most of the forbidden acts is "intentionally" or "knowingly". Other jurisdictions could have different laws, but in the USA, it does appear the prosecutor has to prove that a drug mule knew what they were doing.

Similarly, the federal statute in the USA criminalizing distribution and transmission of child pornography[1] says "knowingly". Someone operating an ISP, an internet router, a VPN, or an exit node has no obligation (and often no ability) to inspect the data they're transmitting to find out if it contains child pornography, and knowing that there's a certain probability a given amount of random traffic contains some does not trigger criminal liability because the operator does not know that any particular data is child pornography.

In another comment you mentioned that ISPs can aid law enforcement because they know details about their customers. They usually do for billing purposes, but in many jurisdictions they're not required to. There is not, to my knowledge a KYC law in the USA for providing internet service.

[0] https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/21/841

[1] https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2252A

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Manuel_D on Friday September 13, 2024 @01:28PM (#41533275)
Continuing to operate a Tor node after being informed by the government that it's being used for illegal activity means the operator did this "knowingly". It's even more egregious than a drug mule transporting an unmarked package:

Imagine the government tells the mule that their employer is shipping dugs in these packages, and the mule still tries to claim that they didn't know that they might be transporting drugs.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Zak on Friday September 13, 2024 @06:16PM (#41535707)
It's not enough in parts of the world usually considered free and democratic for an information services provider to know that some of the data they're transmitting might be illegal. If it was, everyone from ISPs to messaging apps to social media sites would be at risk. In the case of child pornography, most jurisdictions require them to report it if they discover it, but they are not required to actively attempt to discover it.

The EU Chatcontrol proposal seeks to change that in some cases (TOR exit nodes not among them), and most people here are vehemently opposed to it.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Vecr on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @05:06PM (#41505560)
Hidden service connections don't go through exit nodes. In theory it's two back-to-back Tor connection that meet somewhere in the network, but you can also think of it (possibly more correctly) as a six-hop Tor connection to an exit node that is only used to directly connect to the backend server. If set up right this prevents government sniffing at all points.
Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Manuel_D on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @05:14PM (#41505657)
The final recipient is going to be able to decrypt the content, right? Regardless of "hidden service connection" or "exit nodes". Charlie is the final recipient and will be able to decrypt the content and know that it's illegal content.

Is there some mechanism that prevents Charlie from knowing who sent the content to him? Fundamentally, you can't stop the government from sniffing at the endpoint. Because they're not really "sniffing" they're just requesting content like any normal Tor user.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Hizonner on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @05:19PM (#41505704)
> Is there some mechanism that prevents Charlie from knowing who sent the content to him?

That is, in fact, the whole point of Tor. In the hidden service case, neither end can identify the other.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Manuel_D on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @05:24PM (#41505739)
Sorry, in case I wasn't clear, I'm not talking about identifying the site hosting the content. I'm talking about the second-to-last hop in the traffic. My understanding is that Tor obfuscates traffic by sending through several hops, each one decrypting a layer of traffic (hence the "onion" network). So we have:

Host -> Node 1 -> Node 2 -> .... -> Bob -> Charlie.

Charlie doesn't know where the Host is. But Charlie does know that Bob sent him illegal content. Or is that final link, from Bob to Charlie, also obfuscated somehow? If so, how did OP get raided by police if he's supposed to be hidden?

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Hizonner on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @06:03PM (#41506085)
OK, so there are basically three cases:

1. Charlie is running a client and downloads something. In which case Bob is an entrance node, not an exit node, but it's essentially the same thing. Charlie does know that the next hop is Bob. Depending on whether the ultimate destination is a hidden service or on the clearnet, Charlie may or may not know who's running that service.

2. Charlie is running a hidden service, and somebody uploads something. Charlie knows that it came via Bob, but doesn't know where it came from.

3. Charlie is running a regular clearnet Web server, and somebody uploads something to Charlie via Bob's exit node. Again Charlie sees that the traffic comes from Bob.

In the first two cases, Charlie has to be actually running the Tor software, and knowingly using Tor. So Charlie also knows that (a) Bob is just a relay, (b) Bob doesn't actually host the content, (c) Bob doesn't handle more than a packet or two of the content at a time, and deletes those as soon as they've been relayed, (d) Bob doesn't know, and can't find out, what the content actually is, (e) Bob doesn't know, and can't find out, where the content originally came from, and (f) Bob is really unlikely to keep any record of the whole connection after the session is over, which means probably no more than 10 minutes or so.

If that's enough to go after Bob, then it's enough to go after Bob... but historically it hasn't been. Bob can reasonably claim not only that he doesn't know what that particular traffic was, but that, although he knows there's probably some illegal traffic, most of the traffic he relays is probably legal.

In the third case, it looks to Charlie like Bob is the ultimate user. Unless Charlie does some investigation, Charlie may go raid Bob. But Charlie should then find out all that other stuff.

I think the most common actual case is that Charlie is running a honey pot, either as a hidden service or on the clearnet, and somebody gets the content from Charlie via Bob. But the same basic ideas apply.

The main issue isn't that Charlie doesn't know what the content is, but that Bob doesn't.

[Oh, and on edit, just to be clear: In the first two cases, that "packet or two" that Bob may ephemerally buffer is encrypted so that Bob can't read it, nor can any other relay. In the third case, where Charlie is a clearnet service, the end user is usually still using TLS, so Bob still can't read it. And none of the non-exit relays can read it no matter what.]

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Manuel_D on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @06:16PM (#41506175)
> So Charlie also knows that (a) Bob is just a relay, (b) Bob doesn't actually host the content, (c) Bob doesn't handle more than a packet or two of the content at a time, and deletes those as soon as they've been relayed, (d) Bob doesn't know, and can't find out, what the content actually is, (e) Bob doesn't know, and can't find out, where the content originally came from, and (f) Bob is really unlikely to keep any record of the whole connection after the session is over, which means probably no more than 10 minutes or so.?

But at the end of the day Charlie, the government agent, is catching Bob in the act of delivering illegal content.

Imagine a government agent buys drugs on the dark web and arrests the courier. The courier protests, "I didn't know it was drugs, I didn't ask what was in the package". Do you think that defense is going to keep the courier out of prison?

It sounds like Germany is treating Tor operators as common carriers, and not holding them liable for content they delivery. They're being quite generous in that regard, in most countries the node operators are probably not met with such leniency.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Hizonner on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @06:54PM (#41506438)
> Do you think that defense is going to keep the courier out of prison?

Yes. That happens every day.

> It sounds like Germany is treating Tor operators as common carriers,

That's probably because they basically are common carriers. And the service isn't particularly designed for illegal activity, even it can be useful for that. It's especially not designed for activities that tend to be illegal in the "free world".

> in most countries the node operators are probably not met with such leniency.

The Tor network has been running for about 20 years. There are on the order of thousands of relays. Unlike users, relay operators aren't anonymous; there's a public list of their IP addresses. The relays are all over most of Europe, especially Western Europe, and the Americas, especially the US and Canada, with a not-insignificant number of them in other countries.

So far as I know, nobody's ever been arrested, let alone convicted, for running a Tor relay. If they have, it's been in the sort of country where you also get arrested for running a newspaper. That may change soon, but it's still the case so far. Oh, and a good chunk of the funding for development (but not relay operation) comes from the US government.

You say "leniency", I say "not being an authoritarian hellhole".

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by cesarb on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @06:36PM (#41506316)
> Imagine a government agent buys drugs on the dark web and arrests the courier. The courier protests, "I didn't know it was drugs, I didn't ask what was in the package". Do you think that defense is going to keep the courier out of prison?

I, recently, bought a computer mouse from an online shop. The courier who brought me the package had no idea it contained a computer mouse. It might have been listed on the manifest outside the package, but even then, the courier had no way of knowing whether that was true without opening the package.

So, yes, I do think that defense can keep the courier out of prison.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Manuel_D on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @06:45PM (#41506379)
Reality demonstrates otherwise: plenty of drug mules are in prison because the jury didn't buy into this defense.
Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by alasdair_ on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @06:44PM (#41506374)
>Imagine a government agent buys drugs on the dark web and arrests the courier. The courier protests, "I didn't know it was drugs, I didn't ask what was in the package". Do you think that defense is going to keep the courier out of prison?

Well, yes, otherwise FedEx and UPS would quickly go out of business.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Manuel_D on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @06:50PM (#41506406)
FexEx and UPS receive immunity as carriers in exchange for several things. Minimum standards around recordkeeping and knowing their customers is one. Assisting the government with law enforcement (tracking down customers, scanning packages, etc.) is another.

Juries aren't stupid, they're not going to buy it when the courier says, "I just saw this online ad for deliveries on the dark web. Sure, it paid way more than normal delivery jobs but that's not cause for suspicion, right?"

And that's exactly what a tor node is doing: delivering content from the dark web. As far as I'm concerned, Germany is being very generous in its decision to let these operators continue to operate despite knowing full well that they are enabling criminal activity.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by rtkwe on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @08:55PM (#41507178)
Because it's not illegal to do that and if they're accessing hidden services they know they're accessing it via TOR and aren't directly connected to the illegal host. The most common reason exit nodes get raided is because they're the exit for some illegal user and appear as the source of the illegal activity.
Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by RobRivera on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @04:56PM (#41505438)
>it's a clear-cut case that the exit node operator facilitated illegal activity.

If someone leveraged your employment services to commit crime, would you consider yourself having facilitated illegal activity?

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Manuel_D on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @05:33PM (#41505817)
My past employers have had to scramble to prevent things like hackers using their service for C&C, malware distribution, etc. Companies usually have to meet some minimum standard to enjoy immunity from liability for abuse of their services. Telecoms need to retain logs, know the identity of their customers, and assist with government wiretapping for example.
Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by bawolff on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @04:59PM (#41505492)
IANAL, but i imagine it comes down to how many legit purposes tor has vs the illegal ones.

I have no idea where the line is, but like we dont charge art supply stores with facilitating forgery, so some amount of bad usage is clearly acceptable.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by RobRivera on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @05:02PM (#41505527)
Well the great thing about U.S.C is that you don't have to imagine, you can read the docs.

Measure of purposes, 'legit or otherwise', is not a law for anything ever.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by bawolff on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @05:08PM (#41505591)
Fun fact, usc does not apply to germany where the article is about.

But regardless, in both systems i am very certain your purpose ("intent") matters a lot. (Details depend on the specific crime in question)

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by beaglesss on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @05:21PM (#41505717)
All sorts of foreigners have been extradited for supposedly violating USC despite never stepping foot in America. They could argue the node operator facilitated money laundering that touched a US bank, that they conspired with a US person, a US CSAM victims likeness went through the node, etc etc.

USC has extraterritorial power about everywhere but NK, Russia, and Iran either formally or through influence.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by bawolff on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @06:27PM (#41506242)
Normally extradition requires the activity to be a crime in both juridsictions.
Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by ruthmarx on Wednesday September 11, 2024 @01:09AM (#41508187)
Not when the US asks.
Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by RobRivera on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @05:46PM (#41505947)
Forest for the trees, compadre.

:%s/USC/law/g

I distinctly believe you do not care to better understand the reality and the nuance, however.

Re:Recent Tor Exit Node Operator Raids and Legal Harassment ... by Zak on Tuesday September 10, 2024 @11:06PM (#41507685)
It operates legally because there isn't a law against it in the jurisdiction in which it operates.

What part are you surprised isn't forbidden? The part where it accepts connections anonymously? The part where data is encrypted in transit?

Exit node operators, like telecoms can be required to tell law enforcement everything they know about a user. The difference is they don't know anything of value.