How do ISPs operate legally? Every single thing that's ever been done over a Tor relay has crossed multiple ISPs.
They could keep logs, but they choose not to. They are intentionally unhelpful.
The reason they aren't keeping logs is not for the privacy of others.
If I run an exit node, I know I am not reading the logs to garner personal information of others. And unless someone hacks my server and goes through the logs, which is extremely unlikely, noone else will read the logs either.
The only one reading the logs would be law enforcement.
By not keeping logs, you are intentionally hindering law enforcement.
This is why I keep a diary indicating every single person I've ever interacted with, along with the date, time and place. It's a pain to do so and it takes up a lot of storage space and it makes people wary about interacting with me but I'd certainly never want to hinder law enforcement.
It is not a "pain" to set up logging. Most non-tor proxies implement logging. It would be a completely reasonable task for the tor project to implement logging by default.
No one would be any more "wary" to interact with your tor node. Trusting your node not to log would be foolish anyway. So whether you make known that you are logging, or whether you claim not to log (but might secretly do anyway) doesn't make much of a difference.
The storage space a log takes up is negligible (unless you keep logs for unreasonably long times) on anything but the smallest systems. And since running a tor node takes quite a bit of processing power, you won't be running your node on a system that can't handle a few megabytes of logs.
The perspective is that in order for these actions to be ethical, you must log the traffic, or you should not bother setting up the node. It's irresponsible to setup the node (which takes some amount of effort) but not do the precautionary part which makes it ethical.
You can believe otherwise if you'd like, but this is an ethical framework applied to many other parts of our society and it's the thing that sets you apart from the ISPs, and generally it's the thing accepted by the public at large.
It is legal to keep some logs for a limited amount of time if you run an IT service in Germany, mostly for the purpose of keeping the service running properly. If you have that data, you can give it to LE when they request it.
The thing accepted by the public at large is often codified within a country's laws. German laws generally do not require you to store logs if you are an ISP. Storing them for too long can even be unlawful. There is no so called Vorratsdatenspeicherung anymore, and it is a recurring topic of political debate. So at least in Germany, the public view on storing data is more complex, and people don't believe not storing data or reducing the amount of data stored is clearly immoral when running IT services. https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Datenvermeidung_und_Datenspars...
On another note, if LE requests you to log specific access patterns in advance, you might have to do it. If your ISP services are really big (lots of users), you might even have to provide some sort of interface for LE. IMO and under certain interpretations of the involved laws, the German state could ask every single node operator in Germany to log everything, but the political backlash would be quite high.
Please add /s or the links or both.
Chalmers sent a copy of his timeline to Premier Park Ltd, the company that charged him with the crimes, and the defendant was able to prove his innocence. The charges against him were dropped.[1]
the lawyer met with the detective in order to show him screenshots of McCoy’s Google location history, including data recorded by RunKeeper. The maps showed months of bike rides past the burglarized home, NBC News reports.[2]
1: https://www.phonearena.com/news/google-maps-keeps-user-from-...2: https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/03/10/google-data-puts-in...
I was not making any moral judgement on people operating tor nodes.
I was simply stating that you are, in fact, hindering law enforcement if you set up a non-logging proxy for the purposes of hindering law enforcement.
Whether that's a good or a bad thing is up to you to decide. Clearly many people think it's a good thing; good enough to go through the efforts of setting up a proxy.
I think it differs because tor is specifically created to protect against surveillance; both private surveillance and state surveillance (a.k.a. law enforcement).
If a shop was actively helping people avoid surveillance, I would expect them to actively assist law enforcement, too.
I find it perfectly reasonable to consider people who actively help a project which advertises on its website that it is being used to protect against state surveillance / law enforcement to be hindering law enforcement.
Some tech companies have extremely sophisticated observability which dumps huge volumes data about the internal state of a program. Some companies have very limited observability beyond maybe logging "we just served a request". Your argument suggests that companies who don't have the extensive logs of the former are being intentionally unhelpful?
There are lots of reasons to not keep logs – lack of storage space, additional economic cost of doing so, slower response times due to overhead of observability, etc.
You are implying that by not keeping records of all events you are involved with you are intentionally hindering law enforcement, implying that we are morally and legally bound to gather and retain information which helps law enforcement.
Does that make clearing browser history a deliberate attempt to hinder law enforcement?
Internet cafe's wipe the computers after every session. Is that intentionally hindering law enforcement?
The difference between your examples and logging proxy access is that logging proxy access is the standard behavior (for proxies which aren't tor).
Tor proxies deliberately decide to behave in a non-standard manner. And with what tor is about, it is clear that this is not for technical reasons but for hindering law enforcement.
I will claim that if the tor project did not openly intend to make government surveillance more difficult, it would have implemented logging long ago.
But that's just a claim, not a fact. Maybe I'm wrong.
Aren't there valid reasons for people not to conceal or anonymize their communications, such as whistleblowers, journalists, or people needing to hide their communications from oppressive governments?
On the issue of clearing browser history are you aware that the FBI threatened a boy for clearing his browser history under laws intended for destruction of corporate documents and communications?
Keeping logs doesn't help other goverments. Other governments cannot access your logs. Your government can access your logs. You are protecting them from your government. You may claim that your government is oppressive. But that doesn't change that you are hindering the enforcement of their (oppressive) laws.
Regarding the moral question: I agree that there are cases where hindering your own government's law enforcement may make sense.
Regarding tor, I mostly take issue with the concept of onion services. If you want to publish USA government secrets, you can publish them on Russian servers. If you want to publish Russian government secrets, you can publish them on American servers, etc. The sole purpose of onion services is to publish content which is illegal in every country on earth. I can't think of many good things that are ollegal in every country on earth.
I mean, exit node operators are being intentionally unhelpful? They're intentionally helping people who don't want to be tracked. "I don't want to give you the papers" and "I can't give you the papers because I burned them so that I couldn't give them to anybody" are equivalent morally; the only difference is that the latter is irreversible.
There are good reasons to not want to be tracked, but there are also bad reasons to not want to be tracked. Exit node operators have chosen to help both. Police on the whole tend not to be the kinds of people who understand the "good reasons not to want to be tracked" thing.
There are other differences. One is after the fact, the other is a decision made before the fact; one is specific (rejecting that request in particular), the other is general (all requests of that type are guaranteed to be affected equally).
It's the same with, for instance, email retention policies. We accept that old messages are irrevocably deleted after X days, even when we require them to be produced once requested if they still exist.
Indeed it is. The intention and moral purpose of email deletion policies is to reduce the risk of embarrassing or incriminating emails being turned up as part of a lawsuit or investigation -- in other words, to be unhelpful.
The legal justification for being unhelpful in both cases is that "this is just policy, we're treating everyone the same". That doesn't change the fact that in both cases the intent was to be unhelpful to investigators.
I have long retention policies for things and life cycles for others. Information shouldn’t be permanently available to me if it’s not relevant or it’s a waste of resources.
It's best to assume the government is a hostile, rabid actor who will seize any reachable assets and your freedom at any point they wish and proceed accordingly.
I described exactly that in my second paragraph.
How do you expect further fruitful dialogue?
... or at least there never was in the past. The new wave of stupid and extremely broad "duty of care" laws that try to apply to the design of any and every communication service may change that. But it hasn't been litigated anywhere.
It sounds like Germany extends some sort of carrier protection to Tor exit node operators. E.g. if someone organizes a drug deal over the phone, Verizon is not liable. But Verizon does have to meet some minimum standards of records keeping and law enforcement assistance (wire tapping).
Perhaps the most famous example is DMCA: [Google] is exempt from liabilities for hosting pirated movies on [YouTube] by US laws, on condition that it's not actively involved with it and fully robotic with takedowns.
It's not like courts treat popular businesses like buses and ISPs as sceneries just by gut feeling. There are always laws.
This largely conforms with how the first telecoms received immunity for abuse of their services. They retain logs and assist the government with investigations, and in exchange they are shielded from liability. WhatsApp and iMessage would probably cooperate to the same extent, minus wire-tapping messages in transit (because they can't). That's vastly greater cooperation than a tor exit node operator that retains no logs.s
I imagine for tor, the reason is that there are also good uses for tor. However i dont think "i intentionally know nothing" works as a defence in general.
Ianal
"Facilitation" as an offense in itself is one of those things that tends to be a real thing, but varies a lot depending on the jurisdiction. In most places, most of the time, you're only going to get in trouble for facilitating crime if your service is especially set up to be unusually useful for crime. You're especially vulnerable if you specifically designed it for crime. If those things apply, then knowing it's being used for crime (but not necessarily on which specific occasions) can make it worse for you. Give or take, depending on where you live.
In the past, Tor nodes, even exit nodes, have mostly gotten a pass, at least in countries where most of them are located. They get raided all the time, but largely as cases of mistaken identity. That's probably because most Tor traffic has historically probably been people trying to hide from ad tracking or people worried about their perfectly legal activities being spied on. So it's hard to say the service is really aimed at illegal activity.
Things are tightening up worldwide, in statute and probably in case law, mostly because of Tor and other services possibly being swept in by standards primarily aimed at social media. We may start seeing Tor nodes targeted because Tor is now considered "too adapted to legal activity", or even because node operators are "not doing enough to prevent" illegal activity (including redesigning the system if necessary).
But until fairly recently that's been more what you'd expect to see in North Korea than what you'd expect to see in Germany (or the US).
With Tor Hidden Service there's no exit node as such since traffic terminates inside the Tor network. The networking route is doubly anonymized so both the server and the client can't track each other down.
1. Bob is running a Tor exit node.
2. Charlie is a government official investigating illegal content (use your imagination)
3. Charlie downloads illegal content via Tor
4. This content is sent to Charlie from Bob's exit node.
5. Charlie observes that Bob's exit node sent him illegal content.
I understand that even if Bob is raided and his computer searched, they cannot find the website hosting the illegal content. But Charlie would know that Bob helped deliver the illegal content. Tor Hidden Service does not anonymize the exit node from the client.
Charlie could only see the machine in the final step of requesting the illegal content it Charlie was hosting the hidden service themselves. These requests can come from many different Tor operators not just exit nodes.
Host -> Node 1 -> Node 2 -> ... Bob -> Charlie
this obfuscates the Host from Charlie. But Charlie knows that Bob sent him illegal content. Yes, Bob didn't host the content. The host is obfuscated. But Bob is still delivering illegal content and Charlie knows it.
Guard Relays usually don't have these issues, since you have to be somewhat technical to actively probe relays by requesting content through tor. And technical people know there isn't any point to rading an operator's home.
Does BOB know they are delivering illegal content?
No... is it even possible to send unencrypted traffic by Tor? If it's even possible, Charlie must be the only person in the world doing it.
He does when Charlie knocks on his door and informs him that he delivered CSE to him. Ignorance of the fact that one is breaking the law is rarely accepted as a defense. Carriers usually get this protection when when meet some standards of safeguards and cooperation with law enforcement.
Taking the wrong jacket by mistake is not theft, and operating the exit node through which someone downloads CSAM is not criminal possession of CSAM or knowing facilitation thereof.
That rarely happens in practice because prosecutors are usually pretty good at their jobs, and tend not to bring cases they can't prove.
Back to our Tor example: if you've been repeatedly told by the government that your node is being used for illegal activity, it's hard to plead ignorance.
A look at federal drug distribution statutes in the USA[0] shows the mental state used for most of the forbidden acts is "intentionally" or "knowingly". Other jurisdictions could have different laws, but in the USA, it does appear the prosecutor has to prove that a drug mule knew what they were doing.
Similarly, the federal statute in the USA criminalizing distribution and transmission of child pornography[1] says "knowingly". Someone operating an ISP, an internet router, a VPN, or an exit node has no obligation (and often no ability) to inspect the data they're transmitting to find out if it contains child pornography, and knowing that there's a certain probability a given amount of random traffic contains some does not trigger criminal liability because the operator does not know that any particular data is child pornography.
In another comment you mentioned that ISPs can aid law enforcement because they know details about their customers. They usually do for billing purposes, but in many jurisdictions they're not required to. There is not, to my knowledge a KYC law in the USA for providing internet service.
Imagine the government tells the mule that their employer is shipping dugs in these packages, and the mule still tries to claim that they didn't know that they might be transporting drugs.
The EU Chatcontrol proposal seeks to change that in some cases (TOR exit nodes not among them), and most people here are vehemently opposed to it.
Is there some mechanism that prevents Charlie from knowing who sent the content to him? Fundamentally, you can't stop the government from sniffing at the endpoint. Because they're not really "sniffing" they're just requesting content like any normal Tor user.
That is, in fact, the whole point of Tor. In the hidden service case, neither end can identify the other.
Host -> Node 1 -> Node 2 -> .... -> Bob -> Charlie.
Charlie doesn't know where the Host is. But Charlie does know that Bob sent him illegal content. Or is that final link, from Bob to Charlie, also obfuscated somehow? If so, how did OP get raided by police if he's supposed to be hidden?
1. Charlie is running a client and downloads something. In which case Bob is an entrance node, not an exit node, but it's essentially the same thing. Charlie does know that the next hop is Bob. Depending on whether the ultimate destination is a hidden service or on the clearnet, Charlie may or may not know who's running that service.
2. Charlie is running a hidden service, and somebody uploads something. Charlie knows that it came via Bob, but doesn't know where it came from.
3. Charlie is running a regular clearnet Web server, and somebody uploads something to Charlie via Bob's exit node. Again Charlie sees that the traffic comes from Bob.
In the first two cases, Charlie has to be actually running the Tor software, and knowingly using Tor. So Charlie also knows that (a) Bob is just a relay, (b) Bob doesn't actually host the content, (c) Bob doesn't handle more than a packet or two of the content at a time, and deletes those as soon as they've been relayed, (d) Bob doesn't know, and can't find out, what the content actually is, (e) Bob doesn't know, and can't find out, where the content originally came from, and (f) Bob is really unlikely to keep any record of the whole connection after the session is over, which means probably no more than 10 minutes or so.
If that's enough to go after Bob, then it's enough to go after Bob... but historically it hasn't been. Bob can reasonably claim not only that he doesn't know what that particular traffic was, but that, although he knows there's probably some illegal traffic, most of the traffic he relays is probably legal.
In the third case, it looks to Charlie like Bob is the ultimate user. Unless Charlie does some investigation, Charlie may go raid Bob. But Charlie should then find out all that other stuff.
I think the most common actual case is that Charlie is running a honey pot, either as a hidden service or on the clearnet, and somebody gets the content from Charlie via Bob. But the same basic ideas apply.
The main issue isn't that Charlie doesn't know what the content is, but that Bob doesn't.
[Oh, and on edit, just to be clear: In the first two cases, that "packet or two" that Bob may ephemerally buffer is encrypted so that Bob can't read it, nor can any other relay. In the third case, where Charlie is a clearnet service, the end user is usually still using TLS, so Bob still can't read it. And none of the non-exit relays can read it no matter what.]
But at the end of the day Charlie, the government agent, is catching Bob in the act of delivering illegal content.
Imagine a government agent buys drugs on the dark web and arrests the courier. The courier protests, "I didn't know it was drugs, I didn't ask what was in the package". Do you think that defense is going to keep the courier out of prison?
It sounds like Germany is treating Tor operators as common carriers, and not holding them liable for content they delivery. They're being quite generous in that regard, in most countries the node operators are probably not met with such leniency.
Yes. That happens every day.
> It sounds like Germany is treating Tor operators as common carriers,
That's probably because they basically are common carriers. And the service isn't particularly designed for illegal activity, even it can be useful for that. It's especially not designed for activities that tend to be illegal in the "free world".
> in most countries the node operators are probably not met with such leniency.
The Tor network has been running for about 20 years. There are on the order of thousands of relays. Unlike users, relay operators aren't anonymous; there's a public list of their IP addresses. The relays are all over most of Europe, especially Western Europe, and the Americas, especially the US and Canada, with a not-insignificant number of them in other countries.
So far as I know, nobody's ever been arrested, let alone convicted, for running a Tor relay. If they have, it's been in the sort of country where you also get arrested for running a newspaper. That may change soon, but it's still the case so far. Oh, and a good chunk of the funding for development (but not relay operation) comes from the US government.
You say "leniency", I say "not being an authoritarian hellhole".
I, recently, bought a computer mouse from an online shop. The courier who brought me the package had no idea it contained a computer mouse. It might have been listed on the manifest outside the package, but even then, the courier had no way of knowing whether that was true without opening the package.
So, yes, I do think that defense can keep the courier out of prison.
Well, yes, otherwise FedEx and UPS would quickly go out of business.
Juries aren't stupid, they're not going to buy it when the courier says, "I just saw this online ad for deliveries on the dark web. Sure, it paid way more than normal delivery jobs but that's not cause for suspicion, right?"
And that's exactly what a tor node is doing: delivering content from the dark web. As far as I'm concerned, Germany is being very generous in its decision to let these operators continue to operate despite knowing full well that they are enabling criminal activity.
If someone leveraged your employment services to commit crime, would you consider yourself having facilitated illegal activity?
I have no idea where the line is, but like we dont charge art supply stores with facilitating forgery, so some amount of bad usage is clearly acceptable.
Measure of purposes, 'legit or otherwise', is not a law for anything ever.
But regardless, in both systems i am very certain your purpose ("intent") matters a lot. (Details depend on the specific crime in question)
USC has extraterritorial power about everywhere but NK, Russia, and Iran either formally or through influence.
:%s/USC/law/g
I distinctly believe you do not care to better understand the reality and the nuance, however.
What part are you surprised isn't forbidden? The part where it accepts connections anonymously? The part where data is encrypted in transit?
Exit node operators, like telecoms can be required to tell law enforcement everything they know about a user. The difference is they don't know anything of value.
My assumption is that Germany has some sort of common-carrier privileges for Tor node operators. In America, telecoms can't be sued for facilitating illegal activity. But they do have to assist law enforcement with finding criminals when requested.
Would be happy to hear from someone who is more knowledgeable in this area.