Host -> Node 1 -> Node 2 -> ... Bob -> Charlie
this obfuscates the Host from Charlie. But Charlie knows that Bob sent him illegal content. Yes, Bob didn't host the content. The host is obfuscated. But Bob is still delivering illegal content and Charlie knows it.
Guard Relays usually don't have these issues, since you have to be somewhat technical to actively probe relays by requesting content through tor. And technical people know there isn't any point to rading an operator's home.
Does BOB know they are delivering illegal content?
No... is it even possible to send unencrypted traffic by Tor? If it's even possible, Charlie must be the only person in the world doing it.
He does when Charlie knocks on his door and informs him that he delivered CSE to him. Ignorance of the fact that one is breaking the law is rarely accepted as a defense. Carriers usually get this protection when when meet some standards of safeguards and cooperation with law enforcement.
Taking the wrong jacket by mistake is not theft, and operating the exit node through which someone downloads CSAM is not criminal possession of CSAM or knowing facilitation thereof.
That rarely happens in practice because prosecutors are usually pretty good at their jobs, and tend not to bring cases they can't prove.
Back to our Tor example: if you've been repeatedly told by the government that your node is being used for illegal activity, it's hard to plead ignorance.
A look at federal drug distribution statutes in the USA[0] shows the mental state used for most of the forbidden acts is "intentionally" or "knowingly". Other jurisdictions could have different laws, but in the USA, it does appear the prosecutor has to prove that a drug mule knew what they were doing.
Similarly, the federal statute in the USA criminalizing distribution and transmission of child pornography[1] says "knowingly". Someone operating an ISP, an internet router, a VPN, or an exit node has no obligation (and often no ability) to inspect the data they're transmitting to find out if it contains child pornography, and knowing that there's a certain probability a given amount of random traffic contains some does not trigger criminal liability because the operator does not know that any particular data is child pornography.
In another comment you mentioned that ISPs can aid law enforcement because they know details about their customers. They usually do for billing purposes, but in many jurisdictions they're not required to. There is not, to my knowledge a KYC law in the USA for providing internet service.
Imagine the government tells the mule that their employer is shipping dugs in these packages, and the mule still tries to claim that they didn't know that they might be transporting drugs.
The EU Chatcontrol proposal seeks to change that in some cases (TOR exit nodes not among them), and most people here are vehemently opposed to it.
Charlie could only see the machine in the final step of requesting the illegal content it Charlie was hosting the hidden service themselves. These requests can come from many different Tor operators not just exit nodes.