I think that the article is trying to say is that the digital wallet automatically updates to the new card with no additional authentication mechanism? That’s the vulnerability here, if I understand correctly. Once an attacker can associate a stolen card with a digital wallet, the victim can cancel that card and get a new one issued but the attacker still retains access because purchases are done with the virtual token which is mapped on the backend. As long as you have the right virtual token, the bank will map that to the correct account.
Like this is a serious issue with digital wallets if true. The advice at the end of the article is key then:
> turn on email notifications when a card is added/removed from the wallet, turn on transaction alerts for credit cards, regularly check credit card statements and review devices linked to credit cards through the bank's web portal or mobile app account settings.
“Here is a fictional example: The victim's credit card number ends in 0123. An attacker adds 0123 to their digital wallet and starts making purchases. Again, digital wallets work by sending a virtual number to the vendor, so vendors receive the virtual number ABCD and take this number to the bank to get payment associated with account 0123.
The victim discovers the fraudulent payments and asks the bank to issue a new credit card. The bank sends a new card with the number 4567 and, on the back end, remaps the virtual number: ABCD no longer links to 0123, it now links to 4567. The wallet automatically starts showing the new card to its user without any verification for the new card to be updated in the wallet. Vendors then go to the bank with ABCD, which has now been linked to 4567, the new and active number, and the purchase goes through.”
TFA seems to have left out the “…and then the attacker does…” part. Because now the token ABCD is disassociated with card number 0123, and 0123 should no longer work, right?