Re:TPM GPIO fail: How bad OEM firmware ruins Intel TPM security
by blueflow on Thursday June 06, 2024 @06:58AM
(#40595939)
The TCB has not been modified - that's the point of that attack. Its just physically elsewhere. A high 24 dBi high gain antennae to close that gap costs 70 EUR and you would attest the device in the attackers hands, not the one in front of you.
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Re:TPM GPIO fail: How bad OEM firmware ruins Intel TPM security
by hedora on Thursday June 06, 2024 @11:26AM
(#40598572)
I think some of those hardware attestation thingies use clocks and tight latency jitter bounds to make replay attacks harder. If it takes more than "2 x time light takes to move 10 ft + deterministic delay from the other side", or less than the deterministic delay, then they refuse to unlock.
Some cars even get this right these days. Most don't.