Re:TPM GPIO fail: How bad OEM firmware ruins Intel TPM security
by blueflow on Thursday June 06, 2024 @06:58AM
(#40595939)
The TCB has not been modified - that's the point of that attack. Its just physically elsewhere. A high 24 dBi high gain antennae to close that gap costs 70 EUR and you would attest the device in the attackers hands, not the one in front of you.
Re:TPM GPIO fail: How bad OEM firmware ruins Intel TPM security
by hedora on Thursday June 06, 2024 @11:26AM
(#40598572)
I think some of those hardware attestation thingies use clocks and tight latency jitter bounds to make replay attacks harder. If it takes more than "2 x time light takes to move 10 ft + deterministic delay from the other side", or less than the deterministic delay, then they refuse to unlock.
Some cars even get this right these days. Most don't.
[1] https://github.com/ANSSI-FR/ultrablue