This is just what losing looks like in that situation. Yes, we lost.
Did Germany lose world war 1 or did they just decide to stop bothering with it? I think the answer is clearly the former, but in the end they still kept an independent state, weren't occupied, etc.
[edit] my point simply being that yes, that’s a loss, and in fact it was the only real way a loss could have looked, so if that’s not a “real” loss then I guess we “couldn’t lose” that war, which is plainly a strange way of looking at it.
Well, I think the entire reason the US has been so quick to insert itself in situations like this is because there's a very real feeling that the US can't really lose these wars, because the consequences of failure are very different from, say, WW2.
If the stakes were higher for America as a nation we'd probably be significantly less likely to enter into these sorts of conflicts to begin with. And if the stakes were higher for America in the conflict for some other reason - say it was Mexico instead of Vietnam - there'd probably be significantly more political and public support for continued action and additional resources being thrown at it. But it's hard to do that when it's for the more nebulous idea of keeping the foreign power most aligned with US interests in the region in power.
Which isn't to say I disagree with the general idea - Vietnam was a loss by any reasonable sense of the word - but that I think there is a certain amount of truth to the idea that people in power really did look at Vietnam as a war that couldn't truly be lost.
Germany and Japan unconditionally surrendered.
World war 1 is not the same as world war 2.
The point of war isn't neccesarily to have your opponent destroyed, just to have them yield to your political objectives. If you give up on all your objectives , and grant your opponent everything they want, that is a loss.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ngo_Dinh_Diem
There was also great turmoil in the U.S. at the time (as we remember with the approaching DNC convention in Chicago). Nixon implemented an effort to distance the U.S. from the situation.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnamization
Watergate closed the door on efforts to maintain South Vietnam.
I do not fully understand the backstory, but the Vienamese seem to have done OK out of the "Communist" victory. It's a very different place from North Korea.
Alternate counterfactual: is there a route through history where https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haiphong_incident does not take place and a peaceful, unified Vietnam exists from the end of WW2 onwards?
They have largely followed the Chinese model of economic development, via a policy of Đổi Mới[0][1] adopted in 1986 and has since continued with various reforms in the 1990s as well. This is persistent today in how Vietnamese economic policy is driven, as far as I can tell
[0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C4%90%E1%BB%95i_M%E1%BB%9Bi
[1]: https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/rp2008-84.pdf
Really, the US is all about the under dog fighting for independence, isn't that the US Mythos? We should have been rooting for the Vietnamese, not bombing them.
I think it all depends on (a) what was our desired outcome, and (b) did it come to pass? If we didn't achieve our desired outcome, then we lost.
It's doubtful that the US could've continued to keep troops in Vietnam.
By the time (1973) the Paris Peace Accords happened, there was little US domestic support in the public, in business leaders, or in Congress. US troops hadn't done any major offensives for years, in order to keep casualties low.
By 1970, within the US Army in Vietnam, there was an level of mutiny, with entire units refusing to go on missions, officers and NCOs getting fragged (murdered) if they sent troops on missions felt to be too dangerous or pointless. The US strategy was one of attrition, and they simply couldn't continue. The Vietnamese were going to kick the foreigners out and re-unite the country, no matter how long it took.
For the whole war, the NVA / Viet Cong - largely held the initiative - around 85% of the time from '65 to '68' and then around 75% afterwards, they could choose when, and if to engage US troops and thus control their casualties to a certain extent. Once engaged, the US could bring massive firepower, but it required grunts as bait to go searching for ambushes, in addition to the constant threat of mines and booby-traps.
Bears repeating. This was true of a lot of "anti-communist" US actions: propping up a hated local elite who were in no way democratic.
Not wrong, but I'm curious to know how things worked out (so far?) over the long-term: a lot of non-communist dictatorial countries (that the US propped-up?) managed to move over onto more democratic systems eventually, whereas (AFAICT) communist governments have managed to hang on and are still single-party states.
Most(all?) of the anti-communist dictators/juntas are gone. Greece in the 70s, South Korea in the 80s. The last that I can think of were El Salvador and Guatamala in the 1990s.
Supporting hated dictators/rulers is still around, e.g. all the Gulf states.
In 1973 there was the Paris Peace Accords that crystallized (Communist) North Vietnam and (non-communist) South Vietnam, just like the two Koreas. Then in 1975 the north invaded:
* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1975_spring_offensive
and the US (military) basically did nothing to help the south.
Kind of like Afghanistan more recently: as long as the US had an interest in it the Taliban could not "win", but the US simply concluded that they didn't want to be involved any longer and pulled out.
If the US had continued support and presence, like with South Korea, would it have been possible that South Vietnam would still be around? Bothering with (South) Vietnam wasn't of strategic importance (?) any more, and so the US pulled out and let the chips fall where they may. If the US had continued to care about Vietnam strategically, could they have continued to make tactical (military) decisions to support the south?