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Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by cletus on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @08:04AM (#39916344)
The US spends $30-60 billion a year on agriculture and subisides [1]. This is controversial for all the obvious reasons. Without subsidies we'd waste less food but overproduction of food is an intentional objective of these programs. Why? Because if there's a major drought or crops are lost to ice or snow or flooding, Americans won't starve. It's why we have things like the US government having a reserve of over a billion pounds of cheese [2].

People not starving is a national security interest.

It's getting to the point where the software we rely on is also a national security interest. The US government should be paying to maintain and improve this software. Security risks in Linux and core packages threaten to shut down key infrastructure.

Paying developers to maintain open source projects that are actually used could be an incredibly effective use of tax dollars.

[1]: https://usafacts.org/topics/agriculture/#581290c9-a960-49aa-...

[2]: https://www.deseret.com/2022/2/14/22933326/1-4-billion-pound...

Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by chjj on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @08:21AM (#39916510)
I'm not sure why people keep misidentifying the problem as "lack of funding". Lasse Collin was doing fine as a maintainer up until Jia Tan showed up. He was psy-op'd into believing there was a crowd of angry people eagerly awaiting a new release when there wasn't. No real person was unhappy with the way he'd been maintaining xz.
Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by Cthulhu_ on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @08:36AM (#39916636)
Funding aside, single individuals being responsible for software is not a good thing, see bus factor.
Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by Gormo on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @10:16AM (#39917819)
In fact, there was no issue with Lasse Collin maintaining xz as a single individual, and creating a false impression to the contrary was the primary tactic used by the antagonist to gain access to the project.
Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by rebolek on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @09:47AM (#39917428)
Fortunately there was Jia Tan to help him. /s
Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by diggan on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @08:29AM (#39916575)
I'm not saying money would absolutely fix the issue, but I could also see it helping. If Collin was approached by a government that said "Hey, the thing you're maintaining is important, if you want, we'll fund 2 additional full-time maintainers that can contribute based on your guidance", maybe Collin would be in a better position to ensure the Jia Tan contributions were genuine and proper.
Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by chjj on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @08:45AM (#39916721)
There's probably a number of things that could improve the situation. Mindlessly throwing money and government at a problem almost never improves things.

Which government bureaucracy decides how much Lasse Collin should be paid? Based on what metrics? This is a giant can of worms.

Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by rebolek on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @09:45AM (#39917397)
If I was the maintainer and was approached by government telling me, "hey, here are two folks who're going to be two new full-time maintainers and we're funding them" I certainly would be worried.
Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by diggan on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @12:13PM (#39919286)
Similarly, if the government approached me and said "Here, embed this black-box binary into your build process", I'd be worried too. But luckily, no one suggested this, nor what you wrote about :)
Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by irdc on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @08:37AM (#39916648)
Getting help for mental health issues is a whole lot easier if you have the money.
Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by lenerdenator on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @09:08AM (#39916963)
IIRC the xz package was maintained by an individual in a place with at least some socialized healthcare, but correct me if I'm wrong (I'm not trying to be snarky here, please do).
Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by dboreham on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @09:29AM (#39917192)
Perhaps socialized medicine is the solution.
Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by Gormo on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @10:22AM (#39917903)
Socialized or politicized?
Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by transportgo on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @08:28AM (#39916566)
But if he was paid he might not have given up control
Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by chjj on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @08:40AM (#39916677)
Okay, sure, but rather than trying to solve a problem by throwing money at it (or worse, trying to solve it with government intervention), maybe it's better to think of other mitigations.

For example, maybe developers need to be made aware of potential psyops by attackers (the publicity surrounding this issue probably made some progress on that front).

Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by udev4096 on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @08:30AM (#39916585)
He never mentioned about any financial problems, it was more about his mental health
Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by mwcampbell on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @08:37AM (#39916642)
And would mental health issues have kept him from working on xz if that had been part of his day job?
Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by yunohn on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @08:50AM (#39916764)
I’ve been in similar burnout situations, and the difference between work and side projects did not matter to my mental health. The money was not an issue, it was headspace and fatigue.
Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by sofixa on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @08:39AM (#39916661)
The EU realised this like a decade ago, and have had a couple of programs around it that have been small steps in the right direction, but not enough - such as EU funder bug bounty programs, giving grants, mandates that the EU should use specific open source tooling for specific needs (e.g. VLC).
Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by vb-8448 on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @08:40AM (#39916676)
It seems very stupid to me.

How long will it be before the government starts pressuring these maintainers to do the things the government wants?

Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by Gormo on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @08:49AM (#39916759)
For example, introducing their own backdoors.
Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by Gormo on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @08:47AM (#39916744)
It's not valid to regard the potential of negative consequences in any sphere of human life as a "national security risk".

It's not valid to presume that the only way to mitigate risks is through top-down political intervention.

And it's absolutely not valid to presume that making FOSS communities dependent on political subsidies would not have much worse and much longer term consequences than the problems we are trying to mitigate.

In fact, it's entirely possible that the political intermediaries who control the purse-strings would have an even greater capacity to introduce their own backdoors or otherwise compromise security in pursuit of their own ambitions.

What you're proposing here might well represent trying to keep out one set of threat actors by handing the keys to the castle over to another set of threat actors. And this would be on top all of the other problems it would cause: convergence toward homogeneous monocultures, project priorities being distorted by political incentives, vested interests using political influence to suppress competition from FOSS projects, etc.

It's worth pointing out that the swift detection and remediation of the xz backdoor by the community almost immediately after the threat actor pulled the trigger on their two-year long con represents a resounding success of the FOSS "many eyes" model, and it's not clear what politicians throwing money around would add to the equation.

Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by acdha on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @09:11AM (#39917016)
Your argument falls apart when you remember that the U.S. federal, state, and local governments are critically dependent on open source software – not just directly in things like Linux servers or Chrome/Edge/Firefox but also open source components used in appliances or compiled into commercial software. It is quite reasonable to argue that even a narrow approach of improving only components they run would be justifiable on those grounds and it’d be a tiny part of, say, NIST’s budget to fund developers directly or to pay some group like the Linux or Apache foundations to support an open source maintainership team.
Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by Gormo on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @09:36AM (#39917279)
Organizations of all types -- government and otherwise -- are dependent on a wide variety of externally-sourced solutions for mission-critical operations. They can and do develop their own processes for testing and vetting potential solutions against their own criteria for performance, reliability, maintainability, and security.

Government orgs can and do contribute the results of the work they do in this regard upstream to FOSS projects. This has never not been the case, and when government-employed developers release the work they do to meet their own security requirements to the broader community, everyone benefits.

But this is drastically different from the scenario that the preceding poster was proposing, in which government officials would assume effective responsibility for the entire project, not just act as participants in the FOSS community.

That proposal would invert the situation, and change it from government devs adhering to the norms and conventions of the community to the community adhering to the rules and priorities defined by the government, which is where the negatives I outlined above would come into play.

Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by illiac786 on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @09:34AM (#39917247)
I fail to see how you addressed the previous comment here. You ignored 80% of the points made.

Donations is fine, but it needs to be “no strings attached”, otherwise I agree with the GP that the risk of weaponising FOSS may become even greater.

I do agree that the US government is critically dependent on FOSS by now though. But “why throw money at it if it ain’t broken?” is the prevalent mentality, especially when everyone can have their own definition of “broken”…

Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by acdha on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @11:58AM (#39919118)
The first sentence was a category error. It is a national security issue as long as systems which national security depend on are running the code in question. I totally agree on the FOSS side, but consider that the proposal could be as simple as having, say, NIST give the Linux foundation money annually to pay a supporting team of developers rather than the government taking over maintenance on anything.
Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by Gormo on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @12:15PM (#39919315)
> It is a national security issue as long as systems which national security depend on are running the code in question.

This is itself a category error. By this standard anything and everything upstream of certain government agencies implicates a "national security", and you might as well say that the supply chain for staplers is a national security issue because government officials staple documents together, or that the manufacture of socks is a national security issue because government agents wear socks.

Naturally, it's up to organizations themselves to make sure that their particular usage of any specific resource meets their exceptional security needs, not to expand the definition of "national security" to encompass the entire upstream supply chain independently of their use cases.

> NIST give the Linux foundation money annually to pay a supporting team of developers rather than the government taking over maintenance on anything.

This in itself would create a nexus of influence that could ultimately function as a vector of social engineering attacks, including from factions within our own government. It's just not cut-and-dried enough to presume that government money is some sort of magic solution and wouldn't itself actually make things worse.

Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by acdha on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @02:32PM (#39921167)
> you might as well say that the supply chain for staplers is a national security issue because government officials staple documents together, or that the manufacture of socks is a national security issue because government agents wear socks.

You’re leaving out the key part: this only works if there’s a way for a flaw in those staples or socks to impact national security functions. Once you correctly make the analogy you can easily see why that’s true for a server operating system but not either of your examples.

Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by Gormo on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @06:57PM (#39924394)
What if a threat actor embedded secret listening devices into staplers? What if wool socks specifically designed to maximize ESD discharge were used to disable sensitive equipment?

Organizations that are concerned with outlandish risks like these implement their own policies and procedures to safeguard against them. They might x-ray office supplies before allowing their use in secure facilities; they might maintain a short list of approved fabrics in an ESD-sensitive environment. The point is that organizations that have exceptional security requirements apply their own policies and procedures to mitigate risk, and don't expect parties upstream of them do so for them.

Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by acdha on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @07:05PM (#39924460)
Socks and staplers are not part of the security infrastructure. Computers are, and that means it’s in the interests of everyone to keep them secure.
Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by Gormo on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @08:55PM (#39925275)
"Computers" is too broad to be meaningful. Compression tools are no more a part of the security infrastructure per se than socks and staplers are.
Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by Spooky23 on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @10:04AM (#39917672)
I think we’re lucky that the compromise was ham fisted enough to be trivially detectable. I’m sure other, better attacks exist, implemented by smarter actors.

Software is a national security threat because IT is increasingly dependent on computing. Plenty of civilian tech is being used in Ukraine to good effect.

Smart stakeholders are going to watch where stuff is used and target the supply chain. It may be Russians, Mideast stakeholders, or domestic extremists.

Software is to 2024 what a truck bomb was in 1994.

Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by unethical_ban on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @09:43AM (#39917376)
It's worth pointing out that we got lucky with a savvy tester stumbling on the backdoor in the dark. It wasn't anyone's job to find this backdoor, and arguably if it had been designed just a little better, no one would have noticed.

I wouldn't have gov't be maintainers of the main repos, but either be assigned to vetting critical repos, or mirroring them and co-maintaining copies endorsed for security (if I agreed gov't should be involved).

The ultimate questions is, are our critical systems (kernel, systemd, core userland) safe *enough* against future similar attacks, that we are okay trusting the global economy to another lucky valgrind test?

You incorrectly implied that a national security risk is "the potential of negative consequences in any sphere of human life". If we didn't get lucky, this could have been an economic and human catastrophe. That's not an inconvenience.

Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by Gormo on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @10:08AM (#39917726)
> It's worth pointing out that we got lucky with a savvy tester stumbling on the backdoor in the dark.

I believe in Bayesian probability a lot more than I believe in luck. The fact that a random sysadmin investigating performance issues was able to rapidly unravel this whole thing is at least a minimal indicator that either (a) this particular attack was largely incompetent, and any of the many "savvy testers" in the community would have uncovered it within short order, but more sophisticated attacks might remain undetected, or (b) this was a sophisticated attack, and the community is generally resilient to this form of infiltration.

Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by lenerdenator on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @09:06AM (#39916941)
Doesn't .gov do a bit of that already?

Part of the problem is, no one knows who's really working on what. If you asked some of the most knowledgeable people in the GNU/Linux ecosystem who maintained xz before last week, there's a real chance they couldn't have told you, not without some investigating first. And that would only have gotten them a name, not the maintainer's personality, resources situation, etc.

There needs to be a census of sorts over the stuff that goes into the GNU/Linux ecosystem to see who needs what.

Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by sylware on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @09:09AM (#39916979)
It may be paying for minimal (including the SDK), but able to do a good enough job, ultra stable in time reference software/network protocol/file format maintainance.

It excludes nearly all software out there (even open source, and closed source are de-facto excluded), because most "developers" are only a bunch of scammers heavy on planned obsolescence.

That includes software "maintained" by the academic sector, like your have with MIT media labs and the nice "donations" from bill gates (to probably steer it the way he wanted, I would not be surprised this is not alien to c++ in gcc... one of the biggest mistakes in open source software), that revealed in the epstein files.

To say the least, it is far from ez. If you are an _honest_ dev, you know it is extrutiatingly hard to justify a permanent income.

Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by throw4847285 on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @09:33AM (#39917246)
Agricultural subsidies are a terrible example because they're so corrupt. The cheese reserve doesn't exist because it's gonna protect Americans from starvation. It exists because the dairy industry massively overproduces. Only a small amount gets converted into cheese. Millions of gallons just get dumped[1]. The dairy industry is entirely unsustainable, especially given that the government keeps the price of milk low because it's considered vital for children's development, dairy lobby propaganda with no basis in fact. And these massive subsidies don't even help small farmers. The only way to keep up with the absurd artificial demand is massive factory farming of genetically engineered super cows bred in a lab to produce as much milk as possible with a life expectancy a third of a normal cow.

[1]: https://www.wsj.com/articles/americas-dairy-farmers-dump-43-...

(I guess this isn't really relevant to the OP, but I recently read a fantastic book about the dairy industry and now I can't shut up).

Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by jart on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @09:56AM (#39917544)
Why are you advocating for the government to take control of open source projects? Is anyone here naïve enough to believe that, after being persuaded of the national security interests of these projects, they're just going to hand over money to the random people who maintain them to keep doing what they're doing? The U.S. Govt isn't Santa Claus. Look at what they did to the farming industry. Most people used to be farmers and now there aren't many farms at all, since most of it's being done by big companies. Applying that idea to open source means the government would use regulation to prevent community developers from having their software used in production, and all future work on open source code would have to be done by engineers at big tech companies. In many ways that's already the de facto system we have today. So if you get the government involved, it'll just become law, and the lone wolves in open source who big tech doesn't want to hire will be fined, sent to jail, etc. Read "Everything I Want To Do Is Illegal" by Joel Salatin.