Which government bureaucracy decides how much Lasse Collin should be paid? Based on what metrics? This is a giant can of worms.
For example, maybe developers need to be made aware of potential psyops by attackers (the publicity surrounding this issue probably made some progress on that front).
How long will it be before the government starts pressuring these maintainers to do the things the government wants?
It's not valid to presume that the only way to mitigate risks is through top-down political intervention.
And it's absolutely not valid to presume that making FOSS communities dependent on political subsidies would not have much worse and much longer term consequences than the problems we are trying to mitigate.
In fact, it's entirely possible that the political intermediaries who control the purse-strings would have an even greater capacity to introduce their own backdoors or otherwise compromise security in pursuit of their own ambitions.
What you're proposing here might well represent trying to keep out one set of threat actors by handing the keys to the castle over to another set of threat actors. And this would be on top all of the other problems it would cause: convergence toward homogeneous monocultures, project priorities being distorted by political incentives, vested interests using political influence to suppress competition from FOSS projects, etc.
It's worth pointing out that the swift detection and remediation of the xz backdoor by the community almost immediately after the threat actor pulled the trigger on their two-year long con represents a resounding success of the FOSS "many eyes" model, and it's not clear what politicians throwing money around would add to the equation.
Government orgs can and do contribute the results of the work they do in this regard upstream to FOSS projects. This has never not been the case, and when government-employed developers release the work they do to meet their own security requirements to the broader community, everyone benefits.
But this is drastically different from the scenario that the preceding poster was proposing, in which government officials would assume effective responsibility for the entire project, not just act as participants in the FOSS community.
That proposal would invert the situation, and change it from government devs adhering to the norms and conventions of the community to the community adhering to the rules and priorities defined by the government, which is where the negatives I outlined above would come into play.
Donations is fine, but it needs to be “no strings attached”, otherwise I agree with the GP that the risk of weaponising FOSS may become even greater.
I do agree that the US government is critically dependent on FOSS by now though. But “why throw money at it if it ain’t broken?” is the prevalent mentality, especially when everyone can have their own definition of “broken”…
This is itself a category error. By this standard anything and everything upstream of certain government agencies implicates a "national security", and you might as well say that the supply chain for staplers is a national security issue because government officials staple documents together, or that the manufacture of socks is a national security issue because government agents wear socks.
Naturally, it's up to organizations themselves to make sure that their particular usage of any specific resource meets their exceptional security needs, not to expand the definition of "national security" to encompass the entire upstream supply chain independently of their use cases.
> NIST give the Linux foundation money annually to pay a supporting team of developers rather than the government taking over maintenance on anything.
This in itself would create a nexus of influence that could ultimately function as a vector of social engineering attacks, including from factions within our own government. It's just not cut-and-dried enough to presume that government money is some sort of magic solution and wouldn't itself actually make things worse.
You’re leaving out the key part: this only works if there’s a way for a flaw in those staples or socks to impact national security functions. Once you correctly make the analogy you can easily see why that’s true for a server operating system but not either of your examples.
Organizations that are concerned with outlandish risks like these implement their own policies and procedures to safeguard against them. They might x-ray office supplies before allowing their use in secure facilities; they might maintain a short list of approved fabrics in an ESD-sensitive environment. The point is that organizations that have exceptional security requirements apply their own policies and procedures to mitigate risk, and don't expect parties upstream of them do so for them.
Software is a national security threat because IT is increasingly dependent on computing. Plenty of civilian tech is being used in Ukraine to good effect.
Smart stakeholders are going to watch where stuff is used and target the supply chain. It may be Russians, Mideast stakeholders, or domestic extremists.
Software is to 2024 what a truck bomb was in 1994.
I wouldn't have gov't be maintainers of the main repos, but either be assigned to vetting critical repos, or mirroring them and co-maintaining copies endorsed for security (if I agreed gov't should be involved).
The ultimate questions is, are our critical systems (kernel, systemd, core userland) safe *enough* against future similar attacks, that we are okay trusting the global economy to another lucky valgrind test?
You incorrectly implied that a national security risk is "the potential of negative consequences in any sphere of human life". If we didn't get lucky, this could have been an economic and human catastrophe. That's not an inconvenience.
I believe in Bayesian probability a lot more than I believe in luck. The fact that a random sysadmin investigating performance issues was able to rapidly unravel this whole thing is at least a minimal indicator that either (a) this particular attack was largely incompetent, and any of the many "savvy testers" in the community would have uncovered it within short order, but more sophisticated attacks might remain undetected, or (b) this was a sophisticated attack, and the community is generally resilient to this form of infiltration.
Part of the problem is, no one knows who's really working on what. If you asked some of the most knowledgeable people in the GNU/Linux ecosystem who maintained xz before last week, there's a real chance they couldn't have told you, not without some investigating first. And that would only have gotten them a name, not the maintainer's personality, resources situation, etc.
There needs to be a census of sorts over the stuff that goes into the GNU/Linux ecosystem to see who needs what.
It excludes nearly all software out there (even open source, and closed source are de-facto excluded), because most "developers" are only a bunch of scammers heavy on planned obsolescence.
That includes software "maintained" by the academic sector, like your have with MIT media labs and the nice "donations" from bill gates (to probably steer it the way he wanted, I would not be surprised this is not alien to c++ in gcc... one of the biggest mistakes in open source software), that revealed in the epstein files.
To say the least, it is far from ez. If you are an _honest_ dev, you know it is extrutiatingly hard to justify a permanent income.
[1]: https://www.wsj.com/articles/americas-dairy-farmers-dump-43-...
(I guess this isn't really relevant to the OP, but I recently read a fantastic book about the dairy industry and now I can't shut up).
People not starving is a national security interest.
It's getting to the point where the software we rely on is also a national security interest. The US government should be paying to maintain and improve this software. Security risks in Linux and core packages threaten to shut down key infrastructure.
Paying developers to maintain open source projects that are actually used could be an incredibly effective use of tax dollars.
[1]: https://usafacts.org/topics/agriculture/#581290c9-a960-49aa-...
[2]: https://www.deseret.com/2022/2/14/22933326/1-4-billion-pound...