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Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by acdha on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @02:32PM (#39921167)
> you might as well say that the supply chain for staplers is a national security issue because government officials staple documents together, or that the manufacture of socks is a national security issue because government agents wear socks.

You’re leaving out the key part: this only works if there’s a way for a flaw in those staples or socks to impact national security functions. Once you correctly make the analogy you can easily see why that’s true for a server operating system but not either of your examples.

Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by Gormo on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @06:57PM (#39924394)
What if a threat actor embedded secret listening devices into staplers? What if wool socks specifically designed to maximize ESD discharge were used to disable sensitive equipment?

Organizations that are concerned with outlandish risks like these implement their own policies and procedures to safeguard against them. They might x-ray office supplies before allowing their use in secure facilities; they might maintain a short list of approved fabrics in an ESD-sensitive environment. The point is that organizations that have exceptional security requirements apply their own policies and procedures to mitigate risk, and don't expect parties upstream of them do so for them.

Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by acdha on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @07:05PM (#39924460)
Socks and staplers are not part of the security infrastructure. Computers are, and that means it’s in the interests of everyone to keep them secure.
Re:Reflections on Distrusting xz by Gormo on Wednesday April 03, 2024 @08:55PM (#39925275)
"Computers" is too broad to be meaningful. Compression tools are no more a part of the security infrastructure per se than socks and staplers are.