Since then there has been a lot of consolidation of the suppliers of Boeing, to the point where Boeing has much less leverage than it once did and often has only one option left for many of the parts in needs. I'm not sure how much this has contributed to its current issues, but it seems a systematic issue that Boeing doesn't make its own planes anymore and has to rely on suppliers who are scraping every ounce of margin out of their production processes.
There must be counter examples but I can’t think of any.
Regulation can help, and it broke up the single telecom where I am and really improved things (just wondering if I can justify a 8gbps connection…).
That’s why many utility companies in the US are government sanctioned monopolies.
Get a bunch of yes men on the board regulating a utility, though, and all the sudden it's easy for them to just approve whatever the utility wants to do regardless of public comment.
I can name lots of examples. Before 1982 there were like 20+ companies who wanted to produce video game console.
Did we need 10 different commercial unixs.
Also, the consolidation results in companies that have the capital to invest. Having LM, MC, Boeing and Airbus all making widebodies didnt make sense and resulted in issues for both tri-jet producers. Airbus was the winner in that situation because neither company could invest in twin-jet widebody.
The idea that the economy would be awesome if there were only small companies doesnt really hold up.
So just saying consolidation bad 100% doesnt really hold up.
The telecom are special because they were all state owned then privatized, they are mostly not the result of consolidation.
I am now a dedicated credit union customer.
I almost get the impression that wants and needs are confused here... Some people didn't want 10 different commercial types of UNIX, but some people did need a specific type of UNIX.
This probably sounds woefully inefficient to the average American business mind, but it seemed to work great. Each sub-firm had their own way of doing things that was tailored to maximize efficiency on a local level. Sure, inter-division communication could be wonky sometimes, but eventually you learn how to iron out those wrinkles.
Sure, there's redundancy in some parts of the business. Those costs are easy to calculate. What's much harder to calculate is the cost of taking 14 manufacturing firms scattered 4 continents, stripping them of their current internal processes, and replacing them with a unified system.
Most things are just so short term focused these days that there are few incentives to build a slower, more stable business (or product, or government, or social network, or news media, etc)
Consolidating companies into a few massive corporations centralized power, but it also centralizes risk. They'd be more careful, and may even be unwilling to risk the treadmill of endless acquisitions if each addition adds more risk and liability.
Consolidation in the aircraft industry has failed the country. We've got no other vendors.
I'll also admit to working for McDonnell Douglas Aerospace, 1984-86. Sandy McDonnell was CEO, and John McDonnell III had been an engineer in various divisions and disciplines for a while, and was waiting in the wings. McDonell Douglas was a family company. I had to get a manager's signature to get office supplies, Sandy was so thrifty. If, as this article claims, MD accounting based culture was the problem, it hadn't been in place too long before the 1997 Boeing acquisition.