That is correct.
The IAM condition language is flexible and does not prevent you from doing strange things.
Doing glob matching on account IDs is like doing concatenation with guids, applying a bitshift to a UTF8 string, or running a regex on an integer. It is a nonsensical operation, and - as shown here - results in surprising security properties of the resulting system.
Surprising security properties are an undesirable result in an access control policy language.
We, the DevOps people, already knew about side channel attacks, Spectre and the likes, evaluated the performances hit for the fixes (or alleged fixes), patched our kernel boot params etc etc. We are curious people, just like many here.
Well we are, if nothing, consistent.
The next nerd who pinches and inch of the coder/ops divide is going to make a billion.
It's amazing how anything got made considering how disjointed processes used to be.
Not GP, I tried to answer as friendly as possible. Their approach is even more weird given that Security goes really hand in hand with systems infrastructure In any small enough organization, security will be managed by devops/sre. If the org becomes large enough, it will start dedicating people to Security.
It used to be really bad... "works on my machine", bad deploy instructions etc. We paved a lot of these roads with (really fucking bad) strategies like containers. At some point maybe we will learn to write software that is operationalizable. Projects like tigerbeetle give me hope that this is our next evolution.
Anyway, this discussion is a bit amusing to me, since Devops people are discovering side channels[1] now, although other types of side channels such as speculative execution side channels on CPUs (Meltdown, Spectre) already made waves at the time of discovery, and before that we had power analysis[2] and Magnetostriction detection, and constant time cryptography (this one is a field of its own, so I omit references.)
[1] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Side-channel_attack [2] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Power_analysis