https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html
(your first sentence is good though!)
Saying that "humans" are capable of locomotion or movement using their legs implicitly refers to an expectation, and nobody with that intends to say that individuals who are confined to a wheelchair are not humans.
Saying that humans have 5 fingers on each hand, which is the expectation, does not imply that individuals born with a different number of fingers are not humans, but simply that is not the expectation.
This comment cannot be answered properly without knowing who the "biologists" are, which insect types we are talking about, and what is going along with the different number of something.
The fact that individuals with four or six fingers are considered to be of the same species has nothing to do with politics, but with the fact that people with "4 fingers" can reproduce (this is the expectation) with individuals with "5 fingers" and "6 fingers" and produce fertile offspring.
Politics comes into play when it comes to, for example, species conservation. Populations of the same species that have remained isolated from each other for centuries, millennia or more may accumulate due to selection processes, genetic drift or founder effect, genetic and phenotypic characteristics that do not allow individuals from the two populations to reproduce successfully. Fertilization may not occur, the progeny may show morphological abnormalities, or the offspring may not be fertile. But the above may occur in, say, 20 percent, 50 percent or 90 percent of cases, and for any of these percentages the existence of a new species, variant or subspecies can be argued. Should the two populations be protected since they are (or are not) different species?
It is clear that a human being who is sterile, or one who cannot move about, is in some sense a defective specimen, as these deficiencies impede the realization of human telos. (If you deny telos, then truly nothing is intelligible. Not only does the notion of defect no longer make sense, not only are biology and biological function impossible and anatomy made unintelligible, but even efficient causality is made unintelligible and science impossible, as the very fact that an effect follows from a cause, that is is not arbitrary, presupposes telos.)
https://www.princeton.edu/news/2020/05/07/gene-flow-between-...
Well, then you have problems like how speciation occurs. If the ability to produce offspring is your definition, then interbreeding does not exist by definition. And then you're left with the question of how species come about. Let us suppose some member of species A produces an offspring of species B where B is not A. Then for the species B to survive, there must arise another member of that species B (i.e., one that can interbreed). So you have at least three low chance events: (1) two members of the same new species being born (2) at roughly the same time (3) meeting each other and (4?) breeding. You also could not say that A and B could interbreed, and it is only some species C arising form B that cannot interbreed with A, because you've already make interbreeding impossible; if you can breed, you are the same species. So if A and B can interbreed, and B and C can interbreed, then by transitive property, so can A and C. So interbreeding, full stop, cannot be criterion, certainly not the sole criterion.
> Its just a human word like wall or chair.
But this undermines the notion of species as objectively true. Artifacts of that sort differ from natural kinds in the sense that such artifacts have no inherent tendency to be what they are, whereas natural kinds do. A chair is not inherently to be something we sit on. That is merely a telos in the mind of the craftman, and this telos is what that determined the form he would give the artifact. The affordance and suitability of such an artifact for sitting is something that a user of that artifact may recognize in the chair and take advantage of. What qualifies as a chair is at least in part subject to convention for practical reasons. But a bird is not like that. It is not a matter of perspective that a bird is "birdy" and does birdy things and realizes objective ends in birdy ways that are not merely observer relative. Sure, we can categorize animals for practical purposes, and we may do so according to various ends for practical rather than theoretical reasons (like classifying beaver as a fish, and fish as not meat, for Lent), but that sort of practical classification is merely practical and secondary to the question of what something actually is.
And we cannot avoid saying what a thing is as that is inherent to the notion that reality is intelligible. If you were to reduce "birdiness" to mere convention, then you would indeed be characterizing birds in the same manner as artifacts (this is called mechanism, and it has severe problems). But even a mechanist would still need to classify the things that go into making this object of merely conventional identity, at some level, or else be left to conclude that reality is unintelligible, though strangely conventions manage to magically escape this problem, as mental entities would remain intelligible. One who denies the intelligibility of the world would be left with the task of explaining how he can even make the distinction between his intelligible "mental world" and "the world out there" without some intelligibility in the first place.
Ideas have consequences, consequences greater than many realize.