Perhaps one day we might see capitalism as an "iterated socialism" (ie., socialism as thought about if you include time in your imagination).

And communism, libertarianism, anarchism, etc. as all products of a time-free form of reasoning where you can just pause the world and imagine that all people will "run the same program".

Stability and guarantees from a strong central state really grease the wheels of commerce.

I disagree, and history has shown that free markets absent government control doe not instantly become monopolized, and infact through out most of history monopolize form when the government regulates the most

Look at todays market as an example, the most competition is present in markets where the government has the least influence, where markets like energy, healthcare, etc which are the most regulated are also the most monopolized

Neutrally, using the term "anarchical market", i'd say that these markets are empheral. Everyone them has to act against rules which are not in their self-interest, it's highly unclear why a subgroup of market participants wouldnt immediately collectivise and outcompete everyone else.

Collectivisation is human's superpower, and the obvious an immediate thing basically everyone does (hence: mafia, warlords, cartels, etc.). It would be remarkable to see this anarchical market of yours remain free for very long, so I'd gladly hear of one case.

The main mechanism against collectivisation is that some biggest baddest collective decides to prohibit it (hence the state). There may be others, but I can think of none that would operate under anarchical conditions.

The Hanseatic League. This was basically its own trade association across North Europe, based on maritime trade. It had considerable market/economic power, but no legislative power; most participants were city-states so they were self-reliant to a degree, but none of them had jurisdiction or power over the entire group.

> Hanseatic Cities gradually developed common trade regulations.

> That year, the merchants of the Hansa in Cologne convinced King Henry II of England to exempt them from all tolls in London[26] and to grant protection to merchants and goods throughout England.[27]: 14–17

> etc.

> By the mid-16th century, these weak connections left the Hanseatic League vulnerable, and it gradually unraveled as members became consolidated into other realms or departed, ultimately disintegrating in 1669.

So it looks like the league was parasitic on the relevant states involved being able to implement regulations, so, basically exactly the point i'm making.

And secondarily, insofar as the legague itself lacked a mechanism to enforce transnational agreeement, it was weak and collpased.

So QED: insofar as participating states had viable regulating mechanisms the system work; insofar as challenges arose which requrired transnational mechanisms, it fell apart.

Of course it matters what kind of regulation; it's also possible to regulate markets in a way that protects monopolies, and some governments do that. So it's important to have a government that understands the importance of a free market.

To give you some examples, the Dutch markets for health insurance and energy are entirely privatised but heavily regulated, and quite competitive. It's easy to switch from one provider to another, and so they compete hard on price. Although perhaps more so in the early days after privatisation than more recently.

On the other hand, the market for software is not very regulated, it's heavily monopolised. Sometimes the EU makes moves to increase competition, but that's only piecemeal and not always terribly effective; Microsoft still rules the desktop, except in those areas where Apple now rules it.

Monopolization requires control of land or resources. This is because any cartel's attempt to set artificially high prices can be undercut by new entrants to the market who aren't in the cartel.

> On the other hand, the market for software is not very regulated, it's heavily monopolised.

Software is monopolized primarily through regulated monopolies on software (re)production i.e. copyright.

It's not copyright that monopolises software, but api support. The need to reverse engineer other people's work. A lack of open standards. There would be more competition possible in software if regulation mandated open standards and open apis.

So no, you don't need control of land to enable monopolization. You don't need IP law either. There are a million different factors that can drive monopolization, and many of those factors do require some degree of regulation to mitigate them.

Although you could argue that corporations themselves are a government-created construct, and removing those would remove the problem. That could be true, but that's a very big step.

The threat of jail time for people sharing pirated copies or circumventing copyright protected measures changes the pros/cons people weigh whether or not some people copy or reverse engineer despite those risks. There would be a lot more competition if pirates weren't incurring all these additional risks and were able to compete fairly without state backed copyright monopolies.

> There are a million different factors that can drive monopolization

The primary driver is restricting competition. If your competition is unrestricted then why would they join your cartel when they can outcompete you? Someone will always see that they can get a larger piece of the pie by outcompeting the cartel. Monopolies always use force to prevent winning in fair competition.

Could you give examples of this happening? When the prices are low that sounds like a good outcome for their customers. Assuming the price drop doesn't affect other aspects customers care about like quality.

The problem is when prices are raised above what they would otherwise be in a competitive market. You phrased this as "once the newcomer is gone", but there isn't anything preventing another newcomer from emerging, or several. The action of raising prices is openly visible to the market. This will attract entrepreneurs to the industry as a result of the perceived success of the monopolistic firm. In other words greedily raising prices above what the market wants to pay is a suicidal move for a single firm that relies on its customers to continue to buy whatever it is selling. This opens a market opportunity for newcomers where it did not exist before the price hike as customers would be encouraged to look for an alternatives.

Monopolies backed by force are not reliant on their customers' voluntary decisions in this way so the analysis above only applies to situations that prevent forcing customers to choose a particular firm against their wishes.

> When the prices are low that sounds like a good outcome for their customers.

No, because it's only temporary. They only lower the price to drive the competitor out of business, and once they're out of business, they raise the prices again.

> there isn't anything preventing another newcomer from emerging

Yes there is: investment. If every newcomer goes out of business like that, that makes it a bad investment to enter that market. You are already at a disadvantage entering a new market because of the investment needed. If you then can't recoup those costs, there's not much point in even trying. And the established big players can and will drop their prices to run you out of business unless stopped by regulation. Your argument only works if you ignore investment costs necessary to enter a market.

There's literally more than a century of legal history behind this.

I would argue that it's good for the state to take some sort of interest in regulating them, one of several ways that I'm not a free-market fundamentalist.

But arguing that the formation of cartels makes a market non-free is backward. Cartels emerge through free association in trade. Regulating them might make for a more functional market, a more efficient market (or it might not) but it makes for a less free market, always.

I will add that I consider the very idea of "absence of the state" to be badly-formed, states vary considerably in their constitution but there's always something serving that role, even if it's a few elders in a village.

A cartel sets prices, and is one of the many ways markets are unfree.

There's a ton of confusion created by libertarian sorts who fail to distinguish between government regulation which sets prices, and regulation necessary for the operation of the market itself. Basically delusional ideologues have denied the latter exists, by just ignoring it.

If a government acts to set prices it makes a market non-free, just as much as if a cartel does so. "Free" cannot plausibly mean that a mafia is fine but a police force isnt.. and the claim that it does is just libertarian propaganda.

Governments which regulate markets so as to prevent cartels are acting to prevent the very sort of price-setting which "free" denotes does not occur

That's true, but cartels can't enforce this. New or external firms can compete with the cartel. If a cartel reduces production or raises prices then it incentivizes competitors to meet the market demand with lower prices. The only way the cartel can exclude new firms is by controlling the entirety of some resource or enforcing the cartel usually in the form of lobbying for regulations.

You're assuming also that the cartel is operating only "economically", not also, eg., bribing, blackmailing, (stealing, murdering, ...), ...potential competitors. Why not just invite any competitor into the cartel? Why not buy them out? Why not "make life difficult" for them?

The underlying assumption that "things wash out" requires supposing that an extremely simplistic newtonian model of an economy where politics doesnt really occur. But people are foremost political, ie., engaged in tribal behaviour, collectivising, using force, and so on. This doesnt "wash out".

It may not be in Ontario. In a free market (i.e. one that respects property rights) it would be worthwhile. To see why, let me take your objections one by one.

Bribing competitors: The point of a cartel is to use force to prevent competition. Successful firms who are outcompeting their peers don't need to rely on force in this way, and enacting force is costly. The cost of the bribes must be factored into the cartels bottom line rendering them less efficient at meeting the market's needs. On the other hand the cartels inefficiencies require that the bribed competitors are leaving money on the table by taking the bribe instead of competing.

Blackmailing competitors: This supposes that you have some illegal or taboo information that can be used to blackmail competitors. This method of force will not work for any firms you cannot find dirt on. The cost of acquiring the blackmail is another source of inefficiency in the cartel at meeting the market's needs.

Stealing: Property rights are required in order to have a free market. Corrupt courts or enforcement of laws can prevent free markets from forming in the real world. Preventing corruption of these privileged offices is a difficult problem and could use more research.

Murdering: This is a special case of stealing as people own their own bodies so murder deprives them of their property.

> The underlying assumption that "things wash out" requires supposing that an extremely simplistic newtonian model of an economy where politics doesnt really occur.

I wasn't trying to say that "things wash out" no matter what. My point was that the circumstances surrounding monopolies affect their ability to prevent competition. It's easy to see that when an industry is doing well it attracts new competitors. Analyzing the reasons competitors are not able to compete in monopolized industries is the best way to understand how to prevent monopolies.

Are there any states that don't forcefully take property and life without people's consent? States are well known for taxing their citizens and fighting wars.

There are certainly small communities that don't steal or murder from anyone, but scaling them up has many challenges. I'd argue cultural attitudes around property rights are more important to creating free societies than top down laws and enforcement. Obviously some legal framework and enforcement would be necessary.