This is indeed a consequence of a physicalist/naturalist reductionist view. On that view, there is only natural entities and causes, and everything else reduces to just natural entities or causes. Therefore, as you imply, consciousness must somehow be explained by our biological brain or other natural entities/causes (note that I didn't say "arise", since some naturalists deny there's actually any such thing as 'consciousness' to be explained).

But you can also approach this from the other direction: it is impossible for naturalism to explain (or explain away) consciousness, and consciousness is real, therefore naturalism is false. That's my position. There isn't even the seed of an explanation given naturalism, and I think the naturalist's best position is to simply deny there's anything to explain. The whole project, given naturalism, is hopeless.

Again, it's not a problem of scale but rather kind. Naturalism just doesn't have the right building blocks to explain (or explain away) consciousness.

> it is impossible for naturalism to explain (or explain away) consciousness, and consciousness is real, therefore naturalism is false

I’ve always found the denial of the existence of experiential consciousness to be kind of funny. If you removed all my senses and put my brain in a vat to keep it alive, what would be left? As far as my brain is concerned, consciousness is the only thing for which I can be definitively certain of its existence.

It’s a solipsistic viewpoint, because I can only prove that consciousness is real for me. And since I can’t prove that it is real to anyone else, it’s not “science” in the sense of the societal process that requires reproducibility among peers, but perhaps it is still science at the personal level since I can reproduce the observation of its existence to myself at any moment that I choose.

Yes exactly, it is the thing that is most familiar to us, most accessible, and the only thing of which we can be certain. Descartes in his Meditations went down this path, starting with that foundation.

But I don't think you need to land on solipsism, because we don't have to believe only those things which can be proved. To me, it seems a reasonable hypothesis to suppose there are other consciousnesses. For an experimental line of thinking that leads to that conclusion, I would recommend the aforementioned Meditations.

Many are tempted to think that the physical world is the certain thing that we have, missing the fact that we experience the physical world, and so it is experience that we have access to, not the physical world itself. That I am conscious and have experiences of such and such is the thing I am most certain of. Whether there are physical things that correspond to those experiences is an extrapolation.

Materialism (the much more common name of "naturalism") can, in principle, very much describe consciousness, if we understood the functionality of the brain enough. We already have an inkling, due to Turing: the human mind is quite possibly a computation, a mathematical object. Consciousness could then be an identifiable aspect of this computation.

I do agree though that in general, the materialist position is simply that consciousness is just not that deep a mystery, and some of the "deeper mysteries" like qualia are nothing special that even needs any explanation.

So you believe in a soul or what is the practical consequence?

Or even the more limited version: consciousness exists, but doesn't have a lot of the magical powers usually ascribed to it (free will, etc).

By way of analogy, if a civilisation had found an antenna, but has not discovered radio they might think that the internet and it's content is coming from within the antenna, because that's all there is.

So who knows, maybe god is an adtech corporation.

edit: ok you're quite right there are other ways out of the conundrum like idealism

There is another monist view though, one that sometimes gets called idealism, that says there is nothing else except for mental entities or causes. I lean towards this view.

The challenge for naturalism is to explain (or explain away) consciousness (the mental). We call this challenge 'the hard problem of consciousness'. The challenge for idealism is to explain (or explain away) the physical. However, there is no analogous 'hard problem of non-consciousness' (but the explanation of this would take an unreasonable amount of words that I cannot fit here).

There absolutely is. If the world is all ideas, then it's just as impossible to explain why different minds have a coherent shared illusion of the physical world, or even any kind of communication between minds at all. I think it's much easier to reject the concept of consciousness in a materialist world view than it is to reject the inexplicably shared physical world in an idealist world view.

Of course, there is the simple and self-coherent answer of solipsism, but that's a kind of an intellectual dead end, there's nothing really to discuss about it.

It is far from impossible. There are many idealist models. Here is one: there is a central consciousness (call it God), and God is able to give experiences to other consciousnesses, and those consciousnesses can communicate back to God.

On that model, there is a shared world because God gives experiences to these other consciousnesses as of being in a shared world. The other consciousnesses, in turn, communicate back to God what they will, and that influences future experiences that God gives to those other consciousnesses. That gives a shared illusion of the physical world.

Note that whether you're a naturalist or an idealist, you're going to postulate some things as true without justifying them. For the naturalist, they postulate the existence of physical things without explaining why the physical exists at all. For the idealist, they postulate the existence of mental things without explaining why mental stuff exists at all. If the idealist asks to be granted the above simple postulates, then a coherent shared illusion is possible. I'm willing to grant the physicalist whatever physical postulates they need, and from that I would like to see how they explain (or explain away) consciousness.

If I take a camera, a microphone, a speaker, and some other sensors and feed them into a CPU/GPU and self train it to have an understanding of its capabilities (internal/self) and the world around it (the external), this this consciousness or not? If I light a fire near this 'smart' computer via it's sensors it can detect the heat and move farther away. If I give this computer a complex task that it has to calculate multiple steps to achieve before it acts, is this not mental work?

In LLM based systems we can't really figure out how this occurs because the computational complexity of the operations is too high, much like brute forcing encryption, getting to the answer of how it's working isn't impossible, you'd just have to burn the visible universe to figure it out.

Well don't lean on it too hard because its not very solid ; )

(side note: there is absolutely, undeniably, a correlation between brain states and mental states -- but that does not entail that mental states reduce to or are explained entirely by brain states)

Is trying to figure out how the brain works by looking at synapses and blood flow and electric fields similar to trying to see how an iPhone works by looking at transistors and electric fields?

* https://www.cell.com/cancer-cell/fulltext/S1535-6108%2802%29... Can a biologist fix a radio?

* https://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/article?id=10.1371/jo... Could a Neuroscientist Understand a Microprocessor?

Does anyone have a term for this from philosophy of science literature?

If you want to ruin your day, you can try and parse through the SEP page on reductionism. It's a doozy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-reduction/

Would they get another iPhone if they break the first one?

The task is no different than any other scientific endeavor, from biology to physics: they'll keep poking and prodding at it in different ways, making observations, accumulating and discarding hypotheses, until some kind of coherent and useful model becomes apparent. Hell, given sufficient supply of iPhones, this would be much easier than figuring out the brain - there's lot of value in short feedback loops and being able to do meaningful experiments on the cheap.

> Is trying to figure out how the brain works by looking at synapses and blood flow and electric fields similar to trying to see how an iPhone works by looking at transistors and electric fields?

They would be looking at that (after speed-running the relevant part of the "tech tree" to understand fields and transistors), and importantly, how it correlates with observed behavior such as ChatGPT saying something, or crashing the weird fire-breathing demon plane???! simulacra in Grand Theft Auto V. Same is the case with intelligence, except we're not free to circuit-bend people the same way the 1923 scientists would be with their iPhones, due to ethics and stuffs.

Would it still be possible without Boolean Logic (1847)? Of course they'd have to realize that it applied. [1]

Earliest possible date they'd be successful might be post-Leibniz in the 1690's. [1]

Of course, there's an argument to be made that it'd not be possible before Alan Turing's work in 1935/1936-ish. On the other hand, in 1923 you'd already have most of the ideas that lead to Turing's insights.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boolean_algebra#History

It's not plain correlation. It's long been experimentally demonstrated that you can circuit-bend[0] an animal or a human live, by poking in their brain[1]. If in those cases, altering brain state creates/affects behavior and mental states, then there isn't really a place for a non-physical-stuff consciousness. If it existed, it's demonstrably overridable by purely physical interventions, which implies you could just make a physical-stuff consciousness, at which point why postulate a non-material one?

--

[0] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Circuit_bending

[1] - Then there's obviously alcohol, tobacco, and other drugs, that have a slower onset.

However, if you're an alien and you don't know the exact workings, you might conclude that alcohol affects cars.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Necessity_and_sufficiency

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venn_diagram

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heuristic_(psychology)

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three-valued_logic

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proving_a_negative

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness (that which is actually being described) - see also: https://www.joelonsoftware.com/2005/12/29/the-perils-of-java...

If there is a way to prove it is necessarily exhaustive, I would like to hear it.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_statistics

I'm generally ok with beliefs, provided they are realized as such.

I disagree. For example: how can humans operating on scientific principles so consistently stack hundreds of "just" beliefs on top of each other to achieve things like landing things on the moon, as just one very old example?

I suspect there is more to it....I believe that all beliefs are not equal, and I'll go even further: some beliefs are true, and some beliefs are not true.

> using probability for the math is a way to account for uncertainty

That "account for" has a different meaning than "perfectly resolve" seems highly relevant.

> instead of rounding everything up or down to impossible standards of "true" or "false"

Of the two of us, who is rounding things up or down to an artificial truth?

It's like assuming that the driver creates a spark in order to initiate combustion within the car, because the aliens haven't observed an instance of the car starting without the driver present.

But doesn’t seem in any way explanatory of consciousness itself, i.e. the owner of the brain’s awareness of those state changes.

I think this points at the somewhat nebulous definition of consciousness, which at its core seems categorically separate from the phenomena that can be experienced (and manipulated by poking at the brain) within it.

This is why some have theorized that everything is conscious, and the human experience of consciousness just happens to be particularly rich and complex due to the complexity of the human organism. This would suggest that a sufficiently advanced computer could also be conscious, with the specific experience mediated by the architecture of the computer.

(I’m not endorsing this position, but it’s an interesting thought experiment to help separate experiences in consciousness from consciousness itself).

You are right that on naturalism there isn't really a place for non-physical-stuff consciousness. And yet, the existence of non-physical-stuff is the one thing I am most sure of, the one and only thing I have access to. So the challenge is to explain it (or explain it away). As you say, there's no place for it in a naturalist view of the world, and I agree.

But they could be. Elsewhere in this thread, I mentioned computer science is effectively a branch of physics now, because we can connect computation with thermodynamics, and e.g. put lower bounds on amount of energy required to perform certain computation. Therefore, if you consider experiences to be "execution", some specific computations done by our brains, then they still are physical things. Might be tricky to point and prod at them in the structure of our brain, but physical concepts that are smeared over space or time are nothing new - think e.g. waves, whether EM waves or mechanical waves or virtual waves, think of the boiling soup they make out of their medium, and how e.g. Fourier transform can tease them all apart anyway.

Which it seems to me to boild down to the assumption that intelligence and/or consciousness are computable. Which is a possibility, but we should keep in mind that we don't have any proof of this yet, only plausible-sounding arguments.

Why would anyone think that is true? The problem I find with responses like yours is that I think you haven't understood or fully appreciated what it is I'm pointing to that needs explaining. There's something real here that needs explaining or accounting for in a full theory, and an explanation like this doesn't even touch on it. In the full story of "what is experience", there is absolutely without doubt a computational side. But there is an aspect of experience, the 'felt'-ness of it, or the phenomenology, the qualia, that is not explained even in part by reference to computations or any other physical process.

There's just nothing like that, no precursors of it, to be found in the physical world. It's not the computational side of experiences, but rather the what-it's-like-ness of it.

Here's an example of it: what, given naturalism, explains the redness of seeing red? This is not a question about the wavelengths of light, or light hitting the retina, or processing in the brain that leads to the brain states that correspond to having that experience. This is a question about what it's like to see red -- the experiential side of the experience, as opposed to the physical causes of it. Why, given naturalism, would we think that anything experiences (first person perspective) anything at all?

Technically, software isn't exactly physical either, of course. It works with information contained in physical states, but isn't -technically- itself physical.

Arguably this can be demonstrated by moving it to a different physical representation (magnetic, optical, diode charges, dynamic memory cells; little endian, big endian; AMD, Intel, ARM, Turing Machine In Game Of Life, Minecraft Turing Machine) without affecting its behavior or functionality.

I don't think there's anything particularly mysterious about this kind of phenomenon, per-se.

You could grok the behavior of the software by poking at the hardware its running on for long enough; but it might be more useful to split the problem into separate layers that are easier to reason about. (Hence the need for reduction and emergence)

This does not follow. The altering of brain state affects behavior; from this we can deduce that there is a correlation between the two, and that there is a causal link between the two. We can't deduce from this that they're the same thing or that one is reducible to the other: this is illogical.

More generally, it is illogical to claim that brain states are the same as mental states (thoughts). There are several reasons for this. One is that reducing thoughts to brain states means a thought cannot be correct or incorrect. For example, one series of mental states leads to the thought "2+2=4"; another series leads to the thought "2+2=5". The correctness of the former and the wrongness of the latter refers only to the thought's content, not the physical brain state. If thoughts are nothing more than brain states, it's meaningless to say that one thought is correct -- that is to say, it's a thought that conforms to reality -- and that the other is incorrect. A particular state of neurons and chemicals cannot per se be incorrect or incorrect. If one thought is right (about reality) and another thought is wrong (not about reality), then there must be aspects of thought that are distinct from the physical state of the brain.

If it's meaningless to say that one thought is correct and another is incorrect, then of course nothing we think or say has any connection to reality. Hence the existence of this disagreement, along with the belief that one of us is right and the other wrong, presupposes that your position is wrong.

No amount of neurological study will undermine this argument. More generally, describing one aspect of reality in greater and greater detail doesn't gainsay those who claim there are other aspects. You can describe the inner workings of the brain in as much detail as you like -- it is nonetheless logically certain that human thought is not reducible to brain states, even though it obviously correlates with them.

> If one thought is right (about reality) and another thought is wrong (not about reality), then there must be aspects of thought that are distinct from the physical state of the brain.

Of course there is. Computation. Observation. A correctness of a thought isn't a function of thought itself, it's a function of thought and reality. Correctness of a thought is not a physical label. It's not a state. It's something you evaluate, something you compute with respect to knowledge you observe.

The way I see it, you're confusing a thought with computed properties of it. There is no privileged notion of correctness and nature does not put XML tags with correctness score on neurons.

I agree with this, although I think it's more precise to say a thought is correct insofar as it conforms to reality.

> Correctness of a thought is not a physical label. It's not a state. It's something you evaluate, something you compute with respect to knowledge you observe.

This appears to be illogical. The correctness of my thought (that is to say, whether it conforms to reality) is one thing; my evaluation of its correctness is entirely different. Further, correctness must be a 'state', or property, of a thought: otherwise you undermine your own argument (see below).

> nature does not put XML tags with correctness score on neurons.

I agree with this. But this supports my argument. An arrangement of neurons (or anything physical) cannot be correct or incorrect. But a thought can be correct or incorrect (you must think that, because you must think you're right and I'm wrong about this disagreement). Therefore a thought cannot be reduced to an arrangement of neurons (or anything physical).

How does this make sense? There is some divine being that only sometimes looks at the actual synapses to decide if it should feel nauseous or happy?

It's a debatable position in philosophy against the reductionism OP is describing, and maybe a bit magical but I'd find it the more interesting of the two positions to hold.

That view states, as you describe, that somehow the whole is more than just the sum of the parts. I reject that. Instead, my claim is that if the only parts you have are physical parts, you will not get consciousness. You need other parts too -- specifically, mental/consciousness parts.

(although, this sounds closer to a dualist view, while my view is more idealist)

> If you fully understood the laws of physics at an atomic level, would it be sufficient to recognize a cpu as turing complete if you see one?

This is testable if you take an alternate universe with very few laws. Somewhat canonically, do you understand a Turing machine built in Conway's Game of Life if you understand the 2 rules of that game. (Or 4 rules, depending on how you count).

The only way to understand it is to play the game.

Much like there is no divine being that decides "I'm going to make this dense star a black hole", a black hole and the attached phenomena are consequences of matter and forces interacting.

Emotions are thoughts (brains and the attached phenomena) are consequences of matter and mind interacting.

One possibility: the experiences that God gives me at any moment are what they are because of the state of my brain. This isn't a sometimes thing, but an always thing. I see or experience what I do because of the state of my brain, but not only because of the state of my brain.

The problem is that the physical states alone don't entail anything about the experiential -- nothing about the phenomenology. The physical explanation leaves out things that are real and need explaining.

> physical stuff can never explain consciousness

These statements seem contradictory to me, can you elaborate? Also, you don't provide your reasoning for the second statement. Why do you believe that physical stuff can't cause consciousness? What is your definition of "physical"?

And I have a thought I would like to share here, an attempt at arguing for why it might be impossible for a physical pure materialistic model of the world to explain consciousness

In a pure physical materialistic world, we can represent everything as laws, interactions between materials, guided by a set of rules. That's it.

If we had a absolute knowledge, we can represent those rules, all of them, as a set of mathematical and logical equations.

I reduce the material world to a mathematical world of rules and laws, an abstract world.

Saying consciousness could arrise from a pure material world, is akin to saying the mathematical equations and laws, combined, can be conscious. As in, there is a system of rules that if tuned in a certain way can think. Since rules are abstract, and by definition rules don't think. No combination of them no matter how complicated can think

The initial rebuttle I have in my mind is that "well you are conflicting the system with the objects governed by it", I feel there is a better way to phrase the initial proposal to address this issue, but I just wanted to throw this idea out there

You look at all the proposed laws of the universe, and they involve things like energy, mass, time, position, work, etc, as inputs or outputs. No equations have inputs of these sorts of natural quantities and outputs that entail consciousness or that first-person experience.

We can see from these equations how things like tree leaves blowing in the wind, or mountains, might arise. These things involve motions and mass and things interacting with each other. While we might not be able to paint the full picture, we can see that the inputs and outputs of those equations are the right kinds of things that might plausibly lead to mountains and leaves blowing in the wind, at the right scale.

We can't see from these equations anything that might plausibly lead to the first-person experience, the what-it's-like to be something.

Note that the naturalist cannot then just inject these mental/consciousness related parameters into their equations. That would amount to a form of dualism, and destroy their project. What I think the naturalist needs to do is somehow explain away consciousness, because I don't see any path they could take to explain it in purely natural terms. They need to deny that there's anything here that needs explaining at all.

Source: neuroscience MS (dropped out after defending to become a software engineer)

At the moment we have absolutely no idea of what basic organisation (of synapses) it stems from, something we could build upon, nor any idea of the general organisation of the whole system that make the consciousness an emergent property

- It is simple enough to be reachable by a dumb, brute-force, random-walking, incremental process of evolution;

- It scales well, conferring survival benefits from the start, and at every point of the way, from the first neuron, up to the human brain;

With those in mind, it absolutely makes sense for us to find a relatively simple compute/organizational system and scale it all the way to consciousness (or a set of those that scale together) - because that's exactly how evolution must have done it, since it's structurally the only thing it can do.

(Even artificial) evolution sometimes does really weird things.

https://www.cse.unsw.edu.au/~cs4601/refs/papers/es97thompson... (page 399) "Fig 7 [...] The cells shaded gray cannot be clamped without degrading performance, even though there is no connected path by which they could influence the output"

Like a brute-force enumeration running on a supercomputing platform, it's mighty, but it's also simple.

Also, the process is simple. The output not so much.

Taking it a step further though; Of course evolution happened to the very mechanisms by which biological organisms evolve.

Because of course it would.

(eg.

* Eukaryote -> Meiosis : This is obviously a means to create/tailor Variation. (Evolution ~= Variation->Selection )

* Reproduction in Metazoa in general, with all kinds of complex methods to exchange DNA.

* Vertebrates. Just. Vertebrates. (specifically: Sexual reproduction thereof.)

* Simple but still strange: Viruses with multiple reading frames. Sure they successfully evolve, but it's never going to be straightforward!

)

I'm not an expert in this field, but from what I heard brute-force natural selection is the naive explanation we're given in school. There are many more factors at play other than random chance: e.g. there is also sexsual selection. Sexual selection selects some characteristic that isn't necessarily an advantage in the current environment, but it is somehow preferred by the opposed sex. According to some research, the reason why we lost the bone that other primates have in their penis is due to sexual selection.

It helps to understand that in some situations, a search algorithm with some level of randomness can arrive at a solution faster than a systematic/random approach, on average. In other situations, a search with added randomization might be slower, but its ability to escape local optimae (to some degree) means that it is much more likely to find the global optimum (or at least a better local optimum :-P ).

Compare also: Monte-Carlo methods.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolutionary_algorithm

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yLOHdW7dLug

https://www.gregegan.net/MISC/CRYSTAL/Crystal.html

“What created the only example of consciousness we know of?” Daniel asked.

“Evolution.”

“Exactly. But I don’t want to wait three billion years, so I need to make the selection process a great deal more refined, and the sources of variation more targeted.”

Julie digested this. “You want to try to evolve true AI? Conscious, human-level AI?”

“Yes.” Daniel saw her mouth tightening, saw her struggling to measure her words before speaking.

“With respect,” she said, “I don’t think you’ve thought that through.”

“On the contrary,” Daniel assured her. “I’ve been planning this for twenty years.”

“Evolution,” she said, “is about failure and death. Do you have any idea how many sentient creatures lived and died along the way to Homo sapiens? How much suffering was involved?”

“Part of your job would be to minimise the suffering.”

“Minimise it?” She seemed genuinely shocked, as if this proposal was even worse than blithely assuming that the process would raise no ethical concerns. “What right do we have to inflict it at all?”

Daniel said, “You’re grateful to exist, aren’t you? Notwithstanding the tribulations of your ancestors.”

“I’m grateful to exist,” she agreed, “but in the human case the suffering wasn’t deliberately inflicted by anyone, and nor was there any alternative way we could have come into existence. If there really had been a just creator, I don’t doubt that he would have followed Genesis literally; he sure as hell would not have used evolution.”

The moment you've used the term “brain”, you'd already detached that thing from the rest of the body (without which it can't function — just like a spherical cow can't really live in a vacuum), drawn its borders, set limits to its functions, and so on. The same with “synapses”. So by stating that those mental objects are “real”, you've simply found that X equals X, that those things are exactly the same as they are defined. Their evident presence here is no different from the evident presence of demons inside the possessed people in the past.

To subjugate the creator to that which it created is a bit funny.

[1] that's in the same phase state as us, inside a black hole or microseconds after the big bang may derive a different answer.

[2] up to the uncertainty limit

The laws of physics are “universally” agreed truths about certain mental phenomena experienced by the conscious observers that conscious observers have so far interacted with.

I, personally, enjoy a universe independant of the whims of observers.

To give an analogy, imagine the universe really was a collection of bits.[0,1,2,3,4].

We are some program which give means meaning to these bits. Another program on the other hand interprets these bits another way, perhaps even in a language completely incomprehensible to us.

The state of the universe can change to another set of bits, but each observer could still form completely different sets of perceptions, or change of perceptions.

The GP's arguments lead to greater weirdness than that. If the laws of science are mere mental phenomena (which I think is what he's saying), then we have no reason to think that things will ever behave in one way rather than another, because our thoughts about things point to nothing beyond our own minds.

If he were right, then reacting hydrogen with oxygen may produce heat and water; alternatively it may produce a chocolate cake with orange candles and a golf ball in the middle. Because the laws of science would exist only in our minds and wouldn't be about reality, we'd have no way of knowing: one prediction would be as rational, or irrational, as the other.

Since reality isn't like this, we know he's wrong, and that the laws of physics exist independently of observers.

Everything we know is through the observation and mental formulation of our mind. This is just an unavoidable fact. We make proofs of physical phenomena entirely through observation with our sensory receptors. Whatever scientific experiment you have, whether its watching a plant grow in a certain way or particle collision in the Hydron collider, is through the beliefs of an observer.

The question in my view, is how universal these mental conceptions are. After all, we all similarly agree on some basic observations. There is a ball here. The ball blew up, this detector turned on and off at these times, etc.

If however, there were hypothetically some other observer that did not agree with you on these basic beliefs, such that they said that the detector turned on at time 2 and not 1, then what is the reality? What method do you have to confirm what is reality when two observers disagree on what was observed?

It is easy to throw this thought to the wind and say, there can be other perception of reality possible, but that to me seems faith, not logic.

We know reality by means of our senses and ideas. We don't know our senses and ideas as such.

To repeat myself: if your claim is true, then the person who says "reacting hydrogen and oxygen will produce water and heat" can be no more, and no less, correct than the person who says "reacting hydrogen and oxygen will produce jello in the shape of George Washington's nose". Because if, as I think you claim, we know nothing but the "mental formulation of our mind", then our thoughts don't point to reality; and if this is true, we can't predict anything about reality. And therefore each of these two claims about chemistry is as valid as the other. Do you agree with this?

> If however, there were hypothetically some other observer that did not agree with you on these basic beliefs, such that they said that the detector turned on at time 2 and not 1, then what is the reality? What method do you have to confirm what is reality when two observers disagree on what was observed?

This is a red herring. We may never know who is right; that is different from saying that there is no reality to know.

I am failing to see the distinction here. If your only conception of "reality" is through your sensual perceptions, how can you know anything beyond that? How does reality then differ from mental conception of your sensual receptors? To me this is equivalent to saying, "there is a spiritual world that doesn't interact with anything and we cant prove it but it exists". The only thing I can think of is that reality is shared among several observers, who all agree on it.

This is why I brought up the hypothetical scenario of two scientists who disagreed on whether the detector turned on at t=1 or t=2.

If you were the only being on this planet so that no one could disagree with you, and you for some reason were high on LSD for the entirely of your life and saw flying rocks, would that not be your reality? Every scientific test you do would fit your findings, as perceived and evaluated by you. If there was a community of such people who never saw a rock standing still, what would be the real truth? And if you say "but there is still a reality, none of those people would just know it", then I can ask, how do you know we don't fit that same bill, where some other observer could look at us and say "those guys are all seeing an illusion, its actually this way"

>This is a red herring. We may never know who is right; that is different from saying that there is no reality to know.

But what determines who is right? That is my question. What answer can you give me besides "a conscious observer?", or "a collection of conscious observers who all agree".

And if you can't determine who is right, what meaning is there to it being reality? Why is one conscious experience any more correct than the other?

1. Do you agree that it is rational to think that burning hydrogen in oxygen will produce water and heat (prediction A), and irrational to think that it will produce a juicy stake that can play tennis (prediction B)?

2. If yes to 1, do you agree that A is correct (or at least closer to being correct), and B is incorrect (or at least further from being correct)?

3. If yes to 2, do you agree that there must be something against which A and B are both measured that makes one right and the other wrong?

4. If yes to 3, do you agree that the thing against which A and B are measured must be independent of them both?

5. If yes to 4, do you agree that there is a reality independent of our observations, and which our observations presuppose and are caused by?

I think you're saying that we can reasonably think that our sensual perceptions and ideas are all we know, and that we can reasonably doubt that they ever refer to reality, but I want to confirm this.

> And if you say "but there is still a reality, none of those people would just know it", then I can ask, how do you know we don't fit that same bill, where some other observer could look at us and say "those guys are all seeing an illusion, its actually this way"

See point 1, above. I suggest that nobody really systematically doubts their observations. But if you honestly disagree with point 1 then let me know.

> But what determines who is right? That is my question.

Obviously that is sometimes impossible to answer, depending on the situation. But sometimes (more often) it's not. Again, do you disagree with point 1 above?

This is an already answered question by relativity and causality.

Since light has a constant speed and also a propagation speed there are operations that observers will not agree on the order of... but they will always agree on the order of causality. The cup will always get pushed off the table first before it's broken on the ground.

What is the most fundamental fact? What is the first step, from which everything then can be derived?

That first step is the fact that there's something observing. That observer can construct a theory.

That theory can posit "actually, there's matter, and there seems to be matter which does not possess this same capacity of observation, therefore this inert matter must have formed first, and then [insert hypothesis of your choice] that's how the observer arose".

That's valid.

However, it's not a fact, and it's not the only theory.

The theory I'm entertaining instead, is this: the observing phenomenon is as much a fundamental part of the universe as gravity. The reason some things don't seem to possess it is that we can't directly perceive other's observing phenomena, and it's only when this phenomena binds with matter in such a way (time, appearance, scale, complexity, frequency) that it can communicate with similar binding phenomena, then there is recognition: "you have a face, you're smiling, you seem to be alive, so I'm going to assign the observer trait to you".

Now that I recognize other observers we can communicate and form a theory, and see what we can agree on. Then and only then I can say "well let's pretend that there are no observers and see what we can agree on". And thus the laws of physics are born, as a mental model.

I agree with the map-territory distinction -- but the laws of physics (or, better, the "way things behave") is primarily in the territory, and only derivatively in the map. Our map may be more or less accurate, but the map presupposes the territory. Otherwise, nothing we can say about reality is more or less true than anything else, and absurdity results (like the hydrogen-oxygen example I gave before). If the way things behave is solely a property of the map, not of the territory, then it must be the case that we can't predict what will happen when we react hydrogen with oxygen. But we can predict this, and therefore the way things behave is a property of the territory. The map that says hydrogen+oxygen=water+heat is a better map -- that is, closer to the territory -- than one that says hydrogen+oxygen=chocolate bunny. But again, better vs worse map presupposes the territory, and presupposes that the stuff on the map points to real stuff on the territory, however imperfectly.

Are you in agreement with this as far as it goes? Do you agree with my premise that we can predict what will happen when we react H and O?

> What is the most fundamental fact? What is the first step, from which everything then can be derived? That first step is the fact that there's something observing. That observer can construct a theory.

Surely the fundamental fact is existence? Without this, there can be no observation, no observer, and no observed object. These things, like any individual thing, presuppose existence.

Further, your statement presupposes other things: for example, the law of non-contradiction (which is a facet of existence). Your statement says that there is a 'thing', that it observes, and that it constructs a theory. It must therefore take for granted that there is not nothing; that the 'thing' doesn't not observe; and that it doesn't not construct a theory. Otherwise the statement is meaningless.

This is just the beginning of what I could say, but your argument, like any argument, presupposes existence, the laws of logic, non-contradiction, the distinction of one object from another (the law of identity), etc. So we can't take an observer as a fundamental fact. More generally, we can't take any particular thing as the fundamental fact. Universal knowledge precedes particular knowledge. Existence in general precedes existence of the particular.

I'm not sure if this directly affects our disagreement, but it might help understand where I'm coming from :-)

I do agree with the second premise, but I'd say that's just saying we have a really good map for that particular area of the terrain. If you're going to your aunt's and you have a really good map, you're not going to show up in hong kong (I'm mapping the example onto your hydrogen-oxygen case).

But fundamentally, "the laws of physics" are still information as digested by the human brain. At one point our map of physics didn't include relativity. Now it does. The terrain did, but the map didn't.

With this in mind, it's crucial to remember that our current map has nearly no information about consciousness. It's like you have really detailed information about your aunt's neighbor in Chicago, and you know that Hong Kong exists and is Eastward. So you just assume that it's a straight road. Someone might suggest there's a few mountains in the way, but fundamentally you have no idea how to actually connect both points of the map.

Materliasm is essentially that to me, looking at the very detailed map of current physics, wiping their hands and saying yup that should be enough, it's a straight line from here.

>Surely the fundamental fact is existence?

I try to refrain from making an observer-observation distinction. To quote Krishnamurti "the observer is the observed".

Moving the discussion in this direction feels like another map, the map of logic. Within the framework of logic, I do agree with those terms. However, I don't think reality obeys logic in so much as logic is another way for us to make sense of the phenomena around us.

I hope I don't annoy you by another analogy: Imagine we're watching a wolf and his cub, and I ask which comes first. You say the father of course, because he was born earlier. This is true. However, I was asking which of them was ahead, that is in the present moment which of them will arrive first. You were answering from knowledge, not from direct observation.

Maps, models, and logic, are within the realm of thoughts. But experientially, without following and validating the narrative of thoughts, can you directly observe that there is existence without observation? Your thoughts will immediately tell you that this is already a contradiction: can you observe that there is no observer? Can you discern in your own experience "this is observation", "this is existence". Could they be one and the same?

This is where I'm coming from. Thank you for engaging in these topics which are tricky to discuss :)

And therefore, the original statement that I took issue with, which was "[t]he laws of physics are 'universally' agreed truths about certain mental phenomena experienced by the conscious observers that conscious observers have so far interacted with" must be false.

> Materliasm is essentially that to me, looking at the very detailed map of current physics, wiping their hands and saying yup that should be enough, it's a straight line from here.

Oh I totally agree with you about that. I'm not a materialist at all, as my comment history will reveal. Materialism cannot account for the obvious fact of consciousness, or the fact that the human mind is capable of reasoning. In general, any philosophy that tries to reduce all reality to a single principle (like matter, number, energy, power, dialectic, the self, etc) is suspect, IMO. Starting with 'existence' as the first principle avoids this problem.

> I try to refrain from making an observer-observation distinction. To quote Krishnamurti "the observer is the observed"... I don't think reality obeys logic in so much as logic is another way for us to make sense of the phenomena around us.

This must imply that someone who says 'the observer is not the observed' (assuming he means these terms in the same sense as Krishnamurti) is wrong, but this only makes sense if one accepts logic as an unbreakable and truly-existing principle.

So I would disagree that logic is a map; instead, logic must be presupposed by any statement or any belief; it must be presupposed by any map. (I think logic is 'baked into' existence itself -- it's inseperable from existence -- in some sense it is existence.) Again, if we deny the law of non-contradiction (one of the first principles of logic), anything we say, believe or think can be true or false in the same sense at the same time, so any attempt to make any sense of reality will inevitable not even get to first base. Hence, nothing we say would have any meaning whatsoever. So hence, I disagree that logic is within the realm of thoughts (except insofar as it's something we grasp or see - meaning it's only derivatively in the realm of thought).

> Can you discern in your own experience "this is observation", "this is existence". Could they be one and the same?

I'd respond by saying that all these questions presuppose something, which is existence, for the reasons I gave in this and my previous post. The fact that you can ask these questions, and that there is any meaning in the questions, presupposes that (for example) the law of non-contradiction exists independently of you (and me, etc).

> Thank you for engaging in these topics which are tricky to discuss :)

Sure!

    Despite the "observer effect" in the double-slit experiment being caused by the presence of an electronic detector, the experiment's results have been interpreted by some to suggest that a conscious mind can directly affect reality.[3] However, the need for the "observer" to be conscious (versus merely existent, as in a unicellular microorganism) is not supported by scientific research, and has been pointed out as a misconception rooted in a poor understanding of the quantum wave function ψ and the quantum measurement process.

    "Of course the introduction of the observer must not be misunderstood to imply that some kind of subjective features are to be brought into the description of nature. The observer has, rather, only the function of registering decisions, i.e., processes in space and time, and it does not matter whether the observer is an apparatus or a human being; but the registration, i.e., the transition from the "possible" to the "actual," is absolutely necessary here and cannot be omitted from the interpretation of quantum theory." - Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, p. 137[1]

If you are open to have your view on this changed, I urge you to read "Vehicles: Experiments in Synthetic Psychology" by Valentino Braitenberg (1986).

- Most or all of what makes us human, like love, pain, sense of belonging, seeing, hearing, find almost all of their explanation in the physical. I include even things like thinking, reasoning, beliefs, and so on, as finding almost all their explanation in the brain.

- The experiential/phenomenological side of these things (love, pain, sense of belonging, seeing, hearing, etc) are non-physical mental/consciousness things. Everything else besides the phenomenology finds its explanation in our brains (or some wider physical states than just the brain).

- I am not surprised that LLM's could be as powerful as they are today (though I am surprised that I was alive to see that), and I can see them getting better.

- The foundation of reality is ultimately mental/consciousness and not physical, and the physical (to use a philosophical term) supervenes on the mental.

Regarding definition of consciousness: I'm not so bothered with how we define words. I think a lot of philosophy is pointless arguing that amounts to no more than people disagreeing about how we should define a word. I see no point in that. Instead, let's just stipulate what we mean by a word, and get on with the meat of the discussion. In this particular instance, when I talk about consciousness, I'm talking about the thing that the 'hard problem of consciousness' is talking about. I'm not talking about, e.g., consciousness in the sense of wakefulness (where being asleep or under a general anaesthetic would count as unconscious).