In a free market, you should be able to market what you’re selling until the moment it’s officially sold.
That's not what free market means. In a free market (which this is an okayish example of) buyers and sellers are free to set their own terms, rather than having them externally imposed. So you are free to try and negotiate a lack of exclusivity, it's just that likely nobody will take you up on it.
SEC oversite and similar mechanisms, by comparison, is an external imposition on the market.
Ironically, what you seem be suggesting (exclusivity terms "not allowed") could only be enforced by regulation, therefore making the market less free.
Why?
If I’m going to put my business on hold for 3 months to entertain your offer to buy my company, why would it not make sense to make sure the buyer is serious enough to offer something they shouldn’t need to ever pay out if they are serious about their offer?
> structure the dealmaking or negotiate the deal to get what you want.
You usually have lawyers doing a lot of the legal strategy for you. It’s easy to say “negotiate what you want”, but realistically this negotiation happens via redlines back and forth between lawyers who consult the buyer and seller who both make concessions. Whether or not you make a concession is often influenced by what’s most commonly occurring in other deals.
What’s most common in other deals doesn’t automatically equate to what’s the most fair and balanced transaction terms.
Typically, those are only created for unsophisticated parties who don't know what to negotiate for.
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> If I’m going to put my business on hold for 3 months
I've had a failed LOI before (as a seller). Very rarely should an LOI ever fail after 3 months of exclusivity.
The LOI is "hey we'd like to dig deep into this, but we want to be sure we aren't wasting our time." Competent parties shouldn't take much more than a month to figure out whether it works or not. (Funding logistics, or SEC approvals, etc can stretch that out.)
This is by some less than ethical Chinese investors.
That said; it could also be (unsuccessful) sellers remorse.
But the volume of deals that happen in the $3-50 million range is very high (especially if you include non-tech companies, like PE's buying up a veterinary clinics or dentist offices) -- this segment of companies generally are not "sophisticated" re: M&A by any means.
To be fair this article is talking about a $100m+ transaction, so maybe that's the segment your head is in. I'm coming at it from the perspective of a < $50m transaction.
That sounds like a great way to cause your biz to not sell at all.
Is that business valuable in that case? Probably a lot less than they’re trying to get for it, for sure hah.
But it can happen.
Based on anecdotal experience, I'd bet that most of the "50% of signed LOIs" don't actually close because the seller misrepresented themselves.
> There’s an extreme power imbalance in favor of acquirers.
Buyers do NOT like dead deal fees (it doesn't get paid out of the LP fund), so there is little incentive for them to play games there. So, no, this is not true.
I don’t think you’ve provided any evidence other than “buyers like to make as much money as possible at others expense” which everyone knows to be true which doesn’t bear much weight on a skewed power balance existing.
What's your proof that a skewed power balance exists? Just because buyers have experience buying 100s of companies? Well then my experience advising 500+ companies tells me otherwise. So who's right?
Also, you're saying there is a power imbalance because. I was specifically commenting on that power imbalance affecting the poor (50%) success rate.
1. Sellers can tank the deal as well, if they feel the deal is not going as fast as they like (and I recommend agreeing on a general timeline).
2. Sellers generally don't get very many offers, so the opportunity cost is often not as high as you might suppose.
3. Sellers can negotiate more friendly terms (e.g. closing sooner), but usually choose to concentrate 100% of their leverage into the price.
4. Due diligence is expensive for both parties, but the seller can easily re-use much of their side. Non-exclusivity would mean the seller could easily entertain many costly offers simultaneously.
No buyer in their right mind would agree to non-exclusivity, though they can agree to a reasonable window for that exclusivity.
100%
Which is why I hate that exclusivity is industry standard.
It feels exploitative that acquirers can demand exclusivity in a deal when the chances of it closing are less than 80%.
Imagine selling a house and taking it off the market because you got an offer with a 50% chance of actually closing 3 months later.
Even worse, most acquirers will say “nope” if you ask them to cover your legal fees if they back out of the deal.
This happens because sellers of companies only sell 1 or 2 companies in their lifetime, while buyers of companies typically do dozens and dozens of transactions. There’s an extreme power imbalance in favor of acquirers. Most sellers learn these lessons the hard way.