This! If they pown your phone, they've got all your passwords that you've stored on it. Passwords, passkeys, it doesn't matter.

I hate all the resistance to even small improvements over passwords (like passkeys). The only question we should be asking is, "does this improve on passwords?" In this case, yes it does. With passkeys, it's only the person who powns your phone that gets to log into all your accounts. With passwords, it's the person that powns your phone, or gets your password through phishing, or hacks one the the many websites that also has a copy of your password. This is an improvement! Let's do it!

There is a counter-argument that passkeys are more complex for folks who are already pretty good with security, without really adding any value. It removes some control from people who know what they're doing. Google's track record on abandoning things doesn't help me feel more confident.

I don't understand that argument - passkeys behave exactly like password manager managed random passwords. Exactly the same - even same apps use them.

Surely that's the standard for security for "people who know what they're doing"?!

I don't trust my phone with my passwords store, they are on a password manager (some in firefox, some in other sw) on a laptop (and backed up to another encrypted machine).

Have you tried switching your password manager for passkeys?

Maybe because you had an iPhone and your new Phone is an Android, or you don't like the prices of 1password etc.

At the moment you are stuck.

> If the device is unlocked, you have guaranteed access to pretty much everything that matters.

Some applications support requiring a login with either a dedicated PIN, password or biometrics upon each activity launch (e.g. Telegram, Signal). The only way for an attacker to breach that is to either scrape the phone for credential stuffing or to force me to unlock the app.

Unfortunately, at least for Telegram and Signal neither support a "duress PIN", and iPhones and Android don't as well. Basically, a PIN code that when supplied to any app leads the device to lock itself down completely - force-close all applications immediately, wipe all encryption keys from RAM to prohibit a "freeze" attack, and shut down the device. Ideally it would also distribute a trigger to all other devices and services one owns that these lock themselves down as well, and only let themselves unlock after being supplied with a dedicated password.

> Some applications support requiring a login with either a dedicated PIN, password or biometrics upon each activity launch (e.g. Telegram, Signal). The only way for an attacker to breach that is to either scrape the phone for credential stuffing or to force me to unlock the app.

And this is how applications storing passkeys behave (e.g. 1Password). Where's the security issue here?

Most email apps and SMS apps don't, and those are the standard password reset and 2FA mechanisms.

> And this is how applications storing passkeys behave (e.g. 1Password). Where's the security issue here?

Most apps don't, an attacker can do a lot of damage as long as they manage to keep the phone from activating screen lock.

We're talking about passkeys here, what attacker and what damage?

It's literally in the first Google result for "passkey", the Google documentation itself [1]:

> Important: When you create a passkey, you opt in to a passkey-first, password-less sign-in experience. Create passkeys only on personal devices that you control. Even if you sign out of your Google Account, once you create a passkey on a device, anyone who can unlock the device can sign back into your Google Account with the passkey.

[1] https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/13548313?hl=en

Disagree. Accessing my phone will only get you so far. If you manage to crack my password manager then you'll have many, but not all the keys to my kingdom. For instance, there's a lot of randomly generated passwords in there, but you won't have access to my disk encryption keys for instance. Those are also different by machine.

Security will never be automated to be fool proof; there is a modicum of thought the user needs to put into their security profile.

your phone, but the complaint in the original article is about those who don't use great security practices, which is most of us. Passkeys limit the attack surface to just your phone. With passkeys, attackers can't get your password (that regular people reuse everywhere) from some weak website or from phishing and then use that to impersonate you. We must go to something like passkeys.

GP seemed to be talking about physical access.

How would passkeys stop them if they are are in physical possession of the device and can unlock it? It doesn't seem passkeys protect you more here.

I was trying to acknowledge that. Passkeys, passwords, same result if someone has physical access to your phone. The improvement is that passwords don't require physical access to your phone, there are other ways to steal those like with phishing or hacking a website that has a copy of a password that you reused. Passkeys solve that problem.

That's fair; I just don't know that security will ever get to a point that's both easy for everyone and secure, but maybe I'm being a pessimist.

It will never get to that point completely, but we can definitely make strides towards it

Passkeys makes your phone the only target, without your phone you can't access anything but with your phone you can access everything.

Oh, they "only" need to get access to the phone which is already logged into a Google account, shows all the emails, personal photos, contacts, messages and everything else? Including personal notes?

don't forget "backup codes" - where exactly are you supposed to store them, say, while traveling ???

it would be great if backup codes were NOT usable except under <conditions> and/or use of a backup code permitted access only after <N day delay>.

Having my phone shouldn’t be game over. This mindset can be pushed too far.

In general "game over devices" tend to be a bad idea. I’ve seen people type in their passcodes. People may have seen me type in mine when FaceID gives me trouble on my iPad. I’m not at all comfortable with the idea that someone jacking my iPad will have root access to my life.

So we should stick to game over passwords, that don't even require device access, just a clever phishing email or hacking a weak website that has a copy of your password that, oops, you reused on 10 other websites?

Passwords aren’t game over though. Access from a different region usually triggers a verification email.

I don’t think we should stick with them, but there’s a difference between sticking with something and forcing everyone to use something else. Is it true that you won’t be able to use passwords at all in the new scheme? If so, this seems… risky.

Question. Suppose I have a passkey on my device. Obviously it gets synced to some sort of cloud, so that if I lose my device, I don’t lose my account. But does everyone who has access to any device get all my passkeys?

I hope not, but part of the blog post was to raise awareness. This is a nice reminder it’s time to look into passkeys deeply.

>> guaranteed access to pretty much everything that matters

> "game over devices" tend to be a bad idea

If you have something worth stealing, don't put it on your phone.

If you have $1000 in Robinhood or Coinbase along with passwords for TikTok and Instagram in your password manager, sure, put it all on your phone for convenience. It wouldn't be a catastrophe if they were stolen.

But if you have anything that's worth protecting, trade convenience for security. Keep banking, brokerage and crypto apps off the phone. Don't use your phone for password managers and 2FA.

Use a Chromebook with no extensions for sensitive stuff. It's less convenient, but there's no chance of life-changing theft if someone takes your phone at the club.

> You have access to Google Authenticator

FYI you can set a PIN on Google Authenticator so it can’t be opened without your PIN. This should be different than your Lock Screen PIN.

Sensitive information (WI-FI password etc) should be stored in a password app such as 1Password etc.

Don't some (not all) of the underlying apps have protection too?

Even if my phone is unlocked I need to auth via FaceId to be able to open the Google Authenticator app for example.

Wondering if I should into whether more apps have this functionality...

At least on Apple devices, the passkey implementation requires re-authenticating using biometrics to use a passkey.

Even if the device is unlocked.

Strange, if you unlock my phone you still can't access my password manager.