Worst is I've seen CD/CI systems which just pull unsigned unverified binaries off the internet and build software from github, random APT and YUM repos, all sorts of shit. This is then all thrown together and pushed into production systems.
Of course a lot of what we built wasn’t public facing or exposed to the internet at all, so addressing the latest vulnerabilities in record time wasn’t quite as important as known-good builds.
I’ve worked in one or two places recently (big bank) that are large enough to have their own internal repo systems and teams of security/compliance reviewers. Their versions of things can be a bit behind but are at least under control of the same org. Everywhere else, well, it feels a bit like cowboy country…
IME most of the randomly-downloaded software I've used does what it says on the tin. But there is a whole screening process: where did it come from? Does the originating site look legit? What are the possible motivations for the creator?
Besides there is no signing mechanism for your random install.sh. Maybe you check the SHA256 but if an attacker alters the script why not alter the website with the hashes too?
``` curl -sfL https://get.k3s.io | sh - ```
- Not everyone is proficient in bash.
- Some install scripts can easily go on for thousands of lines, especially if they are designed to work with multiple distro or architecture, or both.
- Said install script might be integrated deep down into someone else's build pipeline.
- ... that's assuming they aren't the type that would blindly download and run random exe from the web in the first place
Pretty common, I would say.
Obviously I can make some basic heuristics, but I can’t reasonably evaluate all of the components of trust for every library, package, container, framework, repo even at a regular interval, let alone fast enough to just maintain patch levels (nevermind being reasonably productive).
I actually considered first steps in making a business out of this idea, but I’m convinced that every developer overestimates their ability to identify untrustworthy repos/packages and companies aren’t willing to pay the actual cost (with either subscription dollars or in the friction it would add to reject almost all 3rd party code because it doesn’t meet high standards of quality and security in a transparent and verifiable way).
Related: have you tried throwing a file (or a hash) at VirusTotal lately? If it's executable, they'll run it in a sandbox and give you a forensic report of everything it touched and did.
I'm so suspicious of software I can't at least review the source code of that originates outside of trusted channels that I probably wouldn't run anything meeting that description that I couldn't compile myself if it weren't for that (and similar) tools.
Eg. How do I know with any certainty that a library passes all OWASP best practices? Or is well documented? Or is maintained? Or is responsive to security reports? [… and dozens of other similar properties]
How is this possible? Aren't the packages signed like on ArchLinux so that you can use any mirrorlist?
If you do it from the command line, by editing files, you will have to add the key manually.
But most inexperienced users will just copy/paste and run the "curl | sudo apt-key add" command from the shady repository website, because they want to run the software.
This is not much different from downloading an .exe from an untrusted website, and ignoring the warning from windows when running the .exe.
More here: https://medium.com/@glegoux/ubuntu-22-04-jammy-jellyfish-apt...
maybe you intend to deeply explore the behavior of "the most inexperienced" as if it is Typical of Desktop Linux admins?
Appreciate sf.net isn't as shady now, but ironic it should be listed as that used to spread malware. https://www.howtogeek.com/218764/warning-dont-download-softw...
It's a supply-chain attack because the article has a section about how the official website for "Free Download Manager" was serving malware to a percentage of people.
> While checking videos on Free Download Manager that are hosted on YouTube, we identified several tutorials demonstrating how to install this software on Linux machines. We observed the following actions that happen in all these videos:
> - The video makers opened the legitimate website of Free Download Manager (freedownloadmanager[.]org) in the browser;
> - They afterwards clicked on the Download button for the Linux version of the software;
> - They were redirected to the malicious https://deb.fdmpkg[.]org/freedownloadmanager.deb URL that hosts the infected version of Free Download Manager.
In the article they show a video which shows the user downloading FDM from the official website, and the file coming from that repo.
How is this a supply chain attack? My official debian repository have never been breached so far.
This is no different from downloading an .exe off a shady website and blindly running the .exe.
Also: https://packages.debian.org/search?keywords=download+manager... lists:
• uget: https://sourceforge.net/projects/urlget/
• kget: https://apps.kde.org/en-gb/kget/
• persepolis: https://persepolisdm.github.io/
why use "Free Download Manager" when high quality ones are already officially packaged by debian? Is this targeting new-comers from windows?