How big of a change is it? If you are, say, a Linux terminal native can you just pick up and run?
Doing so has proved hard and slow so far, and Spectrum hasn't had a usable release for the masses yet.
As a qubes user, I think this is interesting but it definitely does not sound more usable.
There's some learning curve for features which exist for valid reasons, especially around communicating between domains. For instance, copy-and-paste between qubes requires extra steps. Plugging in a USB keyboard or mouse doesn't just work - you have to authorize it first (just click the OK button using a PS/2 mouse, or laptop's touchpad). You have to learn how to move files between qubes. USB drives, cameras, and microphones aren't globally available to all applications - you have to attach them to a qube first. You can install software using apt-get inside a qube, but it won't persist across reboots - you have to update the OS template.
I want those extra steps and complications - they are features, not a bugs! The first few days you'll be looking things up in the FAQ. After that it's pretty easy.
There are a few sore points that don't go away. You don't get GPU acceleration in your web browser, so rendering is slower. Gaming is not an option. Your application qubes live behind a firewall qube, so things that require network broadcast like Chromecast won't work. Those are fine for me but not for everyone.
> You can install software using apt-get inside a qube, but it won't persist across reboots - you have to update the OS template.
> I want those extra steps and complications
Is it wrong of me to say that enabling persistence, with snapshots, on a qube should be a single toggle?
Yes, if you only have a USB keyboard, it will work. Manual creation of a USB VM then is recommended for security: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/usb-qubes/
> Is it wrong of me to say that enabling persistence, with snapshots, on a qube should be a single toggle?
Of course you are right. TemplateVMs provide /root partition to AppVMs and software should be installed normally to the former. At every AppVM reboot, their /root is reset to the one from TemplateVM. Ordinary, persistent VMs are also possible. Details: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/getting-started/
Am I wrong about that?
Upd: yes, also there is no GPU acceleration in the VMs.
Of course, I’m not being targeted by the state so my threat model is much lower.
The idea you can really secure you data on a PC connected to Internet from the most powerful actors is very naive.
> Never lead to escapes
Escape is the highest form of security failure. I'm talking about data access and exfiltration.
Do you store all your important data on a VM with no internet access? Even Qubes users don't, it's hard to work with. Then it's Firefox/ kernel bug away from being accessed remotely.
XSAs are publicly known vulnerabilities discovered by someone who wanted to make it public and later were published by the Xen developers. There very probably are publicly unknown vulnerabilities, both in HW and Xen, discovered/created by people who want to profit from exploiting them. There are whole teams focused on this kind of work, payed by states and criminal-enablers like NSO.
> What is restrictive about Qubes?
No GPU acceleration for video in a VM, legacy OS on dom0. Xen development in support of modern CPUs has fallen behind, didn't even boot on modern Zen X570 platform last time I tried, dysfunctional nested virtualization, using KVM from Linux does not work, can't run Android Studio with phone emulator.
Did you just call Snowden a "twitter persona"? You're not serious. Not sure if I should reply further after that.
> Do you store all your important data on a VM with no internet access? Even Qubes users don't
Yes, I do. And I'm a Qubes user. There are many more users like me on their forums. This is much more convenient than you think: you can easily and securely copy/paste passwords wherever needed.
What about that audit?
If you keep all your important data off internet, that's good for you, and Qubes helps.