The problem with 'defense in depth' is that it comes as close as possible to locking down systems to the point of uselessness, without actually, technically, preventing work from being done.
If you want to defend in depth - more power to you.
If the way you're "defending in depth" is mostly not adding security, and is actively making the product less useful... I'm going to call it shite.
If you blindly say "defend in depth" without actually... you know... evaluating what that defense does to the product as a whole, you're doing your job poorly.
Maybe the OP wasn't blindly saying 'defend in depth'? Maybe they were advocating for evaluating what that defense does to the product as a whole? If they were, is their attitude worth describing as cancerous?
My take: you're stuck on the word cancer as some sort of insult, rather than an analogy. I'd argue you're being fairly uncharitable in your responses - and further... you're yet again not engaging with the actual on-topic discussion.
Have a good one.
> If you want to defend in depth - more power to you.
> If the way you're "defending in depth" is mostly not adding security, and is actively making the product less useful... I'm going to call it shite.
Agreed. Sure, there is defense at different depths, but there's no reason to add depth without adding defense as well.
One which can be made reasonably, without telling anyone that their attitude is cancerous.
We are discussing ideas about security in a place and manner that allows us to have honest and frank conversations.
I think security teams optimizing only for security is actually very apt analogy to cancer: Part of the organization is acting in a manner that is negatively impacting the organization at large - while positively impacting that subset of the organization.
Cancer is the act of some cells in your body prioritizing themselves at the expense of the whole.
Personally - I think you're digging to find an insult in that comment, and I take it as a way for you to disengage with the topic at large.
This is an attitude that is routinely used to shut out voices that don't match the current "dress code".
Trust me, I'm hardly going to be calling you cancer over the dinner table for not passing the salt. I'm using that word intentionally and carefully - in a frank and honest conversation. If you're feeling hurt (especially on behalf of someone else...) maybe go do something else?
No, that's a problem with bad engineering. That a process requires skills most people attempting it don't have isn't a problem with the process, it just means that it is hard and relatively new.
One thing I see all the time that demonstrates this incompetence is talking about something being more or less "secure" without reference to a threat model. You simply can't make reasonable tradeoffs without thinking this through, and yet nobody wants to do the exercise.
In fairness, this is not just an engineering fault. I've seen one case where a legal department freaked out when they heard about a risk analysis project in pursuit of a formal threat model - they vehemently objected to anyone producing documents about such things that could potentially surface in some discovery fight.
Hey - I completely 100% agree. Believe it or not, I did quite a stint in software security before becoming this jaded (5+ years fulltime work at a security focused product sold primarily to large fortune 100 companies [banks - it was all banks]).
I think my problem is that for any difficult challenge... there is an answer that is simple, obvious, and incorrect.
My opinion is that the incorrect answers I see most are the two extremes: I don't care about security (BAD!). I only care about security (WORSE!!!!).
The first will eventually lead to compromised accounts/data and that can kill a company. The second will lead to products no one wants to use, which WILL kill a company.
Neither is a good spot to be. You want to find an appropriate compromise in the middle: Secure enough.
----
Side note - no one truly does the threat assessments based on threat model because no one in industry likes the answers.
For small and inconsequential threats - you are already secure enough.
For nation states - there is likely no solution that is workable if the thing is on the internet.
It's like trying to buy a secure door for your house: For most folks walking down the street, the current door is fine. When the Gov shows up with tanks - there is no door you can buy to solve the problem.
Security folks are humans too.
We realize that every human loves convenience and security removes conveniences. Simple As.
No matter what we do as security folks, the users will do everything possible to return to their convenience or complain about the inconvenience until the security is removed.
I’m not saying there aren’t over zealous security folk but our goal isn’t to make humans lives harder. We want to make it harder for the bad guys to ruin humans lives.
Except that it's not a matter of 'convenience', it's a matter of being able to do their jobs. Security is a hard job, in part because you have to come up with security practices that are actually workable, and keep work impediments to a minimum. It's really easy to just add more restrictions. It's hard to add security that doesn't impede the users. When I see 'defense in depth' being invoked to justify massive work impediments for minimal security improvements, I don't see effective security practices - I see a cargo cult.
You are - you're literally arguing for it right now. Short sessions just don't help all that much, and they have an outsized impact on users.
Why are you dying on this hill? Likely because your mindset is "security above all else" and that mindset is literally cancer.
Security above all else leads to a product that does fuck-all else (and it does it poorly).
I would say it makes an excellent analogy: A part of the whole (security) is prioritizing themselves and their needs in a way that makes the overall organism much less capable and effective.
Cancer.
Metaphor: a figure of speech in which a word or phrase is applied to an object or action to which it is not literally applicable.
Cancer: a practice or phenomenon perceived to be evil or destructive and hard to contain or eradicate.
My usage is literal. Organizations that act this way have cancer. They suffer from it, they can be treated, they can die.
It's as real as it gets. I am using cancer in the body as an analogy for this form of cancer - but I am not using a metaphor.
Your inflated sense of drama over this is disproportionate in the extreme. Did... did a fifteen minute session timeout hurt you?
Like, if I put myself in the shoes of the people each of you are replying to, I can see how to reply to horsawlarway: if I disagree with their interpretation of what I said, I can argue back; if I realize that I said something poorly and didn't mean it, I can apologize and correct it; if I disagree with their analysis, I can push back with my own arguments...
...but your comment? You are just pointing at someone and calling them rude. You are then not only refusing to engage with their comment or their points, you are just telling them they shouldn't even be discussed or listened to because they used a word which, to be quite frank, is not insulting; and, in doing so, you have dragged this discussion from one between people who were passionate about an interesting topic that affects everyone on this website--one where I was excited to read both sides--to a bunch of people--sadly, now including me!--squabbling about how words are chosen and how arguments are formed while pointing fingers at each other about who is being insulting, which is a waste of everyone's time so bad I frankly feel bad about how I now feel like I also have to take part.
(BTW, I actually did at first choose to not send this comment: I wrote it, and then decided it was just further feeding you and further wasting other peoples' time, so I put it in a text file and moved on; but, then I noticed one of horsawlarway's responses had been flagged--even though you are clearly the instigator here--so I would need to post a defense of why I vouched for it: you are the person who not only took this thread in a personal direction, but you are the person who decided to start throwing around playground-style bullying: saying an idea is cancer is an opinion and analysis, not an insult... but all of your comments on this thread are patronizing and are the kind of taunting people use to start fist fights.)
It seems to me that 'defense-in-depth' can very easily become a mantra that inevitably means drifting towards the latter. What are the real guidelines for telling when enough is enough? Because ime people who even can articulate anything along those lines are way, way fewer than people who make appeals to defense-in-depth.
And I think this is part of the problem: without a principled way to assess what is gratuitous, repeated appeals to defense-in-depth will lead to security practices that heavily favor having more measures in place over having a good UX. This is because the environments where information security is most valued are already organizations that frankly, do not give a shit about UX. The customers for cybersecurity products are massive bureaucracies: large enterprises, governments, and militaries. The vendors that sell those products are embedded in a broader market where no software really has to be usable, because there's a fundamental disconnect between the purchasing decision and the use of the software. For all B2B software, the user is not the customer, and it shows in a thousand ways. In infosec things are further tilted in that lots of easy routes to compliance which are terrible for UX are falsely perceived and presented as strictly required, perhaps even by law.
The idea that in a B2B market which primarily serves large organizations and governments, you will get any organic weighing and balancing of security against usability 'for free' is sheer fantasy. So where is the real counterweight to the advice that on its own recommends 'always add more, unless you have good reason not to'?
It's also why I strongly link this argument to cancer. It's an idea that grows unbounded until it's harmful, and by the time the organization realizes the harm, it's often too late to change.
Yep. I think your argument pretty much conveyed the same thing, along with a lot of anger and frustration.
I also agree with that anger and frustration— I've felt the same rage before, when I've been hit with blockers or UX degradation related to nominal or actual attempts to improve security. Restrictions that are ill-motivated (or whose motivations are just not clearly or convincingly communicated) are infuriating.
> by the time the organization realizes the harm, it's often too late to change.
This worry is the twin of the rage, for me, this sense that I can't do anything about it and it's never going to get better. A dreadful, reluctant admission to myself that the only way to stop the continual degradation of my work life will be to uproot myself: give up my job and everything I do like about it, leaving behind people I enjoy working with and reducing the amount of contact I have with them.
Happily, engaging directly with my company's infosec department directly often gives me hope and allays these fears somewhat. But generally, online discussion with people who implement security controls tends to reinforce my worry that, to borrow your metaphor, the disease is systemic and terminal.
Most 'cybersecurity professionals' (who are visible online, at least) transparently do not give a shit about UX, display flagrantly antagonistic attitudes about users and developers, and talk often about defense-in-depth but never articulate any inherent limits for appeals to defense-in-depth beyond 'well don't bother with measures that don't increase security at all'. All of it sends strong signals that people who value UX, DX, autonomy, morale, and well-being, to the extent they are present at all, are outliers in infosec who do not belong and have no hope of being effective.
And then the response to someone openly including a dimension of emotionality in an argument about a security measure they feel is gratuitous and cumbersome is
> Did... did [a cumbersome security measure] hurt you?
Like, seriously? Yes. Indeed it did and does.
But more than the security measures themselves, the pervasive attitude conveyed by that belittling question is the even bigger problem. And it generates many of the small ones.
(I appreciate that you're arguing for charitable interpretation, but the personal swipes at the beginning and end of your post wipe out the good effect and then some.)
> yes really - fucking always
You're really angry with that straw man you've stood up. The OP isn't saying systems have to be locked down to the extent that they're useless. Who would ever argue for such a thing?
Note that "You don't stop securing it just because you've found one good option" is NOT the same thing as saying "You don't stop securing it until you've closed every possible security gap and compromised usability".
Be charitable in your interpretation. Your OP is making a simple argument that defense in depth is a part of a security posture, precisely because they agree with your core premise, that security is always a tradeoff. Because we won't choose to implement every security measure, and because the security measures we do implement will be flawed, or compromised by the need for the application to actually be usable.
Step outside, breathe some fresh air, maybe lay off the coffee first thing. And consider not throwing 'cancer' bombs at passers-by.