We've had numerous articles, many of them by VC's, explaining the economics here. VC's need their investments to wrap up within a specific time frame. Near the beginning of the time frame, VC's resist liquidity. Near the end of the time frame, VC's push for liquidity. The companies that hit the moon pay for the ones that don't.
Nobody is taking VC at gunpoint, so bickering over whether the founders are the ones begging to get to the moon or the VC's are pushing them to go there is besides the point.
Either way, customers are strapping themselves in alongside the company for the ride.
And then increasingly being the losers when the capsule fails to reach escape velocity and burns up on reentry into the atmosphere.
There are lots of pros and cons for the 37 Signals model vs VC backed companies, but I've personally reached the point where I won't even bother using a service unless there are strong indicators it will still be around in a year.
Both types of businesses (slow organic growth or VC backed) are capable of reaching that point of earning my trust that they will continue to exist. However, I do think that over the past couple of years that VCs throwing so much money at so many smaller moonshot ideas have really biased me towards distrusting in longevity as being the default state for any new company, and IMO that's a real problem for companies who want to provide their software as a web service where if they go belly up, I completely lose whatever time investment I've made in become their user.
But "Keep in mind that VC companies tend to go big or bust, with large rewards in success and none in failure" wouldn't make such an eye-catching headline.
Actuarially speaking, you are not getting in early on the next big thing. You're one of a cohort of 10 in which 9 are expected to fail; indeed, in which all 10 are being pressured to make longshot bets that hasten failure, because the worst case for the VC actually isn't "company goes out of business".
Failing fast isn't necessarily a bad thing. I'm sure there are many companies that have gone out of business because they took VC and tried to grow too fast, but what percentage is that really? When bootsrapping you often don't even know if the business will be viable for a couple years, which IMHO is a vastly worse situation to be in.
We're talking about being presented with the choice of a medium-risk medium-growth model, and a high-risk fast-growrth model, and invariably selecting the high-risk model.
That's what VC means. At the strategic level, it means invariably selecting the higher risk business model.
Again: "company going out of business" is actually not the worst case for the VC.
Different types of businesses need different growth rates to be successful.
People taking VC money take it because they need to grow fast or it won't work.
Examples outside of tech: Green Mountain Rosters: They make K-Cups. They have to get as many Americans to buy K-Cup machines as possible so that they don't buy a potential competitor's product. If they went slow a competitor would go fast and destroy them. So they sell the machines near cost or less and try to get market penetration. Once everyone has those machines they sell the K-cups which is where the money is.
That business would be ridiculously stupid to go slow in.
Same thing with something like Twitter. If that started catching on but they didn't put any money in it for marketing and growth some other Twitter replacement would have come along and taken their market by being aggressive.
If your goal is to have control over your world and not have a boss, don't take VC money. Build a slow growth business in a saturated market and deliver top quality products. You will be happy and that is OK.
But don't look at what other people are doing with disbelief and frustration that they are "shooting for the moon" and "ruining customer's lives" (not really your words) because they are trying to win in a hard to win place and trying to represent their investors as true fiduciaries.
And coffee is a good example. Because among those indies, there are coffee roasters that have taken outside funding and suffered as a result.
# of coffee shops that went national with no financing = zero.
You can argue about the type of financing, but any type Starbucks had after the first investors expected big growth. Even today their stock price is at a P/E of 30 which means the market thinks they will growth at double digits every year.
I'm not saying going VC is good, or not going VC is good. Rather I am saying that each strategy has its own ups and downs depending on the type of business. Some businesses need VC funding to beat competitors, some can grow slow.
Yes!! This is the essential point, and I'm surprised pg didn't bring it up. It depends on the nature of the opportunity. If it's a large market that has recently opened up for some reason, you have to attack it aggressively or you will lose. Conversely, if the market has to be educated about the virtues of your product, you're better off going slow, because educating a market takes time.
I'll agree with DHH to this extent, though: I wouldn't be surprised if there were a lot more bootstrap opportunities out there than fast-growth opportunities.
You lose me here. 'Lean' startups can benefit from a VC investment as much as 'Moon-shot' startups do. My experience is that a VC investment implies that someone believes that the product can be accelerated by the application of money. When I hear 'moon shot' I hear mostly a pejorative 'high risk, publicity loaded but ultimately no follow-on project' (which is what the NASA Moon shot was)
I also agree with the 37signals guys that money in the bank is great, but its only great if you getting somewhere. John Walecka was one of the investors in FreeGate and he used a car analogy where money is the gas, and if you're sitting there idling you are using gas and not getting anywhere. Money, like gas, should be enough to get you from here to your destination plus a little reserve to cover contingencies.
Again, think of it this way: the runway is 18 months, whether you took 2MM to "go lean" or 15MM to "go nuts".
The fact that you're hiring slow has nothing at all to do with the economics of a venture capital fund. The fund wants your company wrapped up within a fixed time frame either way.
2 great things about "lean": (1) it enables some companies to find their market without ever needing VC, and (2) it sets some companies up to confidently shoot for the moon with a validated market. Lean is helpful. It just doesn't change the mechanics of VC investment.
(I voted you up; someone voted your comment down, which is annoying, because it's a good comment.)
[1] In "Proofiness: The Dark Arts of Mathematical Deception", Charles Seife claims that NASA asked GE to calculate the chances of success in the Moon Landing and came out with 5%. http://www.amazon.com/Proofiness-Dark-Arts-Mathematical-Dece...
Not sure about your experience, but from what I've seen that's exactly the case. I was director of finance of a startup that raised (and burned) $30M+ from several 'tier A' VCs. I was in the board meetings where the VC partners and board members wanted that money spent. You don't hit home runs without swinging.
Well it is not like it is a secret, right?
http://news.ycombinator.com/user?id=emmett
The point DHH is making is that people don't really think through the implications of that logic.
While I certainly agree that there are several cases of startups taking VC money and becoming acquired or building huge, lasting businesses, it is tough to produce much evidence that that route has a high expected value. I would also say that based upon my own interactions with hopeful entrepreneurs, WAY too many are asking questions centered on raising investment cash instead of doing the hard stuff like building and selling.
The entities most capable of unfair or exploitative behavior are those who no longer need value that relationship to their customer. Yes, in one case this applies to companies close to failure - no matter their funding source. But as noted elsewhere, the acceptance of investor money adds many layers and new definitions to what 'failure' is.
Failure is no longer just 'going out of business' - it morphs to mean things like not having hit a number, not having made money fast enough, being pushed out of a job because people have lost faith in you, etc. The options for failure proliferate in an investor-funded corporation.
It's that same irony when a Fortune 500 firm makes a nice profit but the stock tanks because they didn't make as much as someone thought they should. Profit = success in the natural world; but somehow it gets turned around to equal failure - oftentimes costing real people their real jobs and costing companies real value of their shares that they could use to conduct real business.
So, as investor-funded companies are allowed only a small number of ways to define success, they are always closer to failure, and are forever more aware of the benefits of unethical behavior - especially when that behavior is so well-shielded by the corporate veil.
The aspersion on all startups that have raised financing as likely to be unscrupulous and play fast and loose with ethics is pretty uncalled for. Because, of course venture backed startups do those things, but so do bootstrapped startups. You know what usually causes it? Desperation that you're going to fail. Bootstrapped startups can fail too, and often do. They usually just don't get big enough for anyone to notice first.
Finally there's this idea of an "acquisition graveyard". While it's true that acquisitions often go south, when they succeed the results can be great. Take Siri, for example, where the product reaches tens of millions more people than they ever would have on their own.
It seems like what DHH really objects to is taking chances, where you run the risk of failure for higher reward. And it's his right to go for the lower risk option. Raising money and doing acquisitions are just risky, not bad.