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Re:Format string vulnerability found in 'sudo' by kmm on Monday January 30, 2012 @04:04PM (#3530655)
In the source of sudo-1.8.3p1, the error is in src/sudo.c at line 1219. Relevant code snippet:

  easprintf(&fmt2, "%s: %s\n", getprogname(), fmt);
  va_start(ap, fmt);
  vfprintf(stderr, fmt2, ap);
  va_end(ap);
  efree(fmt2);
Obviously, fmt2 can still contain a format string, yet it is printed anyway with vfprintf. I'm really surprised this type of bug still exists. Doesn't every decent compiler warn the developer about this?
Re:Format string vulnerability found in 'sudo' by apaprocki on Monday January 30, 2012 @04:20PM (#3530697)
It just goes to show that all project owners should be responsible for turning on maximum compiler warnings which make sense for their project. There are lots of great gcc warnings/errors which are not enabled by default. In particular, this one is reported by -Wformat-nonliteral or -Wformat-security. From the gcc docs:

  -Wformat is included in -Wall. For more control over some 
  aspects of format checking, the options -Wformat-y2k,
  -Wno-format-extra-args, -Wno-format-zero-length,
  -Wformat-nonliteral, -Wformat-security, and -Wformat=2
  are available, but are not included in -Wall.
Re:Format string vulnerability found in 'sudo' by Karellen on Monday January 30, 2012 @05:10PM (#3530849)
"fmt2" is supposed to contain a format string. It's supposed to contain the format string from "fmt". That's how it prints the args from "ap".

The bug is when getprogname() also returns a string containing a format specifier (e.g. "%s"), which is not expected.

Clearly the fix is:

  fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", getprogname());
  va_start(ap, fmt);
  vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
  va_end(ap);
  fprintf(stderr, "\n");
(Edit for formatting, clarity)
Re:Format string vulnerability found in 'sudo' by tlb on Monday January 30, 2012 @07:57PM (#3531287)
The real crime is creating a library function like printf without also creating a library function to escape format strings. Leaving safe escaping as an exercise for the application programmer clearly doesn't work.
Re:Format string vulnerability found in 'sudo' by ZephyrP on Monday January 30, 2012 @08:16PM (#3531334)
This is like asking for SQL databases to have a SQL-Injection escaping function. You 'escape' format string attacks by using the C language in a correct fashion.
Re:Format string vulnerability found in 'sudo' by spullara on Monday January 30, 2012 @10:47PM (#3531731)
This is provided by MySQL, as an example:

http://dev.mysql.com/doc/refman/5.0/en/mysql-real-escape-str...

I'm sure what you meant was a server-side escaping function which is obviously pointless, but I did want to point out that MySQL's client driver does ship with one that you can use so you don't have to write your own.

Re:Format string vulnerability found in 'sudo' by gizzlon on Tuesday January 31, 2012 @04:39AM (#3532527)
Actually, isn't the escaping done serversiden when using placeholders?

At least in Perl, there's no need to escape placeholder values explicitly. I believe the prepared statement is stored on the server, and then the values sent later. Of course the escaping could be the work of the driver.. anyone know?

Re:Format string vulnerability found in 'sudo' by rjh29 on Tuesday January 31, 2012 @06:19AM (#3532793)
See "Prepared Statement Support" from http://search.cpan.org/perldoc?DBD::mysql#Class_Methods

Prepared statements are disabled by default and require MySQL >= 4.1.3. Instead, the driver does the placeholder replacement on the client, and prepare() does nothing clever at all.

Re:Format string vulnerability found in 'sudo' by gizzlon on Tuesday January 31, 2012 @07:08AM (#3532902)
hm.. could be useful information.. thanks
Re:Format string vulnerability found in 'sudo' by flomo on Tuesday January 31, 2012 @12:51AM (#3532052)
Building dynamic SQL strings for comparison can sometimes be handy (e.g. with LIKE), so it's really too bad there's no server-side SQL escape function, at least in the sql dialects I'm familiar with.
Re:Format string vulnerability found in 'sudo' by gmaslov on Monday January 30, 2012 @11:21PM (#3531841)
Well, just because it really exists doesn't mean it wasn't a silly thing to ask for ;-)
Re:Format string vulnerability found in 'sudo' by tlb on Monday January 30, 2012 @11:21PM (#3531840)
Yes, client libraries for SQL databases should absolutely have an escaping function. The fact that some don't is responsible for a significant fraction of all security failures.
Re:Format string vulnerability found in 'sudo' by nyellin on Tuesday January 31, 2012 @02:59AM (#3532314)
Your suggestion makes no sense.

If you don't want to use a format string, use a function that takes a regular string, like puts, instead of a vprintf variant. Why would anyone go to the trouble of escaping a format string so they can use it with a function whose sole purpose is to parse format strings? (Which you can already do, by the way, by using vprintf correctly.)