But I wouldn't say this clip is stunning (other than the temporal proximity). Sounds like this dude likes to run his mouth. He's bragging about his 3k sqft loft and these weird loan deals in front of strangers... I have no idea who he is, but if you showed me this clip and asked me to guess what he did when things went down, I'd tell you he said some (probably dumb) off-the-cuff stuff.
However, I’m not sure what percent SVB kept. Some are saying zero, is this true?
There is a requirement but not sure if easing of Dodd-Frank allowed SVB to bypass it. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/12/01/2022-26...
additionally it seems the US made their fractional reserve requirement 0% in 2020
It's not true, I think, but it makes for a neat movie plot idea?
If SVB can't offer better deals for VCs then nobody can?
Sounds pretty close to an investment where the investor shouldn't be made whole.
Companies put money in SVB because it was often the default option that everyone used that understood how startups operate.
Then in some cases, companies would raise additional venture debt from SVB and for that you had to park money there. I got invited to events too and rep pushed the debt as “dilution free money” (as opposed to normal money for equity vc deal).
I never took it as didn’t need it.
When you're mixing private deals (for investores and founders) with company deals, you're usually on the hook for something. Letting them off the hook is nice, but it sends a terrible message and will only lead to greater implosions later.
If you claim VCs were demanding portfolio companies use svb, then let's hear names. I've raised money from multiple VCs and that's never been even hinted at.
We used svb because I've used Chase in the past. I know a bunch of stories that I'm not interesting in sharing publicly, but they're terrible. Here's one public story about what the "service" at Chase is like: the morons lost an updated phone number and almost shut down a small business with kyc inquiries dropped on them day of: https://twitter.com/joshtpm/status/1635083618380025858
The value of svb to us was they were a bank with a glowing rep, glowing ratings, good service when we called and asked for stuff, albeit with not particularly good software.
What SVB did was that they know your are vc/founder who raised from a16z and have this many assets or whatever. Because of that they were willing to give you a loan on favorable terms because see low risk defaulting on that.
How every other bank does it: they look at your credit score, ask 2 years salary, ask if you own 20% of any company and some other questions. The feed it to some algorithm running in cobalt which gives them answer if it’s good to go or no. They dont care about your profession, the fact that you run $100M business or your personal assets. You might have $10M equity portfolio but normal bank doesn’t care because it’s not part of their mortgage questionnaire. If you say yes to 20% company question, they have to look in the company revenue (again not assets but taxes and revenue) and the answer might be no because generally banks don’t like back entrepreneurs even if company has $100M in their bank account.
So imo SVB was going much more about the people they were making loans for than most common banks. Their main risk there was that they had huge tech industry concentration that could hurt them if tech completely melts down)
(Disclaimer: I don’t have loans or deposits in SVB. I did apply for the mortgage with but didn’t take it)
It's just that we've decided that this time the risk mustn't be carried by those that profited from the deal.
that's called fleecing the rubes and scamming the noobs
FDIC insurance is not there to insure most commerical banking.
There's absolutely nothing wrong with banks or any other business giving better deals to more valuable customers.
The people running SVB were not stupid and were very aware of this risk, yet they chose to take it. There is a reason for this which we will find out in the fullness of time.
The MBS at least though is tradable and has a market price. Their own book of loans though is much larger and is subject to the same interest rate problems as their MBS and treasuries, and in addition to having lost value due to interest rate issues, it may now have default issues as well. Not a good combination.
I really can't wrap my head around holding $500M earning almost no interest (>$10M annual) in an uninsured account. Why? It's not like they had that much in monthly expenses or income. Was it just more incompetence or as has been suggested in other posts were there "benefits" of doing this that may not have accrued to the corporation?
Of course it was the run of those giant uninsured depositors that caused the immediate cash. Of course it's not clear (had all depositors not been bailed out) that anyone withdrawing within the last 90 days would have not had their withdrawals clawed back... we'll never know. If that had happened, I think we would see a lot fewer flash runs.
edit: https://www.thestreet.com/banking/svb-collapse-roku-had-487-...
It's also weird that we expect large depositors to think about it. If we created the system today, we would never think it okay to just destroy people's money at scale. Large depositors get almost nothing (very low interest rate) in return for that immense risk.
It could have provided 5-10% of (their negative) net income.
Companies and individuals are not trying to invest in their bank when they open a checking account. Does it really make sense that they need to dive into their bank's financials?
We're not talking about a special fintech, we're talking about a MoneyMarket or Treasury account, which are higher interest and lower risk than a bank account, but you're limited to a withdrawal or two a week.
I think everyone would be served by a frank examination and critical review of buddy-buddy networks and "incestuous" relationships in the finance industry generally. Not just SVB and VCs.
Smells of that too big to fail BS all over again.
Well, are they profitable? If they are currently failing to achieve what they supposedly aim for, surely the way they are run leaves something to be desired?
It may be tempting to argue that "they were well run until the bad thing happened" but that is a fairly low bar for running things well.
Most of your comment seemed reasonable, if a tad speculative given a lack of insider knowledge. But the last part feels like unnecessarily searching for a class warfare argument.
To date, said execs have lost their equity, and liabilities have been transferred. It remains to be seen if any more losses will be absorbed, and by whom and how much.
A counter argument is that a bunch of bank runs will destroy the "common man" and small businesses a lot more than folks parking money in hedge funds. The FDIC insurance pool works fine for a small number of regional banks, but it really is not that large.
It's the way the entire world works and there's nothing wrong with it in general.
SVB did not collapse because of this, the collapsed because of bad risk management, a lot of money that they could not lend out in low yield bonds they were locked into. It wasn't even that bad.
The VCs decided to shoot themselves in the foot by creating a run on their own banks.
Their hypocrisy is stunning.
But Calacanis talking about getting sweetheart attention is a nothingburger.
VCs received cheap loans and financial services from SVB if they got their portfolio companies to bank with SVB. There were in some sense backdoor deals, which resulted in these odd loans and bad portfolios. It was all built on an assumption of cheap capital. People are not discussing how incestuous SVB was with VCs, and many will get off the hook for unethical financial behavior.
I dont think calling SVB poorly run is accurate, it was run for profits. The decision making is opaque at this point, and my guess is if the curtain is pulled back, it was run exactly as intended.
If you watch the most recent episode of the AllIn podcast, they hint at this being the case. Clearly they know there was bad behavior, but dont discuss it at length. This is just another case of wealthy people gambling, with the common man absorbing the losses.