That's not a given since it may just reduce profits. Banking is a very competitive environment.
So the options are:
1. Banks eat the cost.
2. Banks take on more risk to cover the cost (putting the whole system at more risk).
3. Banks increase customer fees, interest rates, etc...
I don't have a crystal ball but I have a strong guess about which of these options are most likely to be implemented.
Not only will tax payers likely pay for this but the most likely tax payers to pay are the ones with the least flexibility (stuck with variable rate debt, limited banking choices, no dedicated money managers working on their behalf) aka the poorest tax payers.
If my assessment is correct, they have somehow found and settled on a solution more disgusting than a generally distributed tax payer bailout.
The Fed releases a digital dollar that you can bank without needing to be a part of this oligopoly. Banks are forced to give better terms to be attractive again, terms that will make up for the risk of the bank using your money. Deposits are no longer guaranteed because being in a bank is now a deliberate choice instead of something you're forced to do despite having money.
Banking is not competitive in any way. The small players are very risky to bank at. The big players get to be riskier because they are protected by the government.
Would you notice a 0.05% increase in fees?
Sounds like word games played by people in charge to have tax payer bailouts using two layers of obfuscation.
This is hurtful in more ways than one. Banks routinely charge all kinds of fees from account maintenance to whatever Wells Fargo did for years.
Retail banks won't let the Federal Reserve open a bank account for everyone by default with the Fed.
Either what you say is true and the retail customers are insignificant, and banks must offer no fee accounts. If not, they can't block federal reserve from creating default USD accounts for everyone.
Or they are an important part of the bank's marketing strategy or whatever. In this case, banks must lose the ability to gamble customer funds.
Which one is it?
Actually the FED is opposed to this themselves. A company called the narrow bank was going to try this. The FED refused them a banking license, all the way to court.
The FED wants deposits reinvested into the economy.
> A narrow bank takes deposits and invests the money in interest-bearing reserves deposited at the Fed. Because that’s all these banks would do, they would be very low cost and hence could pass along to depositors the interest earned on reserves, minus a small fee.
> Narrow banks could attract many large depositors, who currently receive much lower interest rates on their deposits at ordinary commercial banks.
It feels like they were offloading their cost to a service that the government maybe offers at a loss.
Hence I believe the Fed was against this to keep the economy running by 'keeping money rolling'.
This proposal for narrow banking seems to employ the government as this vault, sort of like treasury bonds that can be freely withdrawn, which seems a more significant difference.
* I am not denying that this is what the feds claimed and/or believed
Assuming it's a one time charge and not a contagion, it sounds like why we have government and FDIC.
It's more the state government budget for about 1/3 of the states in the union
I'm fairly sure the poor aren't that affected by interest rates - the very definition of being poor is not owning much in the way of assets that could earn interest...
It might seem unfair that shareholders of random other banks have to pay for this but no more unfair than accountholders of SVB paying for it.
But the end result is the same: a tax on everyone to bail out Peter Thiel and friends.
That assumes banks balance this liability by reducing payments to customers rather than reducing profits. That's a common and completely misleading claim by businesses - if they are taxed or fined, they pass it on to their customers (obviously, it's an attempt to create political support for the business).
The reality is that the ability to raise prices (or lower interest rates on deposits) depends on the elasticity. If you raise prices on your bottle of water at the supermarket, then people will just buy the bottle next to it - the water-maker will be paying and fee or tax increases out of their profits. If you have the only bottle of water in the desert, you can charge whatever you want. I would think that regular savings deposits, at least, are easily moved to another bank.
Another consideration is that if they could squeeze more out of customers, they'd probably already be doing it. By that theory, at least, they've already optimized or that and can't charge more.
However, this fee is levied on all member banks of FDIC, which is basically every bank. Thus, it creates the most natural ground for collusion, i.e. everyone implicitly agrees to pass on the fees to the customers.
More than that, a bank account is probably one of the stickiest "purchases" an average individual makes in their lives, unlike a single-use water bottle. How many people do you think has the time and energy to switch to a new bank every time there is a fee increase? Is it the individual's fault for not doing so?
Would you notice a 5 basis point change in your savings account?
How many grains of sand do you need to stack before it becomes a pile?
As you say, the what really matters is (perceived) elasticity. If a company thought they could increase profit by increasing prices then they'd just do it. Conversely if they get fined or regulated or whatever but, as expected, it doesn't affect their elasticity curve then they'll leave prices where they are. If they were acting rationally it was already at the ideal point.
To me it felt like the market collectively decided "this is a good time to squeeze our costumer and have them blame somebody else"
"Any losses to the Deposit Insurance Fund to support uninsured depositors will be recovered by a special assessment on banks, as required by law."
Does this mean all American banks (indirectly bank customers) will pay to cover depositor losses that exceed insurance funds?