Here's the training aircraft: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shuttle_Training_Aircraft
> To match the descent rate and drag profile of the real Shuttle at 37,000 feet (11,300 m), the main landing gear of the C-11A was lowered (the nose gear stayed retracted due to wind load constraints) and engine thrust was reversed. Its flaps could deflect upwards to decrease lift as well as downwards to increase lift.
The actual landing HUD and audio starts at 13:40
Having spent time at the South Pole, the ice runway at the South Pole Station was sized and built and in part funded by NASA to handle the scenario in which a shuttle on a trajectory that took it over the pole found itself in need of an emergency divert runway.
The hole in the ozone layer is repaired because a large number of countries passed regulations prohibiting many uses of ozone-depleting substances, and consumers voted with their wallets as well.
Unfortunately, we're not seeing anywhere near the commitment required to slash CO2 emissions, and a huge amount of damage is already done.
It's not just climate change, but in the last fifty years, something like 2/3rds of wildlife has disappeared. In barely one generation we've wiped out two thirds of wildlife. That is mind boggling and if it doesn't count as a mass extinction, I don't know what does.
Maybe some consumers voted with their wallets for fuel economy car (thus lower CO2 emissions)
I'll also ask out of curiosity if the pair of guys that constituted the Naval outpost that operated the Ground Controlled Approach radar system at the South Pole runway is still there and still as stand-off-ish from the civilian station as they were back in the day, or whether that was a cold-war-era phenomenon (I always assumed that role was reserved for those individuals who managed to piss off an Admiral in a particularly impressive manner, as it seemed to be an incredibly isolated existence for them, hiking out to and back from the radar station and otherwise pretty much not interacting with anyone).
This would, in a nuclear exchange, bring the mean time from initial detection of an American attack to the first nuclear strike on Moscow down from seven minutes (UGM-73 missiles on a depressed trajectory launched from the North Sea near Denmark)[2] to a little over three minutes.
Fears of this, according to the theory, led to several of the design specifications for the Buran shuttle. I find the extensive concerns about, and optimizing of strategy around, minimizing warning time in a nuclear exchange to be fascinating.
[1]https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3855/1 [2]https://www.scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs03gronlu... (PDF)