Pretty much. The mainframe security model used by desktop OSes is fundamentally broken.
Are you confusing a bootkit (ie. malware that's in the boot loader) with malware that's in the firmware itself? If it's just in the boot loader, that's still stored on the hdd/ssd itself, and therefore can be wiped.
Secure boot is indeed designed to protect against bootkits too.
Of course blocking execution is orthogonal to verifying the boot chain, but unfortunately those issues are conflated in the UEFI spec.
If instead the decision had been made to have the user set up some keys and authorize the OS, the process would have to be streamlined and easy.
In conclusion, signing your operating system is too hard, unless you are in the happy path where your OS is signed by Microsoft it is far easier to just disable the infernal subsystem as it gets in the way.
This is false.
The issue is that nobody has written user-friendly tooling to manage keys and sign stuff. Not that actually implementing this is hard.