You can defend against the bad guy disabling SB in the UEFI settings by password locking the UEFI setup. I don't know how common it is but all the mobos I've used for home PCs have such an option. Of course whether mobo manufacturers implement password locking correctly is another matter.
Another line of defence is a chassis intrusion alarm to prevent the attacker from switching to alternate BIOSes and such, but those are normally only found in enterprise cases in my experience, and of course are not completely attacker-proof either.
It's the standard bike lock tradeoff - perfect security is unattainable so you just put more and more roadblocks in the attacker's way to deter them hoping that they give up and go for an easier target. Although, unlike a bike lock, someone attacking your PC is probably doing a targeted attack anyway.
On some desktops, you can't. There is a physical jumper that resets all the settings, and this includes removing the password.
Pretty much. The mainframe security model used by desktop OSes is fundamentally broken.
Are you confusing a bootkit (ie. malware that's in the boot loader) with malware that's in the firmware itself? If it's just in the boot loader, that's still stored on the hdd/ssd itself, and therefore can be wiped.
Secure boot is indeed designed to protect against bootkits too.
Of course blocking execution is orthogonal to verifying the boot chain, but unfortunately those issues are conflated in the UEFI spec.
If instead the decision had been made to have the user set up some keys and authorize the OS, the process would have to be streamlined and easy.
In conclusion, signing your operating system is too hard, unless you are in the happy path where your OS is signed by Microsoft it is far easier to just disable the infernal subsystem as it gets in the way.
This is false.
The issue is that nobody has written user-friendly tooling to manage keys and sign stuff. Not that actually implementing this is hard.
This means that even if you setup FDE correctly (binding to say PCRs 0, 7, and 11), you would be able to bypass FDE using this MSI bug. For example, BitLocker binds to PCR 7.
You could get around this bug by sealing to PCR 4 (which contains the _hash_ of the bootloader). But then you have to redo FDE sealing every time your bootloader updates.
A sane setup might not be using TPM because, e.g.: they don't need it.
I don't use TPM for FDE, just a passphrase. Using TPM means that if my motherboard dies, I can no longer access my disk. Far from ideal.
> a bad guy could easily disable secureboot inside bios settings
Can this be usually reconfigured without the firmware passphrase?
> use shim loader to bypass it.
They'd need to get it signed with the key trusted by the local firmware.