There are certainly scenarios where "all crypto becomes invalid" or "ECC becomes invalid" or "curves similar to Ed25519 become invalid", but with Defense In Depth... if all other things are equal, a stronger curve is better, and that is effectively the case here. The only downside of Ed448 that I'm aware of is a slight performance penalty, which is irrelevant in most applications, so there's no reason to actively choose a weaker curve. The "overkill" option is the sensible option in most cases.
AFAIK, no one is actually encrypting large sums of data using an asymmetric algorithm like we're discussing. It's typically just used to encrypt a symmetric key, which is then lightning fast to use on the bulk of the data. The performance of the asymmetric algorithm is only important in very specific scenarios.
I also believe that "no one" uses Ed448 in much the same way that "no one" uses JPEG XL; a lack of ecosystem support drastically hinders adoption, and it has nothing to do with people believing that Ed448 has no advantage over Ed25519. But, that's just like, my opinion. JPEG XL would be drastically better than the other image format options, but ecosystem support is a chicken and egg problem. Measuring the existing adoption of a poorly supported option doesn't give much insight. If people appreciate Ed25519 (and they really seem to), then offering the stronger version of Ed25519 seems like an obvious next step, even though it is a lot of work (which is why my original comment mentioned future proofing the API, but you seem to indicate that it is, so that's good). If the option existed and were exactly as easy to use, then why wouldn't people pick it for projects were the curve is open for selection?
Maybe making a stronger layer isn't the same as adding an additional layer, but it has the same outcome, so it feels like a distinction without difference.
This sounds great to a non-cryptographer, but it's really not all that true. We've crossed a threshold where—to continue the metaphor—the wall is so thick that the only way it's likely to be breached either by going over/around it or by something that exploits a material weakness in a way where it doesn't matter in practice how thick the wall is.
While it's of course possible that someone finds a way to break Curve25519 in a way that leaves Curve448 standing, I suspect that many cryptographers believe it's far more likely that an API handling multiple curves will create opportunities for vulnerabilities that otherwise wouldn't exist. Particularly when one of those code paths is used extremely infrequently.
Regardless, whether it is "far less likely" or not, it appears to be a very real possibility that is being ignored in favor of what, exactly? An extremely marginal performance gain?
> I suspect that many cryptographers believe it's far less likely than an API handling multiple curves creates opportunities for vulnerabilities that otherwise wouldn't exist. Particularly when one of those code paths is used extremely infrequently.
Honestly, that's just as much an argument in favor of entirely deprecating support for Ed25519, in my view, but that would be an unpopular opinion. In reality, the ECDSA curves support multiple security levels. Has that additional curve support ever been the direct cause of a vulnerability?
If you know of something I’d love to hear it.
Not to speak for Filippo, but adding extra layers comes with a cost. Presumably they've weighed up the cost of adding this functionality (in terms of maintainer time etc.) and decided the cost of implementing it outweighed the benefit.
This is not extra layer but a side entrance, especially if used protocol allows one side to pick what primitives to use, so attacker can make it use the vulnerable one.
It’s a good question with a nuanced answer. First, performance. The amount of data encrypted has no effect on key exchanges like X25519 and X448. They happen once per connection/exchange/encryption/decryption and have a fixed cost. In synchronous settings like TLS that time shows up directly as first byte latency. Second, a hard to quantify ecosystem risk: what are the chances you get broken by one of the few attacks that get X25519 but not X448, versus the chances you get broken by an implementation bug in the lesser used X448 implementation?
Cryptography engineering doesn’t happen in a vacuum. When selecting primitives you have to weigh the risks you are mitigating against the cost in engineering and hardware resources, and compare them against other risks you could be mitigating with those resources. It’s very unlikely the risk gap between X25519 and X448 is where anyone should invest next.
There was a recent flurry of buffer overflows in SHA3 implementations. I'm aware of at least PHP being affected.
Wanting Ed448 for political reasons, or purely for psychological comfort reasons, is a perfectly understandable stance to take as a non-expert.
Unfortunately, the details that experts are privy to matter a ton, and severely outweigh any notions of having eggs in multiple baskets. We're open to having our risk calculus checked, but we're nearly unanimous on this one.
The only real reason to prefer 448 over 25519 is "our legal/compliance folks say we need 192-bit or greater security for our asymmetric keys, or we void our [contract, license, certification, etc.]".
If anyone does fall into that trapping, please speak up.
Both your comment here and some stuff FiloSottile implied in the comment above seem like they would be (largely) mitigated by what the "Go 1.20 Cryptography" post mentions about using formally verified primitives that are generated by "fiat-crypto".
Beyond the curve primitive, wouldn't the majority of the code involved be shared/identical? These are closely related curves, not some oddball algorithm that requires a bespoke implementation. If things were more bespoke, I completely agree that would drastically alter the calculus, but if Ed448 is closely related, that seems like it would limit the surface area for mistakes quite a bit?
> Beyond the curve primitive, wouldn't the majority of the code involved be shared/identical? These are closely related curves, not some oddball algorithm that requires a bespoke implementation.
Well, fiat-crypto only provides the curve implementations.
Each language, library, etc. that wants to support ed448 will need a SHAKE256 implementation too. Given the memory bugs in SHA3 implementations, that has historically not been a safe addition, in practice.
Also, I don't see Ed448 on here (but I do see P448? Not sure if that's interoperable): https://github.com/mit-plv/fiat-crypto/tree/6e6809be8290a7d7...
My argument is specifically: "SHA3 implementations are necessary for Ed448, which increases code size and therefore also increases attack surface". The memory corruption bug was just a specific recent data point about the attack surface increase.
The more meta point is "just add one more algorithm" isn't a free decision. It involves non-obvious trade-offs.
I hope that makes it clearer.
If that's an attempt at highlighting that what you summarized is not persuasive, your tactic also isn't very persuasive. Instead it comes across as snarky, dismissive, or that you misunderstood. It might be worth reconsidering this tactic.
The main reason I wouldn't pick Ed448 is simpler: Nothing else really uses it.
There was a recent flurry of buffer overflows in SHA3
implementations. I'm aware of at least PHP being affected.
Wanting Ed448 for political reasons, or purely for psychological
comfort reasons, is a perfectly understandable stance to take as a
non-expert.
Unfortunately, the details that experts are privy to matter a ton, and
severely outweigh any notions of having eggs in multiple
baskets. We're open to having our risk calculus checked, but we're
nearly unanimous on this one.
Who's "we" here? I think Filippo has a mainstream take on the 448 curves, but I don't know that your take on SHA3 is widely shared.You don't have to agree with the specific reason I cited. That isn't encapsulated by "we". I was providing an additional argument in case the mainstream take isn't sufficient.
You cut the "To add to what Filippo said" part out of the excerpt you quoted, which was the necessary context to understand I was making an additional argument.
This argument is often cited in this context, and is a bit generic. A bigger curve requires more qubits to break, costs more, and provides a number of additional years that could be important.
Still I won’t use 448 (unless I need a prime-order group), because the support for it is limited, and you have to make sure it has been safely implemented.
FWIW, no one uses X448 because if X25519 falls it's unlikely to be due to something that leaves us with any confidence in the similar-but-bigger Ed448 curve. It will have to be a cryptanalysis breakthrough or progress in quantum computers, both of which are more likely to break both than only one.
The original Ed448 paper is a good read for understanding the "paranoia" motivation behind the curve. https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/625.pdf