Regardless, whether it is "far less likely" or not, it appears to be a very real possibility that is being ignored in favor of what, exactly? An extremely marginal performance gain?
> I suspect that many cryptographers believe it's far less likely than an API handling multiple curves creates opportunities for vulnerabilities that otherwise wouldn't exist. Particularly when one of those code paths is used extremely infrequently.
Honestly, that's just as much an argument in favor of entirely deprecating support for Ed25519, in my view, but that would be an unpopular opinion. In reality, the ECDSA curves support multiple security levels. Has that additional curve support ever been the direct cause of a vulnerability?
If you know of something I’d love to hear it.
This sounds great to a non-cryptographer, but it's really not all that true. We've crossed a threshold where—to continue the metaphor—the wall is so thick that the only way it's likely to be breached either by going over/around it or by something that exploits a material weakness in a way where it doesn't matter in practice how thick the wall is.
While it's of course possible that someone finds a way to break Curve25519 in a way that leaves Curve448 standing, I suspect that many cryptographers believe it's far more likely that an API handling multiple curves will create opportunities for vulnerabilities that otherwise wouldn't exist. Particularly when one of those code paths is used extremely infrequently.