Both your comment here and some stuff FiloSottile implied in the comment above seem like they would be (largely) mitigated by what the "Go 1.20 Cryptography" post mentions about using formally verified primitives that are generated by "fiat-crypto".
Beyond the curve primitive, wouldn't the majority of the code involved be shared/identical? These are closely related curves, not some oddball algorithm that requires a bespoke implementation. If things were more bespoke, I completely agree that would drastically alter the calculus, but if Ed448 is closely related, that seems like it would limit the surface area for mistakes quite a bit?
> Beyond the curve primitive, wouldn't the majority of the code involved be shared/identical? These are closely related curves, not some oddball algorithm that requires a bespoke implementation.
Well, fiat-crypto only provides the curve implementations.
Each language, library, etc. that wants to support ed448 will need a SHAKE256 implementation too. Given the memory bugs in SHA3 implementations, that has historically not been a safe addition, in practice.
Also, I don't see Ed448 on here (but I do see P448? Not sure if that's interoperable): https://github.com/mit-plv/fiat-crypto/tree/6e6809be8290a7d7...
My argument is specifically: "SHA3 implementations are necessary for Ed448, which increases code size and therefore also increases attack surface". The memory corruption bug was just a specific recent data point about the attack surface increase.
The more meta point is "just add one more algorithm" isn't a free decision. It involves non-obvious trade-offs.
I hope that makes it clearer.
If that's an attempt at highlighting that what you summarized is not persuasive, your tactic also isn't very persuasive. Instead it comes across as snarky, dismissive, or that you misunderstood. It might be worth reconsidering this tactic.
The main reason I wouldn't pick Ed448 is simpler: Nothing else really uses it.
There was a recent flurry of buffer overflows in SHA3
implementations. I'm aware of at least PHP being affected.
Wanting Ed448 for political reasons, or purely for psychological
comfort reasons, is a perfectly understandable stance to take as a
non-expert.
Unfortunately, the details that experts are privy to matter a ton, and
severely outweigh any notions of having eggs in multiple
baskets. We're open to having our risk calculus checked, but we're
nearly unanimous on this one.
Who's "we" here? I think Filippo has a mainstream take on the 448 curves, but I don't know that your take on SHA3 is widely shared.You don't have to agree with the specific reason I cited. That isn't encapsulated by "we". I was providing an additional argument in case the mainstream take isn't sufficient.
You cut the "To add to what Filippo said" part out of the excerpt you quoted, which was the necessary context to understand I was making an additional argument.
There was a recent flurry of buffer overflows in SHA3 implementations. I'm aware of at least PHP being affected.
Wanting Ed448 for political reasons, or purely for psychological comfort reasons, is a perfectly understandable stance to take as a non-expert.
Unfortunately, the details that experts are privy to matter a ton, and severely outweigh any notions of having eggs in multiple baskets. We're open to having our risk calculus checked, but we're nearly unanimous on this one.
The only real reason to prefer 448 over 25519 is "our legal/compliance folks say we need 192-bit or greater security for our asymmetric keys, or we void our [contract, license, certification, etc.]".
If anyone does fall into that trapping, please speak up.