What I'd like to see Grigg admit to with a straight face is his companies ability to trace monero. his company got the US Government bid for a $625,000 bounty to trace it, and its been two years...so i suspect Grigg's releasing this presser to take some of the heat off the inevitable "no, we cant" he's going to need to admit sooner or later.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monero#Efforts_to_trace_transa...
Updated to reflect the thousands, not mil. bounty.
The problem is a well-understood but innate limitation to all sender-obfuscating cryptocurrencies.
Only those that allow sending coins to recipients without their explicit approval. On pure Mimblewimble blockchains, the recipient must sign for receipt and is much less likely to accept poisoned funds.
I wouldn't call it a scam, it's written into laws we should all be pretty mad about. It's only a matter of time before KYC companies are the only way to engage legally with cryptocurrencies. While I don't think having all your transactions in a public ledger was ever a smart move for your average joe, just one de-anonymizing event and you're out to dry. I think the bigger issue is the ever eroding privacy policy in many countries.
What HN needs is less engagement with useless, time consuming misinformation, and more outright rejection of it.
Although, the phrase "What HN needs is less engagement with useless, time consuming misinformation, and more outright rejection of it." instead suggests that you are of the totalitarian nature that prefers to suppress dissenting thought entirely, so I'm not sure what to think.
"Blockchain" has stopped meaning anything when people decided to use it for anything remotely related to internet money. It's just become a fancy word executives put on investor decks to woo venture capitalists.
But it doesn't mean that the actual cryptographic technology called blockchain, i.e. a chain of digitally signed transactions with a distributed consensus mechanism, is itself insecure.
Monero, on the other hand, is designed to intentionally be hard to trace history of transactions on.
You'd know that hex address X sent money to Y, but you wouldn't necessarily know that X is John Doe that lives at 1234 Main St., nor you'd be able to tell that, knowing address X, John Doe also owns address Z.
With KYC laws you have a lot more metadata to be able to do correlations like that, but I'm specifically talking about the protocol and the technology itself.
Well, except for the important detail that KYC requirements don't preclude the need for warrants...
> They (loudly, incessantly) proclaim to their friends the benefits of a new money paradigm while deriving all sustenance through the umbilical cord of OldFi.
Yeah, it's almost like crypto can't possibly be a fully self-contained ecosystem, and thus it must by necessity have integration points with the rest of the world. Who could have ever predicted that...
Banks and law enforcement frequently share data without caring about warrants. One example: if you send a $10K wire (in the US), your bank may voluntarily submit a Suspicious Activity Report. And since they may be liable if they choose not to report, but are not liable if they do report, guess which option they typically choose?
The remaining half states: "As an additional firewall, a new key pair should be used for each transaction to keep them from being linked to a common owner. Some linking is still unavoidable with multi-input transactions, which necessarily reveal that their inputs were owned by the same owner. The risk is that if the owner of a key is revealed, linking could reveal other transactions that belonged to the same owner"
Unlike Bitcoin, account based blockchains make this extra measure of privacy harder as the receiving and sending address is one and the same, however there's no limit to how many accounts one can have, so anonymity is still possible as long as acquiring the coins doesn't reveal your identity.
Those who sign up for cryptocurrency service providers (who are required by law to perform AML/KYC checks - and do so with the consent of their customers) trade away the privacy (of some of their) transactions for the benefits (most commonly, yield and ease of use) said services offer. This is not different from use cases of cash money, where getting cash money from an ATM or most money transmitters will reveal your identity, and while one is free to make in person transactions and remain "anonymous", if one wants to have a bank account or invest legally, then some level of KYC will be in place.
The article indeed asks the wrong question. DeFi can't operate legally without KYC/AML and customers know it. Your comment on the other hand seems to me to be making an error in believing DeFi users don't know this.
Bad for customers to be sure. Most have no idea what they're doing and have fallen for a scam hook, line, and sinker. They (loudly, incessantly) proclaim to their friends the benefits of a new money paradigm while deriving all sustenance through the umbilical cord of OldFi. ChromaFlair on a Model T.
The article itself is a hot mess of muddled thinking. It starts by talking about the Bitcoin white paper (not a "manifesto"), then asking the absurd question: "Why can't DeFi make good on the promise?" The reason is that "DeFi" is about as far from Bitcoin as "car" is from "carpet."
The Bitcoin white paper describes the application of proof of work to the problem of electronic cash. The vast majority of DeFi projects are just centralized ledgers operating through trusted institutions. They are the very definition of "mint" in the white paper - a single, corruptible player that sets the rules - arbitrarily if need be.