This breach happened through a non-production system. Shock. Surprise.
There's no such thing as non-production/production systems imho, as long as it exists, it's a system requiring security checks and protections.
Anyway, a key point is not to have a network design that's like a Poland where people can just drive across it with little effort. That goes for developers and hackers. It should be organizationally hard for a developer to request to connect a test application to a production system. Change control should automatically put that as a ticket for review and the network team should also be cagey about doing it. It was a big oversight.
The mixing of personal data back into a insecure test system is also a bit iffy. If you think about classification for government secrets, sometimes a large volume of low level data will attract a high protection. Because it's loss represents significant harm.
Optus should have seen it's database of client secrets as a top secret asset and guarded it as such. The release of this information is having profound impacts on many governments, and government systems as well as the individuals (50% of Australia almost).
I think we are still too accepting of non technically literate CEO's. They don't have to know how to solve all the issues but they should know to be very very curious about their IT systems. And this is a telco!
Imagine you're a project manager at a telco, and you are given a project to make a network link from a capital city to a nearby town. You hire some contractors to dig up the dirt, lay down the fibre, put the dirt back in, and then you are done. The project is finished! The budget is spent, and then there is no more money, and nothing to spend it on anyway.
Fibre does not need security patches. Fibre does not need monthly updates. You can simply forget about it, because it doesn't have an end-of-support date. Copper will eventually corrode away and need replacing, but we're talking timescales on the order of 40, 60, 80 years or more, not 4-8 years like in the software world.
Those project managers get promoted, eventually to senior management. The whole budget starts revolving around this short-term, "done and dusted" type projects. Nobody at any senior layer of management develops an expectation of anything else. You deploy things, then you move on to the next project! MOVE. ON.
The same people manage IT and software, but this is a relatively new thing. Certainly a new scale to these organisations. I've been in telco "data centres" 20 years ago, and they were... cute. Just a big office room with maybe two dozen racks in them, the majority of which were optical switching gear.
Now? Telcos might have thousands of virtual machines running tens of thousands of distinct pieces of software. Software deployed in projects run by the same project managers that were used to laying fibre and walking away.
This kind of breach is the consequence of this corporate culture. It's not just the CEO, it's also the COO, the CFO, the CIO, and all the way down to all but the last tier of random befuddled contractors wondering why they're not allowed to touch anything that's not actively being built new.
Don't think for a second that any of the other major telcos are any different or better.
Also security is not one dimensional. A system's required level of confidentiality might be very different from its required level of availability. Being explicit about this might be better than trying to lump different requirements into a "production" label.
Strongly disagree. If it's an isolated copy of your production system with fake credentials, fake data, etc, there's no associated risk. We explicitly turn off various security checks in our nonprod environment because it makes it easier to poke around and debug issues. That would never fly in prod, for obvious reasons.
If that’s truly the case, and they’re fake data, I’d generally agree. That isn’t what’s happened with Optus and I dare say with many other orgs where nonprod is generally interchangeable with less secure
From a security point of view I agree - certainly my current employer makes no distinction and a vulnerability is a vulnerability no matter where it is.
Not to diminish Optus' responsibility here but I think the Australian government should carry some of the blame for imposing this requirement.
I had activated a pre-paid Optus service (in a store, using my drivers' licence as ID) but let it lapse a year ago, and allegedly my licence number was not in the breach.
I never used the Optus number and I have moved since then. So maybe impact is minimal. But I'm still angry.
In cases where there is intentional wrongdoing, existing laws already make complicit people liable both to civil action by people harmed, plus criminal or civil penalty provisions by ASIC (or the ACCC, depending on the industry and conduct). As a plaintiff, you typically join them to increase your potential pool of recoverable assets for your clients.
The same is true if there are breaches of the Australian Consumer Law, and the person has a particular level of knowledge that is below intention.
In cases of pure negligence, like this, if the negligence rises to a criminal standard, then criminal laws and penalties already apply. How and when this works has been a topic for over 50 years, since Tesco v Nattrass in the UK.
In other words, there are already very significant legal mechanisms in place, and by and large they work - and not all of them involve having executives personally liable. In any event, many already do, and this has been worked out carefully over a long period.
I think the limited liability is for debts to creditors and shareholders, rather than limited liability against criminal or other behaviour.
Maybe I’m wrong, but as I understand it, Australian law treats a corporation as a person and the directors are answerable if the corporation breaks the law.
The real problem (as I see it) is that a company the size of Optus can afford to defend their behaviour for so long that enforcement itself becomes a burden. The closer you get to the CEO and board, the more they will spend shareholders money defending themselves.
When you really think about it, that is a VERY scary thing.
Quite literally it goes:
"If I do this illegal thing myself, I'll get in lots of legal trouble."
"If I form a company and do the illegal thing, I'm safe."
Actions without proportional consequences were never going to lead to anywhere but destruction. Folk psychology told us that was likely (however much virtual-economists feigned ignorance). Empirical reality has confirmed it.
The usual way around this is via a class action, and there are already at least 2 being prepared that I know of. They will run and probably settle at some point. The main thing to be policed is to avoid the funders and solicitors taking too much of the proceeds, although that process is already in hand due to recent abuses.
No. Or perhaps yes, but only in part. Our laws need to be updated to make corporate malfeasance in general an existential threat to executives and board members, as individuals. Ordinary Aussies end up in jail for unpaid parking fines. Centrelink 'customers' (ugh) get robodebted, often into depression, sometimes to death. The "law" rules us plebs with a rod of iron, and wields it with abandon. Heads of industry get away with pretty much anything. If they want to skirt a law, all they have to do is shove fines on balance sheets. Those fines can be in the millions or billions; they're just another business expense.
Suits in jail would change the so-called 'incentives' (myopic concept though that is) dramatically. "More suits in jail" should be the catchcry of the next few generations. Every T shirt. Every graffito. Every pop song.
Of course to really fix this stuff we have to go after 'investors' and eliminate the absurdity of limited liability ("gamble on destroying the world and risk only your stake!"), but that ideology is now so culturally rigidified it would require a collapse of 'civilisation' to eliminate. That may well be coming of course.
Imagine a car company which sold cheap cars that injured people. "If we fine them for their actions, the executive team will just raise prices or fire employees!". Yeah - maybe don't sell a car thats so cheap that it causes accidents.
Certainly it would be much more effective than the system we have now - where their negligence seems to have had no negative consequences for the company.
But if you're suggesting there should be personal liability for CEOs as a result of data breaches like this, then I think I could be convinced.
"Nobody wants to be the CEO at the helm when a successful company was ruined"
Are successful people really concerned about pride? I always thought it was money and I'm not being sarcastic. I tried to find some data to back this up but couldn't. However as an anecdotal example Henry Ford II was the CEO/chairman/president from 1945 to 1980. This includes the period where the Ford Pinto (70-80) existed and received huge amounts of negative press. It's also when imports were started to take a major toll on American car manufactures (late 70s) The only reason he retired was the mandatory retirement age at Ford.
To fix this I think we need to ignore punishments for now and focus on prevention. A government agency, funded by fees, should do yearly audits on companies that have more than X users or some other variable to confirm compliance.
And yes, Boeing has this but they were too chummy with the regulators and this and that. Even though it's not perfect it's a first step. We can fix the problems similar to what came about in the aerospace industry later.
Honestly I trust my data with Optus way more than a company that can't build a secure MyGov app where my tax and health info are stored.
And we need to put other companies with terrible security on notice. I think the only way big companies will move is by making their executive team sweat money.
Thats how it works everywhere else in the economy - if your negligence causes harm, you're liable. Serve bad food in a restaurant? Sued. Sell sporting equipment which causes injury? Sued. Misrepresent yourself? Sued, and potential criminal charges. Medical malpractice? Sued. But somehow, if your sloppy software causes harm thats ok? What rubbish. Security malpractice should bear the same punishment as everything else.
Maybe the price of paid software will go up. Thats fine. Maybe there aren't enough qualified security engineers. Also, fine.
If you don't have the expertise to manufacture a safe car, we've decided you can't enter the car business at all. Likewise, if you don't have the technical skill to keep my data secure, you have no business storing my data at all.