That means anyone can implement it, including a physical token (which can be entirely open source, like the solokeys dongle).
The real concern here is friction for the "average end user" - passkeys IMHO are a net-good thing, as long as we don't see this result in everyone regressing towards "single factor auth" in some way. As it stands though, WebAuthn/Passkey gives you a level of phishing resistance that ought to raise the bar on compromising accounts.
The part I do fear about third party password managers is that they'll potentially end up lowering the level of security that WebAuthn heralded, by normalising pure "software" authenticators - putting TOTP seeds into bitwarden alongside passwords feels like putting all your eggs in one basket, even if it's a reasonably good basket. A physical WebAuthn key gives you a level of hardware isolation (limited attack surface, time-bounded attack surface, physical contact required per-authentication) that will be lost if everyone moves to software-based tokens.
On the other hand, if people are replacing a globally re-used password with a "passkey", it's a lot better. If they are replacing a hardware token with a software token, that's a small step backwards. If most people are still manually using the same password everywhere, it's probably a net step forwards.
It is not possible to take anything Apple or Google do in this area to be in good faith.
If that happens it will be 100% the fault of those specific passkey implementations. There's no reason why exporting a passkey database should be any more difficult than exporting a password database.
That isn't to say I disagree with you though.
This could all be mitigated with a little bit of tooling (allowing an existing passkey to enrol a new passkey from another device), which would also help users of hardware tokens to potentially create a way to auto-enrol an off-site key.
I do believe WebAuthn is a good-faith attempt to get away from the pervasive problem of "use the same useless password everywhere", but it makes a range of compromises which (intentionally or otherwise) create a level of cryptographic vendor lock-in that I don't think many people have recognised yet.
Or any other mismatched devices ecosystem, the locked in ecosystem dream of apple is only applicable to extremely tiny amounts of people.
You shouldn't get locked in with a USB hardware token - you can enrol it in Chrome on one computer, and then authenticate via Firefox in another computer.
The issue is really the software-based "passkey" implementation. As long as you're not solely reliant on one company for login (i.e. you enrol multiple keys, one of which is portable and interoperable, AKA a hardware token) you can safely add software-based ones for convenience without getting locked in - you can always use the hardware token to get back in and enrol a new device.
Before "cloud keychain" (i.e. software-backed, like Apple's implementation), your only "safe" option was to have 2x hardware tokens, and try to keep one off-site, but still accessible enough you could enrol it on all the sites you use.
I fear with "cloud keychain" Webauthn, we are heading for a world where getting locked out of (or banned from) your "FAMNG" account will lock you out of everything else, to an extent we've not really seen before - no access to your synced keychain secret will prevent you from logging in to everything. Physical tokens remaining interoperable should give technical users an insurance policy against this, but without some kind of portability (i.e. pairing hardware webauthn keys), I fear it won't be practical enough to keep users safe, and independent of the keychain providers.
You inherently can't copy-paste a passkey, since it's an asymmetric public/private keypair authentication. These keys are (usually) decrypted by a single symmetric key that you protect well. If you allow that key to be exported, you're back to "one password for every website"!
When this is done on a hardware-protected security engine (which doesn't permit any extraction of the key), it's arguably quite secure, but you don't then have any migration path.
Does Firefox use the keychain - on macOS it does not even try
However, the lock-in concern remains: how can you export passkeys to another password manager the same way you can export passwords to it?