Or any other mismatched devices ecosystem, the locked in ecosystem dream of apple is only applicable to extremely tiny amounts of people.
You shouldn't get locked in with a USB hardware token - you can enrol it in Chrome on one computer, and then authenticate via Firefox in another computer.
The issue is really the software-based "passkey" implementation. As long as you're not solely reliant on one company for login (i.e. you enrol multiple keys, one of which is portable and interoperable, AKA a hardware token) you can safely add software-based ones for convenience without getting locked in - you can always use the hardware token to get back in and enrol a new device.
Before "cloud keychain" (i.e. software-backed, like Apple's implementation), your only "safe" option was to have 2x hardware tokens, and try to keep one off-site, but still accessible enough you could enrol it on all the sites you use.
I fear with "cloud keychain" Webauthn, we are heading for a world where getting locked out of (or banned from) your "FAMNG" account will lock you out of everything else, to an extent we've not really seen before - no access to your synced keychain secret will prevent you from logging in to everything. Physical tokens remaining interoperable should give technical users an insurance policy against this, but without some kind of portability (i.e. pairing hardware webauthn keys), I fear it won't be practical enough to keep users safe, and independent of the keychain providers.
This could all be mitigated with a little bit of tooling (allowing an existing passkey to enrol a new passkey from another device), which would also help users of hardware tokens to potentially create a way to auto-enrol an off-site key.
I do believe WebAuthn is a good-faith attempt to get away from the pervasive problem of "use the same useless password everywhere", but it makes a range of compromises which (intentionally or otherwise) create a level of cryptographic vendor lock-in that I don't think many people have recognised yet.