Shut down Selenium right away, checked the logs, yep someone had taken over my selenium grid. It was just a small personal project on a sever I had forgot was still running, but at least they took reports seriously when my account was causing things.
It is trivial to record netflow data (and most networks do that already), and then verify incoming abuse reports against those records.
https://crowdsec.net/ https://github.com/crowdsecurity/crowdsec
Unfortunately he shut down his bgp spam route sender last year.
I have it scanning my Ubiquiti NVR logs, I modified Tomcat to log the remote IP from my reverse proxy. If anyone tries to log into my NVR three times then Fail2Ban adds the IP to a permanent blocklist on my OpnSense firewall and then HAProxy kills the TCP connection. They can't even ping after that.
A bot tries to mass ssh login on entire subnets.
A bot on one machine blocks the first bot and notified their hosting provider.
A bot on the hosting provider responds with a web form for reporting abuse.
A bot tries to fill out the web form, but is hit with a captcha.
I reset it and it has blocked eleven ip addresses in the last hour, mainly China and Digital Ocean as usual.
Just to see what happens, I'v tried sending abuse reports about ssh brute force, vnc brute force and phishing sites, by the standard method of doing a whois lookup on the ip for the abuse email address.
Some server and web hosting companies take the inconvenient approach of having an email auto-reply that says "we ignore all emailed abuse reports, you must use this web form", sometimes requiring a captcha.
When I reported a load of boxes attempting brute force logins, most complaints disappeared into the void.
I got a few responses from virtual server providers saying "no response from the customer after two weeks so we shut down the box" and one CC:ed email that appeared to be from an end user saying "we have reinstalled the box and changed the password."