I'm not saying that you should trust anything coming from anywhere, but you have no other choice than to trust the author of any software you run on your computer.
Even if the Chezmoi's author was a malicious guy, why would he hide something in the installation script when this script literally permanently installs a program on your computer.
Trust seems like such an arbitrary set of lines in the sand anyway.
Adding a repo to your OS and installing the package? Fine.
Same developer provides an install script? Absolutely not.
You have to trust somebody eventually, whether it be your HW manufacturer, OS developers, packagers, developers, etc. There's a lot of it blindly going on, but a script running as your user? Just can't.
(1) I have the server you're curling-into-bash. I write my server to check if it's piped into sh; if so, I instead pipe malicious statements.
(2) I have the server you're downloading from. I write the binary you're downloading so that it later executes malicious statements.
The "don't curl into sh" is worried about the former.
But, the latter seems a much more practical attack, that reading the script you curl is insufficient to protect you from.
It seems weird to mention (1) without at least mentioning (2).
It also requires you to trust that the underlying http server/dns record server infrastructure did not change between runs of the command.
And what form of distribution do you propose that is secure against that?
Note also that the URL is HTTPS.
This command basically downloads and execute something. Yes, it requires you to trust the author but that's what you always need to do anyway alas you don't read and compile yourself anything you install on your computer.
Or did I miss something ?