I'm not saying that you should trust anything coming from anywhere, but you have no other choice than to trust the author of any software you run on your computer.
Even if the Chezmoi's author was a malicious guy, why would he hide something in the installation script when this script literally permanently installs a program on your computer.
Trust seems like such an arbitrary set of lines in the sand anyway.
Adding a repo to your OS and installing the package? Fine.
Same developer provides an install script? Absolutely not.
You have to trust somebody eventually, whether it be your HW manufacturer, OS developers, packagers, developers, etc. There's a lot of it blindly going on, but a script running as your user? Just can't.
(1) I have the server you're curling-into-bash. I write my server to check if it's piped into sh; if so, I instead pipe malicious statements.
(2) I have the server you're downloading from. I write the binary you're downloading so that it later executes malicious statements.
The "don't curl into sh" is worried about the former.
But, the latter seems a much more practical attack, that reading the script you curl is insufficient to protect you from.
It seems weird to mention (1) without at least mentioning (2).