I don't know. I always think this line smacks of paternalism. For instance, plenty of projects suggest for installation something like:
git clone https://github.com/twpayne/chezmoi/; cd chezmoi; make; sudo make install
Of course, "curl | bash" is not always preferable. Re: security, "curl | bash" may be preferable here given the superuser privileges, or the privileges required by dpkg upon install of a stray deb package. But is the implication one reads the makefile and the source code before installing when one git clones a repo, but doesn't when the instructions say pipe to bash?I also think many are afraid to admit FOSS packaging security is mostly smoke and mirrors. Sure, it's nice re: trusting a mirror. It's nice for keeping track of packages and dependencies. But its technical security story vs "curl | bash" would seem only marginally better/worse depending on the circumstances.
Because trust is the great problem. "curl | bash" may have a smell, but it's mostly the smell of the sewer we live in.
Another question one might/should ask is -- what is the cross platform alternative? If it's "Build 10 packages for everyone," I'm not sure how happy that will make anyone. Just specifically re: this tool, imagine wanting to use it everywhere, however, you have a Mac dev laptop and your servers are a mix of Linux/FreeBSD. How much easier is it just to say "I trust chezmoi (because I would have had to trust it anyway) and 'curl | bash' is secure enough?"
This command basically downloads and execute something. Yes, it requires you to trust the author but that's what you always need to do anyway alas you don't read and compile yourself anything you install on your computer.
Or did I miss something ?
I'm not saying that you should trust anything coming from anywhere, but you have no other choice than to trust the author of any software you run on your computer.
Even if the Chezmoi's author was a malicious guy, why would he hide something in the installation script when this script literally permanently installs a program on your computer.
Trust seems like such an arbitrary set of lines in the sand anyway.
Adding a repo to your OS and installing the package? Fine.
Same developer provides an install script? Absolutely not.
You have to trust somebody eventually, whether it be your HW manufacturer, OS developers, packagers, developers, etc. There's a lot of it blindly going on, but a script running as your user? Just can't.
(1) I have the server you're curling-into-bash. I write my server to check if it's piped into sh; if so, I instead pipe malicious statements.
(2) I have the server you're downloading from. I write the binary you're downloading so that it later executes malicious statements.
The "don't curl into sh" is worried about the former.
But, the latter seems a much more practical attack, that reading the script you curl is insufficient to protect you from.
It seems weird to mention (1) without at least mentioning (2).
It also requires you to trust that the underlying http server/dns record server infrastructure did not change between runs of the command.
And what form of distribution do you propose that is secure against that?
Note also that the URL is HTTPS.
> $ sh -c "$(curl -fsLS https://chezmoi.io/get)" -- init --apply $GITHUB_USERNAME
That this is even suggested as an installation command means that they might as well strike "securely" from the tagline. For someone interested in security the foul odor that this line emits is enough to make me stop reading.