But I deliberately keep email off my phone, so I don't look at email on my phone.
So yes, I hate 'passwordless login'. I have a password manager, I can do it myself thanks very much.
If nothing else, the idea of having a separate e-mail account/inbox per use case is an interesting one!
Much like those people that use aliases or something of the sort to be able to tell where who sent then a particular email, like if suddenly some [email protected] started getting random marketing mails.
> If anybody, it's the sites having the problem of missing users.
I mean, isn't that just the consequence of websites optimizing for whatever seems to work for them and forgetting about the minority of users? It might be missed profit, sure, but that depends on just what portion of the users view this as a dealbreaker.
Maybe there could be an app like Google Authenticator that would offer login to multiple websites through one's phone? We already have that in Latvia somewhat, for banking - you enter your user details in the web form and get a prompt on your phone for your PIN to log in with in the web app: https://www.smart-id.com/
If you are not using dedicated special-purpose email addresses with specific services, you're already grossly mismanaging your online safety.
Think about it for a second: how does your password manager help you if your email password gets leaked?
> how does your password manager help you if your email password gets leaked?
You still need my TOTP codes in my case at least, which conveniently are stored in my password manager. Is it perfectly secure? No, of course it's not, but frankly my risk profile isn't worrying about a targeted attack on me and my password manager, it's worrying about leaked shared credentials.
Side note, I also get a push notification on my phone whenever a new device logs on, so unless the attack is _extremely_ targeted, well timed and they know what they want, Its not a risk for me.
It really isn't. Think about it for a second: how hard is it to spot phishing attempts when they are sent to an email address you know for a fact you're not using with a service?
And how vulnerable are you to phishing if your special-purpose email address that you only use for one specific purpose receives zero spam?
To claim that the most basic and easy internet security precautions are at a "crazy level", first you need to somehow believe that no one is targeted by these schemes. But somehow there's a whole international industry that thrives on stuff like Western Union transfers. Why is that?
Perhaps instead of telling everyone to think on things for a second, you should think on things for longer than a second?
>And how vulnerable are you to phishing if your special-purpose email address that you only use for one specific purpose receives zero spam?
This would depend on how you setup the email address, if it truly a separate email address i.e a separate account not just an alias then phishing is not the concern but management of the accounts becomes a huge problem
I use separate alias's for every service against my own custom domain that has a single email account. This is not to prevent phishing but to detect when a breach occurred or when my info is sold, you assume that when you sign up for a service only that service will ever have access to your info, many many many companies and service sell your email address to marketers.
I know for a fact that there are targeted phishing campaigns aimed at users of specific services such as LinkedIn and GitHub and Twitter and etc, primarily because I've been targeted by them.
> What do you think the venn diagram overlap between "uses a specific email for each service" and "gets phished" is?
I know for a fact that the Venn diagram of phishing attempts sent to email accounts that are not used by those services is practically zero.
Do you understand how trivial it is to identify and filter out these attacks when they are sent to addresses that are already known beforehand that are not used for that purpose?
Basic and easy internet precautions are not "register and run a domain and host your mail yourself". Basic and easy precautions are don't reuse passwords/use a password manager, use a reputable email provider, enable 2fa with totp, and dont click links from your emails
> first you need to somehow believe that no one is targeted by these schemes.
I don't see how you come to that conclusion at all. The assumption is that _everyone_ is targeted by those schemes.
> But somehow there's a whole international industry that thrives on stuff like Western Union transfers. Why is that?
Because they're low risk high reward, easy to set up, and you only need to make one mistake.
i'm not talking about unselecting all other types of communication, but rather having the service store 2 different emails for you. one for logging in and one for communication.
Just give the user two links: sign up and log in. Both ask for email address first. The next screen tells them to check their email.
You can use unusual flows without confusing users as long as you give them cues about how to do what they're trying to do.
Need to check something attached to a work email (hello Slack) but purposefully not got work email set up on your personal device? Good luck
This isn't worse or different than SSO, which your work should be enforcing anyway.
... and it just doesn't work.
Ha. Good luck with that. Your email provider probably only supports Chrome.
Here's the truth ; nothing is "secure".
Now... is email more secure than SMS, or less? What about other 2-factor auth things? Is email secure with 2-factor auth?
We did, tried something "original" in the login part, by offering a "one time login link" to our users instead of the standard flow. To be honest, we believe this was a bad idea.
The flow in itself is good and works fine (supposing email delivery works), but as @simonw perfectly said it, "resist the temptation to innovate around login!".
Offering that original "one time login link" is a frequent cause of support request because some users doesn't receive it, doesn't know what to do or how. They are not used to a change on login and this causes more troubles down the road than a standard flow.
That's why we later on decided to add the standard "password" login and tried to reverse that original flow. We still have users that have accounts with no password set though (still connecting via the original "one time login link").
Especially a pain if I'm trying to login on a device without my email.
Can take out phone and click link
That assumes you have that email account on your phone. Also that you have your phone with you, that your phone has signal / wifi, there's no delays, no greylisting, no spam filtering that might catch the email, ...
There's just too many simple ways it can break down for it to be a good system.
We're used to one way of working and have our setups for that. We don't want something different but not because it's worse. It's just different.
And even more, when you have a problem with your password, what do you have to do, yes, email for the most part.
Plus I don't know who's using that to help adtech build their cross device mappings