If something is unexpectedly insecure, you will probably not notice until it's too late.
I think the admittedly annoying security people are right in this instance.
It is not like you can go and tell your government you won't pay your taxes because their tax system doesn't work on newest OS version because it is outdated... Or rather, you can, and then the government will happily shoot you.
I get that access to an unknown site with unknown content with a dated cipher should _by default_ break. By default!
I do not get that I cant't access a well known site any longer because that site that I don't control just doesn't update their cipher. In that latter case I need to and want to be able to override the default recommendation of the gurus --- without having to rebuild my client!
You make configuration available. Most of these disabled-by-default protocols can be enabled by a user who really knows what they are doing (and isn't just saying so). A few might have been outright removed from the code base. In that case, you really need to know what you are doing, but you can still bring them back by installing a custom patch or downgrading the program in question.
I think it is a good idea to create friction along pathways that are probably mistakes. The people who really need to go down that path will put in whatever effort is necessary, while people who are motivated by the path of least resistance will be nudged in a safe direction.
I heard cryptographic weakness are sometimes used to break tivoization/DRM but I don't consider people who do this threat actors - an owner should be free to run any software on own hardware. And an attack on device you hold in hands is completely different than say an attack on remote FreeBSD server.
There is a communications problem within all of this. If I break a cryptosystem, I do not have permission by either party (customer/employer) to go and write a blog post about it. All in the name of "protecting our users". The same goes for my colleagues around the world, as such it gets very little attention.
As for threat actors misusing it, there is a value/effort calculation in their world where it is often easier to access content through other means. Crypto is hard - for everyone, even threat actors - so you won't often see them trying to tackle it.
For example, how does Debian handle this? Debian has testing, then it freezes and it moves to stable.
- Debian 9 (Buster) was released in July 2019 [1] - Debian 9 is LTS supported until June 30, 2024 [2]
Looking, it seems 12.0 was released in December 11, 2018 [3]. From a note on the Wikipedia page,
> The timeline shows that the span of a single release generation of FreeBSD lasts around 5 years
So comparing against Debian looks like a fair comparison.
[1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Debian
For example, Fedora will upgrade package versions and defaults often, because they release often. RHEL, which is made from a frozen Fedora version (for the most part), won't even upgrade versions of installed packages, but will instead back-port fixed into the old versions, so you are ultimately as stable as can be expected from running an OS, as without new versions and new features in packages there's little to worry about with regard to changing behavior.
Usually, that means you're responsible for knowing what to set for package defaults, and while they might change the default for a package such as OpenSSH at a point release (or in critical situations as a normal update), the way their config management works is that your existing systems will likely not see any change, but a new install might (there are different actions in different situations, but it's documented).
The main exception to the above is point releases, which are every six months or so, where they may take a subset of packages and allow newer versions of those to allow for new features, but with copious amounts of testing to hopefully catch any problems that might introduce. In some cases they may deem it safer to back-port a feature than to change the shipped package to a newer version (this is common for some kernel features, for example).
What this means in practice though is that you can choose to do regular security and bugfix updates automatically but stage and test point release updates, and do one or two systems to test whether it introduces problems.
Those are the benefits of an enterprise distributions, such as RHEL (and free derivatives such as CentOS and Rocky Linux) and Ubuntu LTS releases. The downside, if you can consider it that, is that they are so stable that five years later you'll find you're still running that same distro and your problem is that that majority of the software stack you're running is very old, and the annoyances from that continue to mount, and harder to migrate to something newer because there's been so much change in all the software that you can't assume that the configs will work cleanly.
Security's a thankless area since you have no way of knowing which exploits were prevented by security measures. It's like precautions against fires: You have no way of knowing how many thousands of deaths were prevented by measures taken to prevent fires from starting - and you never will. It even affects our politics: We don't know how many deaths were prevented by the measures taken to save lives from the present pandemic, and as a result some people complain.
Any reference on this? Thanks!
I have some old servers with older iLO that suffer from this, and I'm only using them on a local network. Similarly, I have used the "None" cipher on a local network to sync a lot of data from my old NAS which definitely did speed things up (that box didn't have AES-NI, ancient processor).
They don't have to enable it out of the box but having it in there when needed is definitely helpful.
On another point, that 'huge diverging patch' from OpenBSD PF was all about multithreading and dramatically improving performance on modern systems, it's not like it was done for the sake of it... But it should have been kept more up to date, yes.
If you need broken old stuff to run, the onus must be on you to disable the security, not the other way around.
When you weaponize interviewing decisions to enforce cultural homogeneity and agreement with your own opinions, you are reducing diversity and excluding people who are intelligent enough to recognize nuances that break rules of thumb.
Anyone that can explain both the trade off and when it is appropriate to make would be unaffected by this. The default must be security - we don't live in the 80s anymore.
The flip side is that shit will work. For everyone. Even people you didn't even know and that should not have access to said shit.
Cyphers are not deprecated daily. They live on for many years.
(you might need to toggle a different option but I forgot the name)
You know what? I appreciate that. The security people want to break stuff all the time and it is terribly annoying to have to go and fix stuff. Sometimes you even can't, there is software out there that only supports older TLS ciphers and you have to keep an old browser around to access it. And inevitably that old browser is going stop working at some point too... If you are so anal about security, the knobs are there to make adjustments. For the rest of us, stop breaking shit!