Source: at my German uni there are many recruitment drives from these entities
But, keep in mind: the government is actively selling out its constituents and creating an environment that enables a surveillance state, even when that may not be the original goal. Slippery slope and all, first it's child pornography - but where does it stop? It won't, because that data set is rich to mine - rich to sell into. We can make up entire product lines that can be sold, via FUD, into our ignorant government friends and force people to buy it even when it's been shown to provide little to no value to the masses.
So, no - not a lizard conspiracy. More like "Dumb and Dumber: Government Edition".
Incentives are aligned, each party acts in their own self interest and this is the outcome. Conspiracy isn't needed to explain it.
Sleep tight, eu.
its not about bribery, its about being led on by the nearest grifter because everyone actually working on technology isnt in the same circles as the politicians
I think that's much more of a conspiracy theory than the notion that politicians want control.
UvdL has been mentioned in connection with nepotism before (by the German state radio!):
https://www.dw.com/en/german-opposition-to-probe-defense-min...
After that scandal she failed upwards to Brussels. Politicians that are that unassailable should face extended scrutiny. Who protects her and why?
(Here is an unrelated mask procurement scandal that shows how things work in Germany:
https://www.dw.com/en/german-mask-scandal-unforgivable-viola...)
As a German minister of defence, she is known as a person who paid half a billion euros to PwC consultants. Also, she renovated a sailing wooden training ship for more than 200 million euros.
And she is accused of removing proofs by deleting data from her phone and “not remembering” anything.
I would trust that person every evil and corrupt thing one can imagine.
It's sad that our EU doesn't let any hope that they do something because they believe it's the right thing to do. It's always big business and foreign government interests before interests of Europeans.
Paying half a billion to consultants to tell you this is.... Kinda the problem.
Now, if I only could make my previous comment disappear, like she made her messages disappear, so they couldn't be used as court evidence …
It's clear now how these Israeli zero-day exploit software power politicians' informational armies against their political adversaries.
e.g.: Crypto AG incident, old phone taps, etc.
People ascribe to government officials way too much competence and way too little desire to consolidate power and rule absolutely
Might be an understatement?
The lizards may be behind the software companies though
With services like Digital Ocean, you can spin up a chat server with pretty much only the most basic of technical knowledge, hell you likely won't even have to touch a command line.
Sure the EU could move to require OSS software developers operating in the EU to backdoor their software but that will be moot too as it will get caught on to in a heartbeat and a fork (sans backdoor) will be made available.
In short, Dutch hoster TransIP had to pause their scanning service. They got hashes that included default images from WordPress.
"Waar het misging, is volgens TransIP-woordvoerder Marco Edelman dat per ongeluk hashes van standaardafbeeldingen van WordPress-installaties en plug-ins zijn toegevoegd." [1] https://tweakers.net/nieuws/182766/transip-pauzeert-hashchec...
Right now it was clear because it was an often-used package. What if it's something more niche next time?
If I had to guess, you might have been hitting collisions in a truncated MD5 hash. It's not uncommon to do something like take only the first 64 bits of the hash. Doing this you are quite vulnerable to birthday problem issues.
I have no idea if the database is still somewhere, if so, we can look at the git commit and figure out what the possible UPCs are and narrow it down to a couple of hours worth of time stamps. I have a feeling it would probably be more than 512 bits though. UPCs are can be longish, plus a time stamp with each digit being a byte…
I highly doubt the database exists in any meaningful way though, since the product was shut down years ago.
Here's how it works. By law, all machines will require networking, or will refuse to boot.
Network stacks will require a key / license. Licence will be verified by an online server, continually, and any OS without this will be fined, and the devs implementing a bypass jailed.
Stop complaining/pointing out flaws, or you must hate children! Or... are you one of them?
Microsoft are slowly baking in this concept into Windows 10/11 to become more like an XBox at least for the home version. I envision a future version of windows will operate very closely to the method you described. I suspect all of the OS vendors want an app store in front of everyone whenever possible and telemetry to see what needs tuning to keep interaction with the app store as high as attainable. I do not believe it would be a stretch to see a future home version of windows not allow login if their authentication servers can not be reached or if ones cached remote credentials expire.
I could even see this eventually happening with Linux. The latest version of the Fedora desktop F36 interacts heavily with admin.fedoraproject.org and they have an app store. AFAIK Redhat/IBM have not yet implemented any centralized authentication servers with corresponding default client configurations to utilize them and I do not know if they intend to.
The desktop OSes are heading there too but they're still a bit afraid of pissing off their legacy users. Besides the lock-in they're all aiming at that sweet 30% app store commission.
I disagree. It might happen to some flavors of Linux like Fedora, Ubuntu and others that are backed by companies. But because the source is open, there will always be distributions that do not have such a restriction.
In addition the EU is also working on an online ID so a website can request your real identity and verify it. This would link in with that, validate the user as well as their hardware.
Right now? No. But I could see it happen in 10 years. Especially once CSAM is no longer the scapegoat and they have admitted they want the data for a lot more surveillance. I can already see the posts of people that think they have nothing to hide.
Why isn't that better than catching none of the abusers?
That's just one argument on "even if everything works exactly as intended, it's still a terrible idea".
Then add malicious use of such a system once in place. We know such systems are misused ALL the time. So I would bet good money that someone, somewhere, will instead use it to neatly collect CSAM material.
Not to mention other malicious use of surveillance whereby you just add some hashes for files completely unrelated to CSAM. I'm not talking about the slippery-slope of "let's include some gay porn in the mix", but rather stuff related to political opponents, and what not.
It's a false dichotomy to suggest the trade-off is "catch some abusers" vs "catch no abusers". It's a "catch some abusers" vs "violate privacy of minors | remove e2e encrypted communication | etc"
These measures are only likely to lead to the arrest of a small portion of abusers, while opening a massive avenue for government overreach across the entire population.
I would assume that very few to none of us on here are pedophiles, and we're aware this is going on. It stands to reason that the pedophiles are also aware that this is going on, and the vast majority of them are going to adjust their behavior to avoid this scanning. Doubly so once a few arrests are made.
The balance of those issues is subjective, though.
But I agree with the parent comment, the vast, vast majority of distributors doesn't know how to work with encryption. The audience here knows, but compared to the average user, the audience here has much more technical knowledge.
To be very clear, I think there are ways to design applications around encryption to prevent the active abuse on platforms. For example, disabling encryption on minors accounts, limiting messages from people outside of your social circle, allowing opt-in so parents can read messages from their kids, AI models to display a prompt to the child that something may be harmful and they should seek their parents etc.
The biggest disappointment I had with Apple about this CSAM scanning business, is that they were not talking about or taking steps in preventing the active abuse of children. I would love to see regulation put in for the design of apps when a minor uses them. A small part of me is worried about poor regulations, but then we have things like Kik.
You can also just have your kid not use encrypted apps or not allow them to message internet strangers. That is probably the wrong thing to do - blanket bans are a bad way to teach life skills - bit you as a parent can do so. You don't need government help.
According to the DKSB (Deutscher Kinderschutzbund) [1], encryption barely plays a role when it comes to the distribution of CSAM [2]. In short: DKSB is not in favour of this. You know, the people that probably know what they are talking about when it comes to the protection of children, unlike the politicians who are trying to force this through.
The politicians which only really talked to salesmen of surveillance software [3] about this and never really consulted any independent people with expertise in tech, privacy or the protection of children [4].
Because this was never, at any moment, about protecting children.
[1]: https://www.dksb.de/en/home/
[2]: https://www.eu-info.de/dpa-europaticker/316232.html
[3]: https://netzpolitik.org/2022/dude-wheres-my-privacy-how-a-ho...
[4]: https://edri.org/our-work/private-and-secure-communications-...