> (since the distance metric is x²+y²+z²-ct²)
and you just have the line-element for flat (Minkowski) spacetime in Minkowski coordinates.
Change to polar coordinates, and you have to write the line-element down differently (even in SR). Change from flat spacetime and you have to write the line-element down differently. Change the metric signature for convenience from +++- to ---+, and you have to write the line-element down differently. The line-element depends on a choice of how one is putting down coordinates on a spacetime, and the choice of the spacetime itself.
Handily, we can turn to the lecture notes linked at the very top of this discussion. My paragraph above is essentially the content of §2.1.1 (Basic concepts, Manifolds and Metrics) of the lecture notes linked at the top, but I guess the section is just not basic enough to have found its way into this thread. See eq (2.3) for where to stuff in the "d"s and the paragraph after eq (2.1) about why they're ds rather than ∆s (or nothings). Also see equations (5.1) and (5.2), (5.41, footnote 57) for examples of line-elements for non-flat spacetimes; eqns (5.6), (5.35), (6.1) for more exotic line-elements; and (5.37-5.40) for examples of 1+1 line-elements. See footnote 10 for a pithy comment on choice of metric signature. ("Some people." Gee, thanks. cf. footnote 12.)
> In SR/GR we also see time as separate from space
is, unfortunately, almost entirely incorrect. The closest we can get to repairing this notion is by a procedure such as slicing or threading and introducing operators to knit the resulting hypervolumes together in some orderly way. This is discussed to an extent in §§5.1-5.2, or in most numerical relativity textbooks (like, especially given the content of §5 of the lecture notes linked at the top, Miguel Alcubierre's excellent introductory textbook! ISBN-13: 978-0199656158).
I'm sorry to snipe at you, but this comes after reading the discussion here in which you assert and then retract numerous statements about the content of relativity theory. All that sure has confused me, and I'm sure I'm not alone.
You're right of course about the missing ds or deltas in the Minkowski metric, and there's also a missing square, since that is the square of the 4-distance, not the 4-distance.
However, on the basic point that Minkowski spacetime is different from a Cartesian 4-dimensional space, and thus time can be seen as fundamentally different in nature than the space coordinates, in not sure why you claim I am mistaken. Maybe the specific wording I chose, "separate", was the issue?
Time and space are of course tied together in SR&GR, whereas they are more firmly separated in Newtonian mechanics. But "separate" can also mean "different", and I think it is corect to say they are still different things even in GR, though they are tied to each other.
Do we need a "definition of time"? Maybe there are certain fundamental aspects of reality which cannot be broken down into anything more fundamental, and time is one them? If that were true, then "time" could not really be defined (at least not intensionally), we could only point out the fact that it exists. We could never say what it is, if saying what it is is understood as requiring explaining it in terms of something else.
> On the other hand, both GR and QM are also consistent with an interpretation where the universe with its entire Time-line is a fixed object,
GR and QM also appear to be consistent with idealism (Berkeley-style) – all that exists are minds and their experiences, and the physical universe (including physical laws such as GR and QM) are simply patterns in those experiences. Time then might be said to be a fundamental part of the essence of what it is to be a mind. GR and QM could not really tell us anything about what time actually is–they would merely be tools which minds can use to predict what kinds of experiences they will have under various circumstances.
I don't understand how idealism can be a complete theory of the world. What are the minds made of? What are the physical laws that govern their working? How do we know there are more kinds not just one, my own (and arrive at solipsism)?
The Standard Model at least posits a simple world, made of a relative handful of basic elements that follow some simple laws. Minds are extremely complex objects, and it seems very hard to accept them as irreducible - especially if you chose to believe that other people and their minds exist as well.
Edit: Having read a bit about Berkeley's idealism from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [0], to me it seems that it is simply a re-stating of mind-matter dualism with other terms. He posits that the world is made up of spirits and ideas. Ideas are perceived by the spirit, but they are not caused by it, as the spirit cannot choose not to perceive them. But then what is causing the ideas? According to him, a special spirit called God. Why are ideas regular and casually linked at all, and why is a dream different from an apple? Because God has willed it so. So basically "ideas" for all intents and purposes behave like matter (because God willed it so), and spirits are the minds that perceive this matter.
Honestly I don't know how anyone can find such arguments convincing.
Ask an M-theorist "what are strings and branes made of?" They'd probably say something like "in M-theory, they are fundamental entities, they are not made out of anything more basic". Well, an idealist can say the exact same thing about minds. Different minds have different properties, just as different strings and branes can have different properties, but for both theories they are entities which cannot be reduced to anything more fundamental.
> What are the physical laws that govern their working?
From an idealist point of view, I'd say physical laws are regular patterns which exist in the experiences of minds. So, your question then becomes: What regular patterns in the experiences of minds govern the working of minds? The question doesn't make a lot of sense; the best sense I can make of it is – exactly the physical laws you are familiar with. They govern the workings of minds, for (as far as we know) minds always have experiences compatible with the truth of those laws.
> How do we know there are more kinds not just one, my own (and arrive at solipsism)?
I would say that the existence of other minds is an innate idea, an a priori concept. It is a belief which does not require any evidence to justify – because the entire idea that "beliefs require evidential justification" is part of an epistemic value system which has the existence of other minds as one of its unquestionable presuppositions.
> The Standard Model at least posits a simple world, made of a relative handful of basic elements that follow some simple laws. Minds are extremely complex objects, and it seems very hard to accept them as irreducible - especially if you chose to believe that other people and their minds exist as well.
But how are you defining "simple" and "complex" here? From another point of view, the physicalist world is enormously more complex than the idealist world. If we assume there are no omniscient minds, then the universe must contain a vast quantity of irreducibly complex information which no mind will ever know – I've read one physicist suggesting that the information-theoretic complexity of the observable universe is on the order of 10^120 bits – whereas a (non-theistic) idealist can say that no mind will ever know the vast majority of that information, and if no mind ever knows that information it never actually exists, so in a (non-theistic) idealist worldview the infomation-theoretic complexity of the observable universe is likely to be substantially less, meaning the universe is substantially simpler. (Whether the same would hold in a theistic idealist worldview is a more complicated question which I suggest we leave to the side.)
Now, you might object to how I am defining "simple" and "complex" here; but the terms have no precise and unique definition – and even if some theory is simpler than another by some specific definition of "simple" and "complex", why should we care? Even if preferring theories which are "simpler" in some specific way turns out to be the most productive approach to the natural sciences (compared to preferring theories which are "simpler" in some other way) – why should we assume that the same must be true for other disciplines with quite distinct methodologies, such as philosophy?
> Having read a bit about Berkeley's idealism from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy [0], to me it seems that it is simply a re-stating of mind-matter dualism with other terms
I'm sympathetic to Berkeley-style idealism, but wouldn't defend every detail of Berkeley's views. Some idealisms do contain some degree of dualism – the mind itself vs the contents of the mind, experiencer-vs-experiences, my own mind vs the minds of others – but I don't agree that any of those dualisms can simply be reduced to or identified with the dualism of mind-vs-matter – and there is no single mind-matter dualism, since mind-matter dualism exists in multiple varieties: substance dualism, property dualism, hylemorphic dualism, etc, which disagree with each other about what mind and matter are and how they are related to each other.
> But then what is causing the ideas? According to him, a special spirit called God
This is one element of Berkeley's views I definitely disagree with. I think he is too quick to resort to God as an answer to questions which I believe can be answered without invoking the concept of a divine being. (You can be an idealist without being a theist – McTaggart is a famous example of an atheist idealist – and even a theistic idealist might prefer to invoke the concept of God more sparingly than Berkeley does.) In my view, causation is simply another kind of pattern which exists in the experiences of minds – to ask "what causes experiences" becomes equivalent to "what experience-patterns of the particular type we call 'causation' do experiences participate in?" – the obvious response to which is "the answer will be different for every experience". An idealist can provide a theory of causation without bringing God into it.
Well, here is where we get to my claim about complexity. The important point about strings or branes or particles in the SM is that they are characterized by extremely few parameters. I'm less familiar with string theory, but particles in the SM have electrical charge (+1 or -1), color charge (red, green, blue), anti-color charge(antired, antigreen, antiblue), spin (0, 1/2, or 1) and mass (this can take 16 possible values). There are 17 fundamental particles, and the theory describes all of their possible interactions based on the numbers above.
Contrast this with the minds of idealism: to be in any way recognizable as the concept we call mind in our daily lives, minds must be characterized by probably thousands of parameters. If a particular version of idealism recognizes other people and the broad strokes of the world as we know it, it must at least allow for tens of billions of different "fundamental constituents", the different minds of all humans that have ever lived, if not an unbounded number given that more humans will be born in the future.
But even then, if we accept minds as irreducible as we must with fundamental particles or strings, we should still be able to come up with a theory of the properties of minds, and dynamical laws that describe their interactions with other minds and/or ideas or other constituents of the idealistic universe. Are there any philosophers or scientists who have attempted to do so?
And I don't think it's fair to say you accept all physical laws as describing the universe, as the physical laws describing two electrons exchanging a photon have no room for "a mind" in that picture.
So, if you don't accept materialism (that is, don't accept that minds are an emergent phenomenon, with physical reality being fundamental and irreducible) then you don't have a complete description of reality until you also have a different set of laws which explain the functioning of minds.
You seem to be espousing the following principle: "All else being equal, prefer the theory whose fundamental entities are described by the fewest parameters". But why should anyone accept this principle? Even if it turns out to be the most productive methodology for the discipline of physics, why should we expect it to also be the best choice for other disciplines with rather different methodologies, such as philosophy?
> Contrast this with the minds of idealism: to be in any way recognizable as the concept we call mind in our daily lives, minds must be characterized by probably thousands of parameters.
I think your philosophy just moves the complexity elsewhere. You claim that the experiences of everyday life are somehow either reducible to or emergent from the Standard Model (a claim which is actually a philosophical interpretation of the Standard Model rather than part of the Standard Model proper), but you cannot give a complete explanation of how to do so – I'm sure you could provide some extremely high-level outline, but in doing so you must skip over innumerable details. Even just what we know of those details, is so enormously complex that I don't think anyone in the world could possibly know or understand all of it, only some little corner of it in which they've built up expertise – and there remain massive gaps all over our collective knowledge. It seems very doubtful we'll ever assemble a complete picture – indeed, the idea that we ever will is a rather massive leap of faith. And yet, it is claimed, this unimaginably complex complete explanation must exist in theory, even if it will never be fully known in practice. Why aren't you counting that complexity? I expect you'll claim that all that complexity is "hidden in" the simplicity of the Standard Model, waiting to emerge from it – but how can you actually know that is true? It looks to me like a gigantic unproven and unprovable assumption.
> we should still be able to come up with a theory of the properties of minds, and dynamical laws that describe their interactions with other minds and/or ideas or other constituents of the idealistic universe
Why ought we expect to be able to do that?
> And I don't think it's fair to say you accept all physical laws as describing the universe, as the physical laws describing two electrons exchanging a photon have no room for "a mind" in that picture.
Absolutely there are minds in that picture. How do you know those laws are "true"? Well, certain minds derived some testable hypotheses from them, minds performed some experiments and observations to confirm or disconfirm those hypotheses – and then communicated the results to other minds, and convinced other minds to repeat those experiments/observations who in turn also communicated their results, and eventually there is enough experimental/observational data to convince a sufficient supermajority of minds who possess the property of being members of the relevant scientific community that the law is "true". And when we say that law is "true", all we are really saying is that minds have done the things I mentioned in the preceding sentence; and also, since minds have in the past found the law a useful conceptual tool for predicting (certain aspects of) their future experiences, it is reasonable for minds to expect the law will continue in the future to be a useful tool for so doing.
That sounds like block time, but in that case I think the operative part is "fixed object", so there would be no concept of changing the past or having multiple time lines. If there were a loop, it would "always" have been there.
One interpretation I quite like is the idea that objects travel through time just as they do through space, and so if you went back to a past time there would be nothing there. All the matter is in the 'now' on a trajectory into the future, and both the past and future are the time equivalent of empty space.
Yes, if the universe is fixed, anything in it has always been there. Basically it would be like a recording of a movie - both the intro and the ending exist at the same time, and the film could be circular.
That is true as far as we know, but we also thought all laws of nature are P and C and T invariant, and that turned out to be wrong: the weak interaction is not time invariant or, equivalently, not CP invariant (though it is CPT invariant as far as we know) [0].
That is, if you look at two particles with the same parity forwards in time, they will interact differently than if you look at them backwards in time. However, if you look at two particles with the same parity acting forwards in time, and you look at their anti-particles backwards in time and with opposite parity, you will still see the same interaction.
Also, I don't understand what you mean when you say "there is no separation of future and past in thermodynamics" - the second law clearly states that entropy increases with time in a closed system.
But that is also problematic for many reasons. So nobody really knows why we perceive changes in the world as if coming from a state of low entropy to the state of high entropy. From pure probability reasoning and symmetry of time (even if the latter is not 100% true, it does not matter, since the error will not affect the statistical reasoning) if a system at some moment in a state with a low probability then both in the future and the past it is more likely to find the system in a more probable state with a higher entropy.
Of course, it's also possible that we have not yet discovered some other law of nature that is deterministic, but breaks CPT symmetry, that might define an arrow of time at the microscopic level as well. After all, QM still has the measurement problem, where the Born rule I believe also breaks CPT symmetry.
Regarding CPT violation. Even if it was so, it would not imply that one could use it to justify the existence of the time arrow. Asymmetry would imply that one could distinguish the past from future, but it would not explain why what we perceived as the past is the past and not the future.
An analogy is a bar that gradually changes from black to white. Surely there is a color gradient. But that alone does not imply that there is a preferred direction from black to white as the choice of the direction is arbitrary.
The measurement problem arises when one tries to use QM to predict empirical observations. The concept is fundamental to QM as a physical theory - remove it, and QM can no longer be said to agree with experimental observations (in fact, it contradicts them), so it can no longer be verified to be a physical theory.
> But everything is quantum at the end. So there are no classical devices.
This remains a supposition. It is possible that the classical world is indeed an emergent phenomenon, as in the many-worlds interpretation for example, but we don't yet have a full, experimentally verifiable account of how that would work. Decoherence has shed some light on aspects of the problem, but it is not enough (it does not account for the choice of observable to measure, the preferred basis problem).
> Asymmetry would imply that one could distinguish the past from future, but it would not explain why what we perceived as the past is the past and not the future.
Yes, that is a good point. However, moving from the future to the past in SR requires something that can move faster than light (faster than c). Such a particle is in principle possible, but it has negative energy. As such, if such a particle could actually exist, QM would predict that pairs of this particle and regular particles would form all the time in the void, and thus the universe would quickly become pure chaos (this prediction comes from the observation that energy is conserved if in a region of 0 energy you create a particle with energy E and one with energy -E).
So, if we can establish that the future and the past are distinguishable, then relativistic quantum mechanics requires that movement is only possible from the past to the future, and this should give us an arrow of time even at the microscopic level.
Computation is a potential source of a definition of time - a computation naturally introduces an order of successive operations, which happens to match our observation of time very well (you can extend computation to a continuous process if needed, though of course we don't know if time is necessarily continuous).
On the other hand, both GR and QM are also consistent with an interpretation where the universe with its entire Time-line is a fixed object, where we can imagine the past and future exist just as much as distant galaxies. In this view, the concept of time travel makes some intuitive sense, as you can imagine closed loops where you can reach (here, yesterday) just like you can reach (other city, tomorrow).