Say A puts $4000 in and B puts $2000 in with the expectation that they will double their money, but instead they lose it all. By the procedure outlined in article, the “pie” worth -$6000 would be evenly distributed, meaning both A and B would have to pay $3000. So A ends up with $1000 and B ends up with -$1000. This seems especially punitive to B, and they end up in a worse place than they would have with what the article calls the “power” arrangement, under which they would have $0 after losing only $2000 instead of $3000.
I’m curious about how many weaker parties continue to favor the “pie” method when losses are divided the same way as gains—-my intuition is that a “pie”-style deal is typically reached only when there is an almost-certain probability of gain, but I’m curious about how negotiators actually behave!
I would say a better example is that A owns 66% of a startup and B owns 33%. They decide to sell the tech for X dollars. However, they are offered a 2X buyout if both of them agree to work for 3 years at the acquiring company. There's no "partial" offer though, it's both partners or neither. How is the 2X split up?
The contrived example fails because of the 33% and 66% wouldn't be assigned randomly.
If you found a magic investment that was guaranteed to return 200%, but were some money short so couldn't invest at all, if I made up the difference and said we had to split the gains evenly it would still be in your best interests to say yes.
Of course the obvious response is that investments aren't guaranteed to return money. Going by this method, the losses would be "split" evenly as well rather than in proportion. So if the company could only return 50% of the initial investment, you would claim extra money towards your principal, thus reducing your overall risk at the expense of the person who invested less money.
When you frame it as an investment question, the implication is that if either person walks away then they can be replaced by a third party who is willing to stake the cash. Since it is easier to replace someone when their stake is lower, the person putting up the $2k has less leverage in this case.
If you explicitly limited the investment to two specific people (imagine a crazy term in a will or something), then I think you'd end up back with a $7k/$5k split.
What you're seeing in this hyperbolic "counter-example" is that the assumptions of that model don't hold; the person providing 1 rather than 5999 is probably very replaceable and would be willing to settle for much less profit due to market forces, the person providing 5999 probably has the means to at least temporarily acquire another 1, the deal probably wouldn't fall through in the first place if it were for slightly less than 6k, and so on.
Consider an extreme sceanrio - $5990 and $1. As per the article the return should be $8999 and $3001. That's not going to fly in the real world.
So let's say there's some investment opportunity where someone has $4,000 to put in and I have $2,000. The investment requires $6000, so neither of us can access it alone. If we agree to invest, let's say the value is guaranteed to increase, in this example by 200% to $12,000. The power analysis way of distributing that increase would be that the other person gets $8000 and I get $4000. Using this pizza analysis, it would instead be distributed as $7000 and $5000 -- splitting the increase of $6000 equally.
It's an interesting concept. Certainly I, with only $2000, would be more inclined to contribute. And the other party would certainly benefit more than if we had decided to not go through with it at all.
I think it comes down to how much the person with the weaker power is likely to want to contribute. It's a good way to convince them if the power is fairly offset, but when they are close it's not really necessary to convince them.
I think this is partially touched on in the article itself, and it makes sense. It comes down to what seems fair to the parties involved!