I cannot imagine the scandal that it will be if my country (Mexico) would allow Russia or China to place some weapons and troops in say, Tijuana or Cd Juarez. And yet, the USA has bases stationed all around the globe.
The world is not some grand scale intended to be balanced. No one argues the USA is full of saints. Whether the USA is full of saints or not is immaterial to Russia/China being "bad". The truth is, a world Order led by the United States looks a lot kinder than a world led by Russian or Chinese regimes. Resorting to false equivalences (guys, they're all bad) in fact hurts all of us interested in a world that respects basic human freedoms.
I've stated this before, as have many others on this site: the US and the knowledge of its genocides and other violent acts committed on people across the world is only possible when a free press is guaranteed and when we do not need to worry about being whisked away into that eternal night for bringing those atrocities to light. You cannot discuss the Tienanmen Square massacres in China without severe reprisals. Indeed, in Russia, doctors have simply repeatedly fallen out of windows for daring to toe the official line on COVID. It's happened so frequently, it's become something of a meme.
So please, criticize the US all you want (and there's much to criticize) but stop at drawing these false equivalencies because it is easy or because you believe in some global scale that must be equalized.
But that is a preconception you have due to your background. A world order the China way may mean no more narcos and narco killing in my country, no more each-to-its-own culture that is permeating my country.
You have to be aware that in my country we like socialism. We like social healthcare, social help for people. A lot of people believe that it's wrong that 10% of the people has 90% of the wealth.
Thing is, living in a bubble prevents people to see that there is more than what we learn from our country and its social constructs.
I was fortunate to live in 3 very different countries for a long time. It allowed me to both value watch I had at home but also to see other ways to do things. Again the narrative of "russia china bad" is a subjective idea that is given to us by our society.
I have already outlined a few examples for why it is not. If you insist on this damaging false equivalence, and for a taste of something on your continent, you need only look to the illegal violation of the territorial waters of Argentina by Chinese fishing vessels en masse. That is happening today.
The ruthless genocide of the Uyghur people is happening today. The illegal seizure of Hong Kong happened last year. I have personal experience here as a woman I grew close to openly wept for the loss of her freedoms happening in real time.
The Great Leap Forward killed between 13 and 55 million people of which it is estimated at least 2.5 million of these deaths were caused by beatings, tortures, or summary executions. Your vaunted CCP denies and distorts all of these events.
> You have to be aware that in my country we like socialism. We like social healthcare, social help for people. A lot of people believe that it's wrong that 10% of the people has 90% of the wealth.
I live in Denmark. I am quite familiar with socialized healthcare. Denmark and the rest of the EU are good examples of the benefits of what sharing the wealth looks like. China and Russia are authoritarian superpowers who treat history as a story of convenience and you have fallen for it.
>argue that it is in the political interest of Ukrainian nationalists to have Crimea in Russia. Without the votes from Crimea, Viktor
>Yanukovich would never have been elected president.
This is actually a very interesting point, and would explain Ukraine's recent shift to more nationalist politics, and pivot away from Russia - which (unintended consequences for Russia) sparked all these problems in the east.
Seemly Poland in the run up to WW2 got parts of it conquered by URSS, and later when WW2 was over, some territory that was part of Germany became part of Poland to "restore" its territory, effectively shifting Poland westward, this means that eastern Ukraine had polish people inside it.
The guy then explained that Ukraine east side is full of ethnic Russians, even if they consider themselves Ukranians, while west side is filled with ethnic Polish and related groups.
He predicted then (the violent protests didn't had started yet when I read this) that the ethnic EU people would be pro-EU, and would oust Yanukovich in violent protests, and the ethnic Russians would retaliate in some form, either trying to retake the capital by force, or splitting away.
Yet culturally Western Ukraine has much less ties with Russia, due to not being a part of Russian empire.
Again and again, I read this 'ethnic' treatment of conflict in Ukraine. That is not true, for example Kyiv is majority (even today) Russian-speaking, yet it always supported pro-West politicians in elections.
It's a myth perpetuated by Russia
You may find the accounts from two Ambassadors presented in this write-up interesting: https://transatlanticrelations.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/1...
Here's the direct quote from Ambassador Braithwaite's letter. Braithwaite was UK’s Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Russia until 1992.
The assurances Russians point to the following:
Assurances given in 1990:
• James Baker, US Secretary of State, 9 February 1990: “We consider that the consultations and discussions in the framework of the 2+4 mechanism should give a guarantee that the reunification of Germany will not lead to the enlargement of NATO’s military organization to the East”;
• Helmut Kohl. German Chancellor, 10 February 1990: “We consider that NATO should not enlarge its sphere of activity.”
Assurances given in 1991:
• John Major. British Prime Minister, Speaking to Defence Minister Yazov, 5 March 1991: “He did not himself foresee circumstances now or in the future where East European countries would become members of NATO;
• Douglas Hurd, British Foreign Secretary, speaking to Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh, 26 March 1991: “[T]here were no plans in NATO to include the countries of Eastern and Central Europe in NATO in one form or another;”
• Francois Mitterrand, speaking to Mikhail Gorbachev, 6 May 1991: “Each of the [Eastern European] countries I have mentioned will seek to ensure its security by concluding separate agreements. With whom? With NATO, of course. ... I am convinced that is not the right way forward for Europe.” This was, of course, a prediction, not an assurance.
[Author’s note: recently declassified material published by the National Security Archive contains some additional references to similar “assurances.’]
This factual record has not been successfully challenged in the West. The remarks by Major and Hurd are confirmed by British records. I was present on both occasions.
Russia is extremely sensitive about foreign military activity adjacent to its borders, as any other country would be and the United States always has been. It has signaled repeatedly that it will stop at nothing to prevent NATO membership for Ukraine. Nevertheless, eventual Ukrainian membership in NATO has been an avowed objective of U.S. and NATO policy since the Bush-Cheney administration. This makes absolutely no sense. It is also dangerous to confront a nuclear-armed power with military threats on its border.
When I hear comments now such as, “Russia has no right to claim a ‘sphere of influence,’” I am puzzled. It is not a question of legal “rights” but of probable consequences. It is as if someone announces, “We never passed a law of gravity so we can ignore it.” No one is saying that Ukraine does not have a “right” to apply for NATO membership. Of course it does. The question is whether the members of the alliance would serve their own interest if they agreed. In fact they would assume a very dangerous liability.
I point this out as a veteran of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. At that time I was assigned to the American embassy in Moscow and it fell to my lot to translate some of Khrushchev’s messages to President John Kennedy. Why is it relevant? Just this: in terms of international law, the Soviet Union had a “right” to place nuclear weapons on Cuba when the Cuban government requested them, the more so since the United States had deployed nuclear missiles of comparable range that could strike the USSR from Turkey. But it was an exceedingly dangerous move since the United States had total military dominance of the Caribbean and under no circumstances would tolerate the deployment of nuclear missiles in its backyard. Fortunately for both countries and the rest of the world, Kennedy and Khrushchev were able to defuse the situation. Only later did we learn how close we came to a nuclear exchange.
As for the future, the only thing that will convince Moscow to withdraw its military support from the separatist regimes in the Donbas will be Kyiv’s willingness to implement the Minsk agreement. As for the Crimea, it is likely to be a de facto part of Russia for the foreseeable future, whether or not the West recognizes that as “legal.” For decades, the U.S. and most of its Western allies refused to recognize the incorporation of the three Baltic countries in the Soviet Union. This eventually was an important factor in their liberation. However, the Crimea is quite different in one key respect: most of its people, being Russian, prefer to be in Russia. In fact, one can argue that it is in the political interest of Ukrainian nationalists to have Crimea in Russia. Without the votes from Crimea, Viktor Yanukovich would never have been elected president.
One persistent U.S. demand is that Ukraine’s territorial integrity be restored. Indeed, the U.S. is party to the Budapest Memorandum in which Russia guaranteed Ukraine’s territorial integrity in return for Ukraine’s transfer of Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia for destruction in accord with U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements. What the U.S. demand ignores is that, under traditional international law, agreements remain valid rebus sic stantibus (things remaining the same).
When the Budapest memorandum was signed in 1994 there was no plan to expand NATO to the east and Gorbachev had been assured in 1990 that the alliance would not expand. When in fact it did expand right up to Russia’s borders, Russia was confronted with a radically different strategic situation than existed when the Budapest agreement was signed.
Furthermore, Russians would argue that the U.S. is interested in territorial integrity only when its interests are served. American governments have a record of ignoring it when convenient, as when it and its NATO allies violated Serbian territorial integrity by creating and then recognizing an independent Kosovo. Also, the United Sates violated the principle when it supported the separation of South Sudan from Sudan, Eritrea from Ethiopia, and East Timor from Indonesia.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jack_F._Matlock_Jr.
[2] https://www.krasnoevents.com/uploads/1/1/6/6/116679777/krasn...