This argument is not very convincing in my opinion, as it looks like Apple is purchasing ads for brand keywords. If the ad wasn't there, the customer would go to the brands website, which would be ranked #1 without the ad.
Or the the developer would run their own ad.
But those are very different propositions to a middle man running a ‘genuine’ ad which simply takes a cut.
Also neglected for consideration: the developer doesn’t pay for these ads - and the scarcity isn’t high enough to meaningfully affect bid pricing over regular competition.
Sure, they still make profit from the Apple signup, but less than they would have done if people were signing up from their website.
Needless to say if the App Store price is increased 1:1 to match so the developer definitely doesn't lose, it's a terrible deal for the consumer instead (if you're Googling, it's not even like Apple can claim the App Store is adding value with simplicity of discovery...)
It's about Apple driving up the user acquisition costs for these companies so much so that it become entirely uneconomical for them to buy ads that direct users to their own websites, and instead the campaigns that target users to download the app - which results in 30%-to-Apple IAP subscriptions - become much more attractive again. So Apple is trying to make the cost of running these ads so prohibitive to the companies that they stop trying to drive web subscriptions and instead go back to driving app subscriptions only, where Apple gets 30% of everything.
As you can see it's even more sinister than it first appears - it's not a short term land grab, it's a long term strategy to prevent developers from legitimately acquiring users outside of Apple’s walled garden.
(Looking at the economics make this even more clear. Let's say Tinder has a $100 subscriber LTV (lifetime value). If the user purchases the subscription in the app, Apple takes $30 of that, so if Tinder wants to run a marketing campaign on Google, Facebook, etc that drives an app install, they can't pay more than $70, otherwise their spend has a negative margin.
On the other hand, if tinder can use these ads to get people to subscribe on the Tinder website, they have a ~$97 LTV ($100 minus 3% payment processing fee via stripe/adyen/etc). So now they can run a campaign on Google where they can spend up to $97 to acquire a user, much more than the $70 before. And because Google and Facebook inventory availability scales non-linearly with your maximum bid, a 38% increase in acquisition cost allowable could mean a 100% increase in available inventory, and potentially higher quality inventory at that.
But if Apple - with their unlimited cash pile and not caring about negative margins - comes in and soaks up all this inventory by bidding the same $97 for every user, all of a sudden the cost for Tinder to acquire these users goes way up and becomes negative margin. At that point, the rationale thing for tinder to do is stop running these campaigns. This means they stop getting web subscriptions, stop diversifying their business away from Apple, and Apple maintains its iron grip on Tinder.
Remember, in this case Apple is paying $97 to acquire a user who will generate $30 for them (30% of the $100 LTV), so they're massively in the hole on this spend. But they don't care because their goal isn't to profitably acquire users; their goal is to make the costs for Tinder to create a more diversified business so high that Tinder stops trying to. That's some f-ed up sh*t.
The problem is that what you describe is the short term positive impact to Tinder. But that’s far outweighed by the long term negative of having your whole business dependent on the whims of Apple. For example, anytime Tinder wants to make an app update, Apple has to approve it. Well, if Tinder goes after Apple with regulators by filing complaints and pointing to antitrust violations, Apple now has the power to mess with Tinders business. Or if Tinder wanted to offer its users a 20% discount as an inducement to subscribe directly with Tinder rather than through Apple, Apple can and does prevent them from doing that right now by refusing to allow Tinder (or any developer) to reference in the app the fact that lower prices can be achieved by subscribing via web. The examples are countless, but essentially the more reliant Tinder is on Apple, the worse for Tinder and the better for Apple.
Thanks ;-). I wasn’t sure there wasn’t something I was missing.
> the more reliant Tinder is on Apple, the worse for Tinder and the better for Apple.
So you’re saying that the long-term impact for going through Apple IAPs isn’t just the 30% margin, but also increased reliance on Apple, and less knowledge about their customer base? That makes sense, I get why Tinder wouldn’t want that. Thank you :-)
* Apple has a higher LTV estimate than Tinder for this traffic.
* Tinder has less available capital, so they are not able to outbid Apple even though they think that they would still earn lots of money at that price.
* Perhaps someone who is looking to subscribe to Tinder is likely to succeed even without advertising, but without Apple's ads it won't be via Apple's IAP. The amount it's worth to Tinder for a subscriber to come to them directly instead of via Apple and the amount it's worth to Apple for a subscriber to come in via IAP are about the same.
(Disclosure: I work on ads at Google, but not search ads. Speaking only for myself)
As to your bulletes points:
- Tinder is owned by Match Group who - before Tinder - spent 20 years building a paid acqusition machine. In order to do paid acquisition you have to deeply understand the LTV of your users. That methodology, refined iver years at Match was ported to Tinder (just read Matchs earnings calls). While Apple has access to all ybe transaction data of apps on iOS, so do then defelopers, who are highly resourced and highly motivated to understand their LTV/CAC. So no, I dont believe for a second that Applr has an advantage here. And even if they did, applr only collects 30% of the revenues - how could they ever guy profitable when bidding for the same slots as the developers who Are getting 70%?
- Capital - nope. Match produced close to a billion dollars a year in cash flow. HBO billions. Capital isn't an issue for either of them.
- I disproves this hypothesis with the LTV illustration above. To be clear: Theres no scenario where apple can be profitable on this spend when they can only ever get 30% of what the consumer spends.
a) They can click through to a Tinder site, where they subscribe directly.
b) They can click through to the App Store, where they end up subscribing via Apple's in-app purchases. Apple gets a 30% cut.
Assuming your $100 LTV from before, in (a) Tinder makes $97 and Apple makes $0 while in (b) Tinder makes $70 and Apple makes $27. Tinder clearly prefers (a) while Apple prefers (b), but by how much?
Tinder: they make $97 - $70 = $27 more in (a)
Apple: they make $27 - 0 = $27 more in (b)
This means both companies are willing to bid approximately the same amount, since their profit on winning, relative to what would've happened otherwise, is $27.
Any marginal conversion that Tinder creates (either against a competitor or non-consumption) is worth over $50 net to them using Apple payments. ($50 would assume a generous $20 marginal cost to serve.)
That doesn’t mean that the data that Tinder’s ROAS team is looking at will guide them to spend more than $27 in this case, only that it might.
Likewise Apple could spend $27 on every customer they converted who was already going to be paying Tinder on the web to buying via the App Store plus $27 for every user they added to Tinder who paid on the App Store who would have not bought or would have gone to a competitor (minus any credit Apple would have earned there) plus an amount of cashflow and enterprise value created by people seeing ads for Apple’s store and concluding that Apple has more/better apps than their competitors.
If we confine only to first-order effects and assume advertising is exclusively about changing payment preferences of users who would convert anyway, I’d expect both companies to be willing to bid close to $27.
I mean, maybe if tinder's margin was less than apples, but that's pretty unlikely.
If they’re both bidding on the same keywords, which they are, then the price of the keywords is the same to each of them. It’s an auction, so whoever bids the most will win the auction. The developer can spend up to $97 to bid on that keyword and still be profitable or at worst break even, while apple can only spend up to $30 to stay profitable or break even. So if Apple is winning auctions, it means they’re spending more than the developer, despite having less than half the purchasing power of the developer. So they’re spending negatively almost no matter what.
1) more demand in auctions means higher prices. so if apple is taking the second slot they’re almost certainly increasing the cost of the 1st slot for hbo. which is apples whole point: to increase the cost (literal and figurative) of hbo’s efforts to get people to sign up via web rather than via app.
2) in the world of search marketing - including both on google and the app store - there is a strong belief by brands that they MUST be the #1 paid result for their branded search terms, no matter what. so what you’re seeing here is hbo saying “we always have to be #1 on our branded search no matter the cost”. This is exactly why people complain constantly about google showing competitors ads when the original company’s brand is specifically searched for by the user - effectively the competitor is freeloading on the incumbents brand searches to drive traffic (by paying to show ads on those searches). Google doesn’t care because they make more money this way (more competition for the branded keyword drives up CPCs).
all of this is to say that apple being in the #2 slot doesn’t say anything about the intent of their actions here, which is to make it uneconomical for companies to move users off apples rails onto their own systems.
Maybe Apple clears 15% of the user's purchase price after credit processing, tied-in platform development costs, customer service/hosting fees, and the 70% payout to HBO, and HBO clears 15% after licensing, hosting, app development costs and the 30% fee from Apple.
In this case, HBO would be motivated to have a website sign-up to raise their 15% to closer to 40%, and Apple would be motivated because otherwise they are negative for the lifetime of the subscription.
Tinder in this example is still getting the customer. Google is still getting paid.
So the moment Apple stops buying the ads, they’re both ready to participate again. So how is it a long term play?
And even your last point is not wrong: at some point Apple may stop doing this. But that could be year's away, and in the meantime, they're throwing their big stack around to make it too costly for developers - who Apple supposedly partners with - to build businesses that are less dependent on Apple’s whims. Plus, Apple uses the fact that most subscribers to app store products subscribe on the app store itself to bolster their case with regulators that no reform is needed bc consumers are overwhelmingly happy to use Apple’s IAP systems. But if Apple is putting it's finger on the scales in order to actively drive users away from web subscriptions, then they heavily misleading these regulators about the true “choices” consumers are making.
I think we can assume Apple is getting enough out of it to run this scheme permanently.
Unlike Tinder, they can get extra revenue from the user staying in the ecosystem (active credit card registered for IAP), getting used to Apple’s service, and keep buying Apple devices. Their LTV of the user is not just the 30% cut.
For instance any other seller of your book is affected, so you potentially lose distribution channels.
Customers also get attracted to Amazon, but your book is only seen as a bait, and when it goes back at the regular price it will be less desirable (some will have negative feelings of having missed the sale, some will keep seeing your book as something only worth giving away).
If your book has a short shelf life and you didn’t expect much of it, or if it’s a stepping stone into a series and you could have given it away anyway, Amazon footing the bill is a boon. Otherwise it probably shortens the life of your book.
This was specifically re: Amazon using a trademark in AdWords to redirect sales to Amazon, where they then of course also sell competitor products.
This might be moot of course if you granted Apple rights to your trademark in whatever agreements, but then these agreements are also frequently found inapplicable so ymmv.
They say that their app store not allowing side loading is for user safety.
In actuality, it forces the brand/company/startup into a place where they're completely shackled. They pay 30% taxes, have no customer relationship, and have to step through every hoop to satisfy apple.
The handicap their browser so you can't get new runtimes or deploy software via alternate means. Good luck launching your media startup on iPhone without an app.
Now this. They're clearly trying to gobble up any interest in other apps and force them into the payment shackles.
This is a fucking monopoly! Please stop this, department of justice! Apple has undue power in computing! Every company has to go through them to reach 50% of consumers, and apple is extorting us!
Apple says you're welcome to go to consumers another way, and then they do this. Look at their actions.
-- the person currently in charge of the DOJ, when running for office, speaking to donors.
Here, Apple is helping certain "preferred" iOS app developers win against other iOS app developers. Apple stands to profit, the preferred developers stand to profit, but not other developers (and possibly users who will never discover their apps).
There, Google was helping Google Ads users, i.e., "preferred" DoubleClick AdX auction participants, to win against other participants in AdX auctions. Google profits (and brags about it in its internal presentations), Google Ad users may profit, but not the users of Google Ad alternatives.
Big Tech wants to facilitate "winner-take-all" scenarios. Healthy competition and parity amongst competitors (for user attention) reduces the profitability of the "tech" company business model. Big Tech would rather that user attention only be focused on what is most popular, creating more desirability to advertise to that single audience. A "Top 20" mobile app list, or top of page 1 of SERPs.
Concentration of web traffic, 80/20, network effects, and so on. Winner-take-all. The most ideal conditions for selling apps or ad services. The issue is not that they are doing this, it is in how are they doing it. They run and control the so-called "platforms" for advertising and sales and use that privileged position to manipulate outcomes that favour themselves. (And stifle competitors.)
We obviously know why Apple is doing it and why the apps in question don't like it.
But a couple things occurred to me:
You could view this like Amazon giving away your book or android app in a promotion. As I understand it, they still pay the author as if it were a sale, so the author seemingly has nothong to complain about. Even that still seems wrong to me but that's the argument Amazon uses. That is essentially, no, litterally, Amazon advertizing your product for their own purposes.
Another argument Apple and Apple devotees and general "invisible hand" worshippers may try to use is: Any sales generated by the ads would not have existed without the ad, and so it's not taking anything from the app developer.
I don't really buy either theory, but it does take some thinking to describe a mechanism by which they cause harm and should be considered invalid.
They hold enough water to convince a lot of people who want to be convinced, and the arguments against just sound kind of weak and whiny.