It's a (weak) proof of ownership of such passport -- it has to be present to be read.
Some id cards can also function as smartcards and provide kind of challenge-response proof, which is better compared to reading signed document (which can turn out to be a copy).
>I presume the British government does own a database of the passports they issued, so this isn't news to them.
Actually maybe the don't.
It had to exist to be read once at some unknown point in the past, but the government already knows it exists because they issued it. Anything more (such as "it is present now") is speculation.
Cloning static data from NFC readers is something a physical penetration testing team does. Stand near employee in coffee shop, their ID badge says "Hi I'm employee badge #123456789 for site #98765" and you clone that, then walk in later, "Hi I'm employee badge #123456789 for site #98765" says your fake badge with your picture on it. Is it better than nothing? Yes. Would I like my government to aim a bit higher than "Enough know-how to bluff your way into a mid-size corp headquarters building" ? Yes please.
> Actually maybe the don't.
The UK government will issue you one document based on records from another document so long as it's timely. For example when my photo driving license expires, I just renew it with the photo from my new passport. Some people do the opposite way around. You can't renew everything forever because your photo expires and you need to provide a new one that resembles the previous one except now you're older. But the fact they can do this means they do have those records.
Even the resemblance checking presumably means somewhere a minimum wage employee is being shown pairs of images, "Young white guy with freckles and a beard" + "Older white guy, same freckles, no beard" => OK pass unless somebody has drunk way too much ML kool aid, but that can only work if they have the records.
Which is why I wrote "(weak)", as I don't know if the document in question supports active challenge-response or not. I have one that does (passport) and one that doesn't (id).
You’re talking about accessing someone’s house here. I don’t know anyone that carries their passport around.
It’s something you’ll have to deal with anyway, since you cannot issue new passports to your entire population. Not to mention those people that don’t have one in the first place.
> But the fact they can do this means they do have those records.
They certainly have all the records somewhere. But do they have all of them in the same place?
I'd guess that a high majority of passport owners do indeed carry them around when they travel, and places such as airports would be a fairly easy way to find such people carrying their passports.
A yubico device can say "I'm still the same security key that was enrolled" but it doesn't say at enrolment "I am being used by Fred Jones of <address> with passport no 123, NiNo ABC".
GDS verify / government gateway do support 'authenticators' (typically password + totp) to provide a level of assurance that the person logging into the account is the person the account belongs to.
The "document check" is part of the identity bit. That is, how confident are we that the person creating this account / performing this action is who they say they are and can do this thing or see that information. The document check is part of their solution but other parts are supposed to layer on top of it to provide a proportionate level of assurance. e.g. a video of you holding up the passport to check that it's you using it or asking you to provide answers to details you already have like 'how much tax did you pay last year' or checking multiple documents.
> I presume the British government does own a database of the passports they issued, so this isn't news to them.
The passport office (part of the Home Office) own that database. Part of this work is basically a web service to that database for the rest of the government to use.
A remote passport check might be suitable to claim an identity assurance level of 2, say, while getting to identity assurance level 3 would need an in-person visit with multiple forms of other government identification records.
In that way you might then constrain some actions to be taken remotely only by users who have provided strong assurance of their identity at enrollment (even if they login with strong non-phishable authentication... doesn't matter that the auth is ironclad if the user's identity is muddy).
> SP 800-63-3: Digital Identity Guidelines https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-63-3
> SP 800-63A: Enrollment and Identity Proofing https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-63a
> SP 800-63B: Authentication and Lifecycle Management https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-63b
> SP 800-63C: Federation and Assertions https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-63c
1. Verifies that you have the passport
2. Provides biometric info
Of course neither of these are a 100% guarantee of identity. (1) doesn't account for stolen or lost documents. (2) is only useful if the app doing verification is tamperproof and the camera isn't fooled by holding up a photo of you etc. However _nothing_ is a 100% guarantee. These steps, plus any other verification that's going on, can make it very hard to fake ID, which is all we are really able to hope for with these systems.
Because the data is static, it doesn't do that. It only verifies that you know the static passport data.
This was a key problem with the old magnetic stripe credit cards. You could easily clone the stripe. I don't see any substantial obstacle to cloning an NFC passport chip.
2. Provides biometric info
Sure, that is useful, but, this is a government application. The government does have this biometric info, that's why it's baked inside the passports. So this isn't something the passport is enabling for the government.
The caveat is that it's optional-- not all passports support it, and thus there are possible (depending on the reader software) downgrade attacks where a passport with active authentication could be cloned anyways if you can convince the reader not to perform the authentication step. And there are bad hardware implementations out there that don't adequately protect the private key material (leaving them susceptible to cloning anyways).
The key you need is basically the bottom row of the MRZ in your passport, the way a real system does this is to look at the photo page in your password, read the MRZ from it and use that to unlock the NFC chip. This feels intuitively reasonable since you either handed over the passport for inspection, or you showed the photo and identity page to an inspector, either of which reveals the same facts as the chip (by default).
So, we're not talking high entropy keys here. But, this is a real practical barrier compared to the badge cloning. It probably means, "Brush past somebody in a queue to clone their passport" is not in fact practical. On the other hand, if you ever have legitimate access you have enduring credentials, so that's not great.
Is it possible to fool? Like anything it is a trade-off. Acceptable security for an acceptable cost. Hopefully it fulfills your security requirements and you saved a physical visit.
But, the problem here is that the issuer is the British government, so, what are you proving? "Here, you issued this passport". "Oh yes, so we did". I presume the British government does own a database of the passports they issued, so this isn't news to them.
A modestly smart device, such as a Yubico device, is capable of providing fresh proof of its identity. My Security Key doesn't prove "The security key that enrolled me with GitHub in fact exists" which is redundant - but "I am still the same security key that you enrolled". However the passport can't do that, your passport is inert, and the fact that Sarah Smith existed isn't the thing you presumably want to prove to a single-sign-on service. You want to prove that you are Sarah Smith, something the passport doesn't really do.
I think the GDS ignores this problem, which is to be fair no worse than lots of other systems, but the result isn't actually what it seems to be, all the digital technology isn't actually proving anybody's identity in this space.
It reminds me of the bad old days of the Web PKI where it was found that the "email validation" being used would accept automated "virus checking" of email. A CA sends the "Are you sure you want to issue a cert for mycorp.example?" message to [email protected] and even though Somebody is on vacation in Barbados for two weeks, the automatic "virus" check reads the URL out of the email, follows it, ignores the page saying "Success, your certificate has been issued" and passes it to Somebody's inbox... All the "security" is doing what it was designed to do, but, what it was designed to do isn't what it should have been designed to do, and so it's futile.