Suboptimal and an inefficient use of resources, yes, but possibly the only way to combat bots without privacy intrusive services. I'm open to hearing alternative ideas, though!
Bots will trend towards resembling real users exactly.
All you can really do is make it expensive for a bot to spam requests. Everything else will be identical to humans one day, and in the meantime it's annoying to block legit Tor users or legit scraper bots.
With a PoW captcha, it doesn't matter how smart you make your algorithm, it's still going to be slow. With existing systems I'd argue it's probably a lot slower for people than for machines, especially since it's people guessing what a machine thinks people would classify an image as.
This is an easy solution for rate limiting low trust/high risk connections and better software isn't going to magically make it any faster. This has always been what captchas aim to accomplish.
Hell, charge me one penny per refresh and a dime per tweet and login attempt. Then let the bots run freely if they're willing to pay that rate.
Seems like this might exclude users lower-end electronics that might be low-income.
You can have it turn itself off during a normal "1 request per minute" day on a small blog and then crank up to "A new CPU needs 2 seconds" during a DDOS.
Use token bucket or leaky bucket or whatever so a few normal users clicking around for 10 minutes won't trigger it, but after a while the server runs out of patience if they keep making requests faster.
Check out this guy on YouTube, he can pretty much open any lock in thirty seconds without causing any physical damage, will change your whole perspective on security.
https://youtube.com/c/lockpickinglawyer
It’s better to plan for people getting in then depend on preventing it.
If someone wants to make 10,000 accounts, I'd rather it cost them 5 cents per captcha solve, $500, than for it to be free.
Some attackers can make it pay off, but many can't, so they don't try. That makes my life easier, as I'm the one being paged during an attack.
I assume attacker doesn't need the accounts immediately. I also assume that a real user will wait at most 10 seconds when creating an account on their old underpowered phone.
So the attacker could either wait 27 hours (10*10000 seconds) to do the attack, which for most attacks wont matter much. Or they could use some high powered aws instance that's 100x as powerful as the phone and wait a few mins (aws pricing aint that bad if you just need 5 min of compute time).
Yes it increases "costs" but not by very much and not in a way that scales
Then you just need to make sure your algorithm is also space-hard and resists parallelization so GPUs and ASICs can't get it.
Basically it's a password hash, like Argon2. I think libsodium already has an official WebAsm build, so there you go.
Web browsers also have "crypto.subtle" but it's not allowed on file:// (making testing on local difficult) and I don't know if it has password hashing.
Generating 1MM units of PoW will always be more efficient than 1MM people generating each 1 unit of PoW.
Optimization always works better at scale. Therefore an attacker always has the upper hand.
PoW is absolutely useless as a CAPTCHA and doesn't even do what C.A.P.T.C.H.A. says.
It is true that it can still be annoying for extra CPU work though (and may waste energy), and if they both disabled scripts/workers and also won't or can't do otherwise despite that it will still be denied access.
Turns out when you zoom a picture in far enough, large bus windows, train windows, and building windows all look very similar.
There are obviously UX challenges to making it easy to acquire the crypto, but I could imagine this starting as an optional alternative to captchas.
Yea micropayments were Satoshi's vision. For example you could pay like 1/100 of a cent to unlock and bypass captcha puzzle.