Flying light aircraft, I was taught to avoid landing right in the touchdown zone just to have better traction. I'm not sure if this is actually useful or just Old Pilot Superstition but it has some logic to it, and putting a Skyhawk down on a 14k foot runway you have a lot of room for eccentric opinions (similar to landing just a touch off centerline so the nosewheel isn't on the painted stripes, another one I've heard people mention as a "best bad practice").
I think there's a lot of Old Pilot Superstition with more than a dollop of truth in it.
This was to avoid upsetting the passengers and to ensure the champagne didn't get shaken too much.
Even a passive design with the shape of the tread could help substantially reduce the amount of rubber scraped off the wheel on each landing.
That is not to say that some clever physical design could not help. But the idea of spinning up wheels is well-known to gear engineers. Tire wear is a substantial expense, so any bright ideas would be welcomed, and eventually tried out.
Suppose your stuff got the tire spinning at the circumferential rate of 20 knots. The plane touches down at 130+ knots. Is the decrease in rubber deposited noticeable? How fast would you need the tire to be spinning to make a noticeable difference? How much does your extra apparatus weigh? How much extra space does it take in the wheel well?
The extra weight has to be carried throughout the flight. Space in the wheel well is tightly constrained, because it is near the center of gravity of the aircraft, where cargo space is most valuable, and where the wing spar crosses through the fuselage.
Everybody thinks of spinning up wheels. Thus far nobody has had answers to the questions that led to acting on the idea.
Just to clarify for others, this is the same runway but taken in two different directions (west to east and east to west, multiply the number by 10 and you get [rounded] angle in degree, so 100ish vs 280ish). It's 8500 ft. long and it looks like there was a loss of performance around the "touchdown" point of going the other way on that runway, where you had accumulated rubber from those landings (which is pretty normal and monitored, as pointed by leecb below), if that makes any sense.
Rubber accumulation on runways is a normal and expected situation. Part of runway maintenance at airports serving larger aircraft includes regular removal of the rubber using high pressure water or chemicals.
Here's a snapshot of one of the Zurich runways: https://www.google.com/maps/@47.4792249,8.5411849,660m/data=...
Scroll a little NW or SE to see what the actual color of the runway is underneath all the rubber.
« With three FCPCs inoperative, actual remaining runway distance (30 feet margin) of the occurrence flight was shorter than the calculated value (172 feet margin), possibly due to tailwinds, runway conditions, and manual braking as these factors might increase the braking distance. »
I get sucked into how all the little things that are not right make such a big difference in these kind of scenarios.
There is a lot that practices involving life critical complex systems can teach other fields.
Four hopefully independent things went wrong here: three computer failures plus less-than-documented braking performance. Additionally, there were at least two aggravating circumstances: wet conditions and a tailwind landing. Part of the investigation is to find out if there was a fourth or fifth system failure (poor pilot reaction time? Rubber level on the runway unacceptable? Either is plausible, but far from indicated by the report so far).
One extra thing going wrong here, in the wrong direction (anything that impaired braking or pilot reaction time) would likely have led to loss of life. Investigating near misses like this, and not only being exercised once five things go wrong and a hundred people die, is a sign of a healthy safety culture.
If the deceleration varied as much as the report said, then the passengers probably could tell. That was very different from a normal landing. If that wasn't enough, being towed to the terminal might have given them another clue.
> One extra thing going wrong here, in the wrong direction (anything that impaired braking or pilot reaction time) would likely have led to loss of life.
Well, it would have lead to the plane running off the end of the runway. What's past the end of that particular runway? A cliff? A river? Or just another 100 meters of grass leading up to a perimeter fence, then more flat ground for some distance beyond it? If it doesn't overrun the runway too far (say, 100 or 200 meters), no, that doesn't seem likely to lead to loss of life - not unless there's some specific hazard there.
Regardless, that's one to be considered another aggravating circumstance, not an additional failure. When deciding whether this was a close call, you can treat it as if every runway is wet and in a permanent tailwind and immediately followed by a wooden building full of schoolchildren.
And you don't put wooden buildings full of schoolchildren immediately past the end of runways.
Edit: Accessible version of the article here. https://books.google.co.in/books?id=2gk-2rP34LIC&pg=RA2-PA14...
Off topic but I found this very interesting « The deceleration performance of the occurrence flight between 6,600 feet and 7,300 feet from the threshold of runway 10 deteriorated. It may be due to paint marking and rubber deposit on the touchdown zone of runway 28. »