Source: https://www.thestreet.com/investing/palantir-shares-data-acc...

As a sidenote I actually find all the new warnings and stuff annoying (but I'm not saying it isn't worth it all things considered). As a developer I'm quite used to having to pay attention to details already - one typo can be disastrous and there might be no warning (you might say but that is what a proper CI process is for and testing but what if that typo is in the CI process or tests?)

Palantir just made the privacy shotgun, and FBI gave the bullets, but it's the user who pulled the trigger.

https://youtu.be/b9eXYOA8TCk?t=117

FUNCTIONING AS DESIGNED

Yeah, the headline of the article immediately brought to mind an IT system built by a data-hoovering oversight-averse FBI funded to self-develop a system to protect that data and enforce oversight would not... quite... close the loop.

Complaining publicly has no downsides for palantir here.

The complaint can have a real ramifications ( loss of future contracts and so on ). That said, at certain point enough is enough I suppose.

Whether the government purchased a defective product that was insecure or misused a good product, the government should be held to account for the failure, same as with any company.

> Griffith is accused of violating international sanctions by traveling to North Korea and delivering a speech about cryptocurrency.

> He is charged with helping North Korea circumvent sanctions through the use of crypto.

They uploaded (AFAICT, lawfully obtained) evidence into their FBI-wide system, then it appeared in search results legitimately because there was a crossover with another investigation.

The whole point of criminal intelligence systems is to reveal these kinds of unexpected links isn't it?

Does the warrant get granted with some kind of limitations on how the material can be used or who can review it?

Obviously, they have done something wrong as they have apparently felt the need to send a mea culpa to the court, but I don't really see what it is.

Yes.

the glitch is that we allow companies like Palantir to exist.

If this is really how Palantir works, that's pretty bad. Software that's specifically designed and implemented for the FBI should not default to "share with all". And it should have guardrails to nudge users to be careful about permissions whenever they're adding data.

The non tech companies can't compete. So the complete lack of competition means fat profits for not very good tech and services.

Whenever I see statements like this I have to wonder what people think Palantir’s software does. By your logic Microsoft Windows supports the killing of people since gov agencies use that too.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artificial_intelligence_arms...

http://artificialintelligencemania.com/2020/01/08/palantir-t...

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Atomics_MQ-1_Predato...

Care to apologize?

Edit: I'll also add that there are thousands of little Palantirs you've never heard of, taking off the shelf tech, integrating it, and satisfying the needs of the 3 letter agencies. Palantir is big so they get the attention, but they're not that important in the scheme of things.

And of course we have the nightmare scenario in Afghanistan with a US database falling into the hands of the Taliban. Hoping that only "the right people" have access is the worst form of assurance against abuse.

Hard to overstate this one. So more leaks is not, by itself, enough to make changes happen.

Then nobody can prove who/what/why data was illegally accessed.

And if some judge forces you to turn over those 24 hours worth of logs, you fix the ACL's and respond to the judge tomorrow, when the logs show nothing unwanted.

B) The FBI doesn't keep logs of who accessed what because a judge wants it. They keep logs on who accessed what because they want to know who leaked documents to reporters. Something like the Fincen Files leak: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FinCEN_Files is investigated by figuring out everyone who opened the files in question.

The FBI has even more important information than this, in particular the identities of confidential informants and undercover agents. Those cases are actually more complex because they are highly protected- with good reason, if someone unauthorized accesses this data it can get people killed- but desperately need to deconflict: there have been cases where a FBI office in City A was using a undercover agent to try and trap drug smugglers in City B, while a confidential informant in City B was trying to trap gun runners in City A, and no actual criminals were involved.