News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:macOS 11’s hidden security improvements by azinman2 on Friday August 20, 2021 @04:55PM (#28251307)
You can always disable CSR/SIP generally. macOS is unlike iOS in that many security mitigations can be disabled. The fact that new M1 Macs let you side load a diff non-Apple in iOS should be the ultimate proof you need of this motivation to allow user control on Macs.
Re:macOS 11’s hidden security improvements by GekkePrutser on Friday August 20, 2021 @06:02PM (#28251902)
Yes you can disable it, but then you disable it completely and totally. There is no middle ground. Most of the time these things are totally great ideas. Apple is doing really great work on the security front for sure. It's just what they lack is a way to customise them. Most security improvements they make involve giving Apple the keys and them alone. It doesn't have to be that way.

For example I would want to be able to just make an exception for some of the files I want to change.

Re:macOS 11’s hidden security improvements by Klonoar on Friday August 20, 2021 @06:11PM (#28251976)
There actually is a middle ground, in some cases - csrutil can, for instance, allow you to disable unsigned kext blocking but keep the rest of SIP enabled.
Re:macOS 11’s hidden security improvements by GekkePrutser on Friday August 20, 2021 @06:17PM (#28252020)
I thought those were entirely separate things? There's now a GUI option for the unsigned kernel extension block (in the startup security utility). I don't think that's part of SIP per se. It's also the one you need to run any other OS. Whereas SIP is a thing within the OS itself as far as I know. But I have to admit this is where my knowledge gets fuzzy :)

The kind of control I'd want is allowing to add a signator for approved kernel extensions. So that I could add my own key and sign kernel extensions myself. Or trust another party to do this. Just like you can add your own keys to Secure Boot on a PC. The same with the app notarisation. Another feature that's essentially great, but fully under the control of Apple. For example, as a corporate admin it'd be great to be able to notarise which apps I'd allow our employees to use.

These security tools would be super powerful and useful if we would be allowed to configure them more.

Re:macOS 11’s hidden security improvements by easton on Friday August 20, 2021 @07:58PM (#28252731)
If you’re a corporate admin you can whitelist kernel extensions via MDM, maybe that would help?

https://support.apple.com/guide/mdm/kernel-extension-policy-...

Re:macOS 11’s hidden security improvements by GekkePrutser on Saturday August 21, 2021 @08:58AM (#28256629)
I know! And I do (it prevents popping up a user with a gazillion prompts to accept when they enrol)

But this is just kernel extension stuff. We know users use some software (not with kernel or system extensions) that's not allowed in our environment. Zoom for example (people are allowed to use it in the browser only for contact with external parties but many people install the full thing anyway). Our security department has banned the full client because of the backdoor it introduced.

Right now we mark it as malware in our antivirus, but it would be great to be able to prevent it altogether.

Re:macOS 11’s hidden security improvements by beermonster on Saturday August 21, 2021 @05:17AM (#28255474)
Many years ago, when it wasn’t possible to set a strong iPhone password, I worked out I could construct an Exchange ActiveSync profile enabling a strong password policy instead of a four digit number. I didn’t have a corporate Exchange server so I pushed it to the device using the fantastic and open source z-push. A strange length to have to go to mind. I also used this method to force full device encryption and wiping device after 10 failed attempts.

All of these are now possible to configure in settings now and device encryption is on by default.

Re:macOS 11’s hidden security improvements by jchw on Friday August 20, 2021 @05:14PM (#28251488)
If one mentions Android’s “openness” as a plus, people (rightly) point out that sure, it is technically open source and you can often sideload, but that doesn’t mean it is friendly towards those things necessarily. A lot of downsides come with rooting and bootloader unlocking after all. That is when comparing to iOS, which is more restrictive than macOS, as you point out.

I mention this because I think that it’s good Apple lets you use some of the hardware you own with relatively little restriction if you so choose, but it is a lot less practical than the previous status quo and other systems. You definitely lose some functionality (on M1, I believe you lose at least iOS application support.) If we’re going to be frank about it with Android, I think it’s fair to be frank about it with macOS/M1.

I would guess things could be better if user choice was as much of a focus as vendor control.

Re:macOS 11’s hidden security improvements by ChuckNorris89 on Friday August 20, 2021 @06:03PM (#28251916)
>A lot of downsides come with rooting and bootloader unlocking after all.

I think you might be confused. You don't need to root or unlock the bootloader on an Android device to side load apps. Just download desired APK and accept the security prompt of installing from unknown sources. It's literally that easy.

Re:macOS 11’s hidden security improvements by eropple on Friday August 20, 2021 @06:13PM (#28252002)
Those applications can't get root, though, and that does limit user control of the device.

(I used to root Android phones in the 4.x days, and then stopped, and then went back to iOS as I found myself doing progressively less and less with my phone.)

Re:macOS 11’s hidden security improvements by upbeat_general on Friday August 20, 2021 @05:13PM (#28251475)
Except doing so doesn’t let you run iOS apps and not to mention is a pain to do so after every update (I believe SSV requires that).

The list of things to disable seems to grow every year. Even with Gatekeeper, CSR/SIP disabled I’ll still have issues opening applications which may (or may not) be fixed by taking it out of quarantine, changing the signature, etc

Re:macOS 11’s hidden security improvements by saagarjha on Friday August 20, 2021 @05:32PM (#28251659)
You can disable SIP once and it will stay off (although maybe not if you do a full system update).
Re:macOS 11’s hidden security improvements by cma on Friday August 20, 2021 @06:41PM (#28252210)
Won't the next update still wipe out your system changes, putting you back to insecure openssh password auth, etc., or do they have a system to merge your changes over now?
Re:macOS 11’s hidden security improvements by GekkePrutser on Friday August 20, 2021 @07:53PM (#28252706)
Exactly. This is the #1 problem I have with the implementation: I want to set up public-key authentication as the only option on openssh ("Remote Login").
Re:macOS 11’s hidden security improvements by dev_tty01 on Friday August 20, 2021 @11:39PM (#28253966)
You create and run one fixup script as root to modify /etc/ssh/sshd_config. That is root writable and not protected by SIP. It is a tiny hassle, but really no big deal. The fixup script can handle any of these cases, assuming they are in config files that are writable.